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I. Introduction
The purpose  of this paper is to survey the role of investment  incentives  in developing  countries. The use
of investment  incentives is by no means unique to developing  countries.  Industrialszed  countries also
make widespread  use of such incentives,  and they take a wide variety of forms.  Yet, there are some key
forms of  incentives which are especially common in developing countries as well as some unique
institutional  features which make it worthwhile  addressing  their role separately. Given the number and
types of developing  countries, and their special  economic  features, we cannot  do justice in a single  paper
to the detailed  problems  of each.  Instead,  we take a more general perspective  and focus on what we take
to be a few key characteristics  and effects of investment  incentives  used in developing  countries.
Our paper begins with a broad survey of some of the general design issues  in applying  investment
incentives  in developing  countries. The more common instruments  used for encouraging  investment  in
developing countries are presented.  We then spend some time discussing  the economic rationale for
providing special investment  incentives  rather than simply letting the unfettered market determine the
allocation of resources to investment. The issue is one of examining  the possible sources of capital
market failure in developing countries, and asking whether these can form a basis for encouraging
investment. Some of these reasons reflect special features of developing  countries, including  problems
of information  and uncertainty, the important  role investment  plays in the growth process, and the heavy
reliance  on foreign-owned  capital.  Particular  attention is paid to outlining  the role of the corporate tax
since many incentives  are delivered  through that tax system.
We then turn to a discussion of how to measure the impact of investment  incentives.  This
involves  adopting  the methodology  of marginal  effective  tax rates to the institutional  setting of developing
countries. Some of the problems  encountered  in providing  investment  incentives  there become clear in-2  -
this discussion. These include  particularly  the problems  of providing  investment  incentives  in economies
in which a good deal of investment  takes place in risky activities, in firms which are in a loss position,
and in which foreign capital is important. We illustrate  some of these problems with a case study using
the Malaysian  tax system.
Finally, we provide a summary  of the recent empirical work that has been done to estimate  the
effectveness of investment  incentives  in developing  countries.
H.  Investment Incentives in Developing Countries:  Types of Instruments  and Frequency of Use
A.  Some Issues of General Relevance
As outlined  below, there are a wide variety of types of investment  incentives  used in developing
countries and they might be expected to have differing effects.  Yet, there are a number of common
issues which affect many of these incentives  and which we repeatedly  refer to in the analysis  to follow.
Ihe  purpose of this section is to highlight up front some of the more important of these issues and to
discuss  their relevance for the evaluation  of investment  incentives.
The first of these concerns whether or not the incentives  are discredonary or azuomadc  policy
instruments. Discretionary  investment  incentives  are those which  are Implemented  on a case-by-case  basis
by administrative  decision.  There may, of course, be general rules that the administrators  follow.
However, the decision as to whether to award an incentive  is contingent on administrative  approval.
Automatic  incentives,  on the other hand, are those which are available  to any firms meeting  certain  stated
objective criteria.  Examples include type and size of investment, location  of firm, ownership of firm,
profitability  of firm, etc.
Economists  stress  the advantages  of using automatic  policy instrument whenever  possible. Such
istruments reduce  the uncertainty  attached  to incentives,  reduce the planning  time for investments,  and
reduce the possibility  that non-economic  considerations  or favoritism  will enter the decision. Presumably
they also reduce the costs of administering  the incentives. On the other hand, it could be argued that
discretion allows the administrators  to be more selective in awarding grants and thereby increase the
cost-effectiveness  of them by screening  out infra-marginal  projects.
In practice, the line between  discretionary  and automatic incentives  may not be clear-cut. The
criteria for eligibility  may themselves require administrative  decisions, the more so the more selective
the incentives are intended to be.  Furthermore, administrators will rarely be fully informed about
whether the firms using incentives  are fully entitled to use them.  Enforcement and compliance  will
necessarily  require some administrative  participation. Therefore, incentives  will differ only in the degree-3 -
to which they are non-discretionary. We take the general view that less administrative  discretion is a
good thing.
Another general issue concerns the it treatnent  of tax losm  flims.  Many incentives operate
through the tax system and ultimately influence the firm by affecting the tax liabilities of the firm.
Furthermore, many of  the firms  eligible for  incentives are in  a  non-taxpaying position, if  only
temporarily.  In fact, these may be precisely the types of firms for which incentives would be most
socially beneficial. For firms that are in a non-taxpaying  position, the incentives  will increase the size
of "negative  tax liabilities"  held by the firm. It is important  to know whether  these negative  tax liabilities
are treated  symmetrically  with positive  ones, that is, whether  they actually  give rise to tax refunds  or their
equivalent.
Fuliy symmetric  treatment of positive and negative  tax liabilities  would require refundability  of
all negative  tax liabilities. Failing that, unlimited  carry forward (and backward)  with full interest would
be equivalent  in present  value terms, though it would give rise to a different cash flow for the firm. The
appropriate  interest cost to ensure present value equivalence  would be problematic, however, for firms
which faced  credit constraints  on capital  markets. Partial loss offsetting  measures  might involve  the carry
forward and backward of losses, but probably for a limited time period only and without interest.
Compared with full loss offsetting, this would be like the firm giving an interest-free loan to the
government. Loss  offsetting  provisions  may differ from one component  of the firm's tax base to another.
For example, depreciation  allowances  may be taken at the discretion  of the firm, which is equivalent  to
extending the carry forward of losses arising from this type of capital cost.  Also, some types of
investment  incentives,  such as investment  tax credits, might be refundable  even though other components
of tax liabilities  are not.
Loss offsetting is important  for ensuring that the tax system applies uniformly across different
types of frms.  The sorts of firms that are in a negative  tax liability position would generally include
small growing firms, firms engaged  in large risky projects, and perhaps declining  firms.  Furthermore,
the small growing ones might be in a cash-constrained  position given their relatively large investments
and given  the fact that they may not have established  a reputation  for themselves  on the capital market.
The absence  of full loss offsetting  would tend to discriminate  against risky investments,  precisely  those
that might have a high expected  return.  It would discriminate  against small growing firms that might
already  have a high cost of capital  because of imperfections  on the capital  market.  Anything  short of full
refundability  would serve to worsen  their already tight cash flow position. The absence of refundability
might also postpone  the exit from the market of firms that are declining. They have an incentive  to stay-4-
in business  to write off as many  of their capital  costs As  they can. Finally, refundability  will be important
in cases v.  sre, the credibility of the government is,suspect.  In this case, uncertainty about future
government actions will cause firms to discount future funds from the government relative to those
received up front.  Thus, refundable  investment  tax credits will be more valuable to the firm than the
equivalent  present value of funds received, say, though future tax reductions.
A  third important distinction is between I  temporary and  it permanent incentives.  Some
incentives  may be introduced for a limited length  of time, or they may be available to the firm for only
a fixed period.  In this case, the incentive  may have as its primary effect a change in the timing of the
firm's investment  rather than a change  in the level of its capital  stock in the long run.  On the other hand,
there may be circumstances  in which a temporary incentive  to invest  may have a permanent  effect on the
fortunes of the firm.  Tbis will be the case if there are capital market imperfections  which discriminate
against young firms starting up (e.g., infant industry arguments).
Incentives  may differ in the degree  to which they are it selective  rather than general. Selectivity
may be according to various criteria, such as type of asset, type of sector, ownership, location, etc.  In
the absence  of market inefficiencies,  selectivity  of incentives  will introduce  distortions in the allocation
of capital across sectors.
One final consideration  which is important in evaluating investment  incentives  is the extent to
which capital markets are it open to the rest of the world so capital can flow freely into and out of the
country.  Typically, developing economies will be capital importers and will rely heavily on foreign
investment. 'he  tax treatment of foreign investment  will influence  the incentive for foreign firms to
invest in the host (developing)  country. Furthermore, foreign investors will typically be faced with tax
liabilities  in their home country  and will have opportnities to invest  in alternative  locations. This means
that the interaction  of the host country  tax system with that of the home country one will be important
in detmining  the effectiveness  of investment  incentives. For example, under a system of foreign tax
crediting (where the foreign investor receives a credit in the home country for taxes paid abroad),
investment  incentives  could simply  reduce foreign tax credits of firms operating in the host country  and
have little or no effect on the actual incentive  to invest.
B.  Types of Instruments to Encourage Investment
Developing  countries  have traditionally  given a wide variety of special preferences  to encourage
investment  broadly or in specific sectors and  regions. The most typical of these incentives include tax
rates differentiated over  time,  size, location, ownership and  activity of  firm;  accelerated capital-5  -
consumption  allowances;  and investment  and employment  tax credits and allowances.  These and others
are  briefly discussed in the following  paragraphs. Further details are provided in Appendix  A.
1.  Preferental Tax Rates: Certain types of firms may receive lower tax rates than others, either on a
temporary or on a permanent  basis. The use of preferential tax rates is a blunt instrument  for providing
investment incentives since the  incentive does not  vary  with  the  amount of  investment done.
Furthermore, the  absence of  full loss offsetting provisions often renders the  incentive relatively
ineffective. Also, if marginal  tax rates are already very low, the incentive  effect is minimal.
An extreme  case of this is a tax holiday whereby a firm is tax-free for a given period of time.
Tax holidays  may be awarded  on a discretionary  basis to firms in designated  industries  or areas.  Firms
awarded  tax holidays are typically those  just starting up, and are referred to as "pioneer firms."  This
is a widely-used  incentive in developing  countries, and is currently  practiced in Pakistan, Malaysia,
Morocco, Thailand,  Brazil, Bangladesh.  Lesotho  and Cote d'Ivoire. Of these, Morocco  and Lesotho  have
extended  tax holiday provisions to foreign investors as well.
2.  Investnent  Tax Credits and Allowances: Under an investment  tax credit, companies in a specific
industry, or  more  generally, are allowed as a deduction against their tax liabilities a fraction of
expenditures  on new additions to physical  or R&D capital stock or employment.  T1  credits  can be
granted for specific activities and, by providing a direct subsidy, can be  more effective than rate
reductions. (An investment  allowance  is similar in effect to a tax credit except it is a deduction  from the
taxable income for corporate tax purposes.) The effectiveness  of them depends upon whether  they are
refundable, and therefore provide cash up front to the firm, and, if not, the extent to which they can be
carried forward.  Ihe  less generous the loss offsetting  provisions, the less effective will the incentive
effect  be for firms in a loss position  relative  to others.  These include  firms which are small and growing
and firms which are engaged in risky activities.  Tax credits may be targeted to specific types of
investments,  both tangible  and intangible,  and they may be discretionary  or automatic. They may  reduce
future depreciation  allowances. In the case of foreign subsidiaries, a relevant consideration  is whether
or not the credits are offset by the system  of foreign tax crediting. To the extent that they are, they may
represent at least partly a transfer of tax revenues  to foreign treasuries. An  investment  allowance is a
deduction  from the  taxable  income  for corporate  tax purposes. Mexico, Greece, Pakistan  and Malaysia
permit investment  tax credits. Turkey provides 100% investment  allowance  for priority industries  and
scientific  research and development.-6-
3.  Fast Write-offs: Certain types  of costs may obtain an' fast writeoff.  Most commonly  this is
depreciation  (capital  consumption) allowances  which can be acceierated  (initial allowance),  or can even
be expensed. Intangible  investments  are also commonly  expensed  (R&D, exoloration,  advertising, etc.)
In principle, any type of cost could  be accelerated,  including  financing (interest) costs.  Loss offsetting
provisions  are also relevant  here.  Certain types of write-offs  may be "elective" in the sense that the firm
has some  discretion as to when to claim it. Tbis is particularly attractive  to firms in a loss position  when
carry forward is limited.  Some countries combine  elective depreciation  allowances with tax holidays.
Examples  of acceletarted  depreciation  schemes  include Brazil, which allows 50% or 100% depreciation
in the first year for approved investment  projects that contemplate  2/3 shift operation, and Malaysia,
which allows qualified  expenditures  to be fully expensed  in the first two years.
4.  Financing  Incentives:  The government  may  provide  incentives  which  reduce  the cost of financing
investments. A cash grant would be analogous  to a tax credit in this regard. The cash granted may come
with various strings attached. The government  may provide  financial assistance  through an investment
fund. It may provide cheap loans or it may provide  public sector equity  funds with the associated  equity
participation  of the government. Financing  assistance  may  also be provided  through the tax system. The
flow-through  of tax write-offs to shareholders will be beneficial to firms in a loss position.  Various
methods of imputation of  corporate taxes to  the shareholders will reduce the  cost of  finance to
shareholders. However,  this is not so much  the giving  of an incentive  as a removal of a source of double
taxation.
5.  Employment  Incentives:  While most incentives are directed towards investment, there can be
incentives  for employment  of labour as well.  These could be employment  or wage subsidies, or tax
credits.  Manpower  training programs could also be used.  Mexico is an example of a country which
allows an employment  tax credit.
6.  General  Policy Instruments: In addition to policy instruments  directed specifically  at certain types
of activities,  more general policies  will affect aggreg ze  investment  and its allocation  among  various uses.
Examples  include indirect  taxes, tariffs, and the establishment  of free-trade  zones.  Investments  will also
be influenced  by infrastructure  provided  by the public sector such as industrial  parks, roads, education,
and the like.-7-
7.  Technology  Danfer  Governments  may have in place certain provisions which affect the transfer
of technology  from foreign  firms. These include  equity participation  requirements, nd the tax treatment
of royalties and licenses. As well  the threat of expropriation  and uncertainty  about  future tax policies  will
influence  the incentive  for foreign  investment. More generally, the existence  of uncertainty  makes cash
up front more valuable  than incentives  providing  benefits in the future.
m.  ITe Economnc  Rationale for Investment Incentives
As we have seen, investment  incentives  typically  operate through the tax system either directly
or indirectly.  That is, they ultimately reduce the tax liabilities faced by the firm, especially those
accruing under  the corporation income tax.  A proper evaluation of  incentives requires first  an
understanding  of the role of corporate taxes.  We begin this section by discussing the rationale for
corporate taxes and their optimal design given that rationale.  This is followed by a discussion of the
efficiency  of capital markets and possible sources of market failure.  In light of the latter, the case for
firther intervention  in the form of investment  incentives  is discussed.
A.  The Role of Corporation Income Taxes
Virtually all countries levy direct taxes on corporations. Ultimately, these taxes will be borne
by households  so one might think that it would be ideal to tax households  directly rather than indirectly
through their ownership  of corporations. The essential question  to address is why corporate taxes are
needed at all given the alternative  of0  taxing households  directly using personal taxes (or indirectly  using
sales taxes on their consumption purchases).  Posing the question this iway makes it clear that the
corporate income  tax is essentially  supplementary  to the personal  income tax. It owes its existence  to the
fact that for various reasons an ideal tax system cannot be achieved by personal taxation alone.  It is
usefl  to distinguish  three main reasons for having a corporate tax alongside  personal and commodity
taxes. We refer to these as the withholding  function,  the rent-collecting  function and the revenue-raising
function. We discuss  each in  un.
1.  The WiWolding Funcdon
One way to view the corporate tax is as a withihuAding  device for withholding at source against
equity capital  income  generated  in the corporate  sector. This is the conventional  function  of the corporate
tax, at least in developed  countries. The need for withholding  arises becauise  of the fact that corporate
source income would  not otherwise  be fully taxed on accrual  by the system  of personal  taxes. There aretwo distinct types of reasons for this, each of which might call for a different  type of corporate tax when
considered  in isolation. However, the corporate tax is called upon to satisfy both types of withholding
functions  simultaneously,  and that makes its design more problematic  and judgmenwal.  The two types of
withholding  are as follows.
a.  Withholding  Against  Resident  Shom  tolders.
Most  personal  tax systems  are designed  with the intention  of taxing income on as comprehensive
a basis as possible.  Among other things, this would require taxing capital gains as they accrue.
However,  this seems difficult  to do; capital  gains are typically  taxed on realization, if at all.  This implies
that asset owners can postpone tax liabilities oy not realizing capital gains as they accrue.  One of the
main ways  they can do this is by retaining  and reinvesting  income  within  a corporation  rather than paying
it out.  A corporation  income tax provides a way for taxing at sourct equity income earned within the
corporation.
If this were the only role for the corporate tax, the design would be straightforward. It would
only need to be applied  to retained  earnings. Its rate might be the top personal  rate of shareholders,  and
the corporate tax payments ought to be viewed as being taxes collected on behalf of the shareholders.
This means that the corporate and personal tax systems ought to be integrated so that shareholders  are
credited with the taxes having been collected  on their behalf.  One way to do this might be simply to
credit the corporation  with the coiporate taxes that had previously  been paid on funds that are paid out
to shareholders. This is referred to as the dividend-paid  deduction  system and it would seem to represent
perfect imputation. Unfortunately,  as we shall see below, this system is not likely to be suitable in an
open economy  context. A system  of imputation,  such as a dividend  tax credit operating  at the shareholder
level, is required.
The imputation  method becomes somewhat imperfect if the corporate tax itself is not applied
uniformly. For example, if loss offsetting  is imperfect,  the effective  tax rate paid by the firm will  differ
from the statutory rate.  Suppose  the imputation  is achieved  by a dividend tax credit system applied at
a constant  rate to all shareholders. If the rate is chosen to be that appropriate  for fully-taxpaying  firms,
it will be imperfect for shareholders  of tax-loss firms.  On the other hand, different firms may face
different tax liabilities  as a matter of policy.  In this case, if the imputation  system were to reflect the
differences  in tax treatment  of firms, it would  essentially  undo the preferential treatment intended  for the
firm by the corporate tax.  Tbis would argue in favor of a uniform dividend tax 'tedit  system.-9 -
A fully-integrated  system would apply a dividend  tax credit at a rate equal to the corporate tax
rate, which in tu  i is set equal to the sp  personal r,ate. Let the corporate tax rate be u and the top
personal rate be t.  If the dividend tax credit rate is d, the effective personal tax rate on dividends
received  by shareholders  in the top bracket is given by 7  =  (t - d)1(1 4).  This is because  the dividend
'ax credit system works as follows. When a dollar of dividends  is paid out, taxable income is grossed
up by the dividend  tax credit rate and so increases  by 1/(1 - a).  This is taxed at the shareholder  tax rate
t and a dividend  tax credit at the rate d is allowed. A fully integrated  system sets u = t = d (so 7  =  0).
If capital  gains are not taxed, even on realization,  this ensures that corporate equity  income is taxed once
and only once in the hands of the shareholders  for those in the top bracket.I  For those in the lower tax
brackets,  the system withholds  more than required, but eventually  gives credit when profits are paid out.
These shareholders  will effectively be giving a small interest-free  loan to the government.  Thus, the
imputation  system wIll not be perfect.  However, since most shareholders  are close to the top marginal
bracket, this should not be a great problem.
In practice, there are a couple of reasons why full integration  as described above may not be in
place. For one, because  the corporate  tax must fulfill more functions  than  this one of withholding  against
resident  shareholders,  the corporate tax rate may not be set equal to the top personal  rate.  The dividend
tax credit should then be equal to the corporate tax rate.  If the latter is set below the personal tax rate
there will be still some small incentive to retain funds within the corporation, and vice versa.  For
another, there may be a capital gains tax imposed  on realized capital gains.  If so, there will be some
personal  taxation implicitly  applied to retained  earnings, although  at a lower effective  rate.  This means
that the dividend tax credit can be set at less that the fully integrated  rate.
Some domestic  saving in corporations  will be done in a form which is sheltered  from the personal
tax altogether.  The most common example is saving in pension funds.  There would be no need to
withhold  taxes against  income  accruing  to pensiorn  funds,  but in practice kt  is impossible  for the corporate
tax to treat such shareholders  differently  from taxable ones.  This implies that fill  imputation  should
apply  to these funds, although  often that is not done in practice.
Finally, recall that the rationale  for withholding  against domestic  shareholders  was to tax capital
income on accrual that would otherwise escape full taxation at the personal level.  This presumes that
comprehensive  income is the chosen personal tax base.  M,1,any  economists  would argue that personal
17Tnis  is disouaaed  more fomlally  in Boadway  and Bwuce  (1992).- 10-
consumption  has advantages  over income as a direct tax base.2 In fact, many tax systems which purport
to tax income come closer to taxing consumption  given the number of assets which are sheltered, such
as pension funds, housing and other consumer  durables,  human capital accumulation,  insurance and cash
balances.  If countries were to adopt a full consumption  tax system, this withholding  rationale would
disappear.  Even so, a corporate tax may still be needed to fulfill some of the other roles discussed
below.  If that role were the other withholding  role, a system of imputation  would still be desired.
b.  Wholding Agais  Foreign  Shareholders
Income accruing to foreign shareholders  would also escape domestic personal taxation  since the
latter applies  only to residents. If it is desired  to tax foreign  shareholders,  a corporate tax could  be used
for this purpose (perhaps alongside withholding taxes).  The  ability to  extract tax revenues from
foreigners  depends upon the tax systems facing foreigners in their home countries.  Specifically,  if the
host country  into which the foreign capital is imported  is small relative to world capital markets, which
wil  typically be the case, taxes can only be obtained from foreigners to the extent that the taxes are
creditable  against  tax liabilities  in the home  country. Otherwise,  any attempt to tax foreigners  wil result
in capital  leaving  the country  until the rate of return before  tax rises to cover tax liabilities. Effectively,
the tax is being shifted back to domestic factors of production.  If host country taxes can be credited
against home country  tax liabilities,  a pure tax transfer can be affected from the home country  treasury
to that of the host country. Since this is costless it should  be fully exploited.
Typically, there are two sorts of capital income taxes which are creditable.  Pure withholding
taxes are creditable  to the extent specified  by tax treaties. As well, many corporate tax systems provide
credits  on taxes paid abroad. The credits are limited  by the amount of home country tax liabilities,  are
calculated  using  the home country  tax system  and are available  when dividends  are repatriated. As well,
full credit is usually  only available  on shares held in fbreign-controlled  affiliates,  which accounts  for most
foreign  direct investment.  To exploit  this tax transfer  fully requires  that the host tax system conform  with
the foreign one.  If host country tax rates are too high, some foreign investment  will be discouraged.
If  they are too low, the host country is forgoing costless tax transfer.  Since most countries tax
corporations  on the basis of some notion of equity income, this is also the sensible tax base for host
countries to adopt, despite the fact that for domestic withholding  purposes only retained earnings need
be taxed.  It would not be possible for the corporate tax to apply differently  to domestic and foreign
2  llhe arguments  an  wel-known and are presented  in Meade (1978)  and  U.S. Treasury  (1977), among other  "Jlac".- 11  -
firms, since that type of discrimination  designed  to exploit the tax transfer from foreigners selectively
would presumably  result in host countries  denying  fulJ crediting  of taxes.
Note that this withholding  role is conditional  upon  the host country  tax system  offering  full credits
for taxes paid by its resident corporations abroad.  This is equivalent  to operating implementing  the
corporate  tax on a full origin basis.  If foreign tax systems  offered  only deductions  for taxes paid abroad
rather than credits, no tax tr nsfer would be possible. 3 Any tax levied on capital income by the home
country  would  be shifted  back to domestic  residents  by induced  flows of capital abroad. One of the great
mysteries  of corporate tax policy, and one which is the subject  of current research in the area, is why do
creditor nations choose  to use the origin principle  for their corporate tax systems when by doing so they
are simply inviting a tax transfer to debtor nations.
Given  this second reason for withholding  using the corporate  tax, the question  of integration  with
the personal  tax becomes  more contentious. Certainly  one would not like to impute corporate taxes  paid
to foreign  shareholders  when  dividends  are paid out. To do so would simply  undo the tax transfer  which
is the reason for taxing foreign firms in the first place.  This essentially  rules out the dividend-paid
deduction  as mentioned  above. Any integration  would have to be done at the personal level, say, by a
dividend  tax credit, so that only domestic shareholders  are affected. This mixing  of the use of the origin
basis for the corporate  tax with the residence  basis for the imputation  makes  the integration  an imperfect
policy device.  In an open economy, the saving side of the domestic capital market is effectively
segmented  from the domestic investment  side.  In the aggregate,  the two need not be equal; the rate of
return is exogenously  given and does not serve as a domestic  market clearing  price. This means  that tax
measures  that apply  at the personal level influence  the saving  side of the market while measures  applying
to corporations  influence  the investment  side.  Given that imputation  applies at the personal level while
the corporate tax applies  at the corporate level, integration  effectively  removes  the tax on equity income
at the personal  level while leaving the corporate  tax distortion intact. At the same time, interest income
remains  taxable  at the personal level, but deductible  for the corporation. Thus, households  would  prefer
to hold equity while firms would prefer debt financing.  Integration  cannot remove this distortion on
capital markets.  As argued in Boadway and Bruce (1992), where this analysis is developed in more
detail, this makes the case for taxing consumption  rather than income at the personal level stronger.
These problems  would be avoided  under a corporate tax system which allows deductions  rather
than credits for foreign taxes paid.  In this case, the only withholding  role for the corporate tax would
3 This  point  has been  long recognized  in the literature.  See, for example,  Musgmave(1969),  Feldstein  and Haruman  (1979),
and Gersowitz  (1988).- 12 -
be against domestic  shareholders  since it would no longer be possible to transfer taxes from the foreign
treasury.  Integration  could be achieved  at the corpor,te level using a dividend-paid  deduction. In this
way, foreign shareholders  would  be exempt  from tax and domestic  shareholders  would  be taxed once on
equity income. Interest and equity income would be treated on a par.
2.  The Rent-Collecting  Function
The theoretical taxation literature has stressed the desirability of  taxing corporations in  a
non-distorting  manner. The purpose of a non-distorting  tax is to tax pure proflts or rents.  To do so the
tax base must correspond with rents or economic  profits.  Measuring  pure profits is extremely  difficult
to do since it involves  measuring  all real imputed costs  on an accruals basis, including  true depreciation,
asset  depletion,  costs of risk and finance, etc. However,  as is well-known,  the equivalent  can be achieved
in a feasible way by using a cashflow tax.  Should  a cash flow tax not be palatable becanse of the way
it postpones  tax liabilities  of the firm, any tax base which is equivalent  in present val;  :erms will do.
An example  of such a scheme which is flexible  and easy to implement  is presented in Boadway  and Bruce
(1984). If such a tax were to be used, no imputation  would be desired since it would undo the purpose
of the tax.
While it is easy to see why economists  would find a cash flow-type  tax attractive, it is not clear
that it makes much sense as base for a corporate tax. For one thing, a cash flow tax is not compatible
with  the withholding  function, which is a main role of the corporate tax. For another, one cannot identify
the rent-generating  sector with the corporate  sector.  One would expect that a good portion of the latter
would earn only a market rate of return.  It might be better to target a rent tax to those sectors most
susceptible  to earning rents. A prime candidate  would  be the resource  industries. Most  countries  already
impose special taxes on them at least partly for the purposes of giving the public sector a share of the
rents.  It might be better to direct cash flow taxation specifically to those sectors rather than to the
corporate  sector as a whole.  Ibis would  mean revising  inefficient  resource taxes such as severance  taxes
(royalties)  and other levies which do not properly account for costs.
One interesting  phenomenon  that is often observed in developed countries is that corporate tax
systems  often favor precisely  these industries. Special tax measures  such as depletion  allowances  and the
rapid write-off of exploration and development expenses imply that effective tax rates on  resource
industries  (both marginal  and average) are less than for other industries.- 13 -
3.  The Revenue-Raising  Funcdon
In developing  countries, many taxes are costly  to use in the administrative  sense of compliance
and enforcement, especially  direct taxes.  A good part of what should be included in income escapes
taxation because of  difficulties in  detection and  measurement.  In  these circumstances, a  tax on
corporations  may be a relatively efficient way to raise revenues since there are fewer taxpayers and
evasion  may be more difficult. The use of a corporate tax simply as a revenue-raising  device alongside
personal and indirect  taxes might be reinforced  if capital incomes  are otherwise  difficult  to detect at the
personal  level. A corporate  tax used for revenue-raising  purposes  presumably  need  not be integrated  with
the personal  tax, although  this means  double  taxation  of capital income and the discouragement  of saving
and investment.
in an open economy, the extent to which the corporate tax can be effective at raising revenue
from capital owners is limited. As mentioned  above, except  to the extent that tax payments  are credited
abroad, a tax on foreign-owned  capital imposed  by a small economy  will end up being shifted back to
other  less mobile  factors of production  such as labor and will leave the economy  with less capital. It may
be more efficient  to tax the immobile  factors directly, if possible.  Even if the economy  is large enough
to have some effect on its return to capital, say, due to country-specific  risk, a corporate tax would not
be usefil in exploiting  it.  What the country  wants to do in this case is to increase the amount of capital
imported, and this would be achieved  by subsidizing  capital, not taxing it.  We return to this below in
our discussion  of investment  incentives.
To summarize  this discussion,  the main reason for a corporate  tax is for withholding,  both against
domestic shareholders and against foreign-owned  firms.  A subsidiary reason might be simply to raise
revenue in an economy where no tax is perfect.  Since the corporate tax cannot treat foreign firms
differendy  than domestic ones, a common  tax must satisfy all objectives. The withholding  functions  can
best be satisfied  by a tax on corporate  equity income defined  in a similar way to that of capital-exporting
countries. Also, to take full advantage  of foreign  tax crediting  systems, the  tax rate should  be comparable
to that used in creditor countries.  An imputation  system could be put in place, but it must be done
through the personal  tax side (i.e., on a residence  basis).  If there is full imputation,  capital gains taxes
are not necessary.  Whether or not there is an imputation  of corporate taxes at the personal level, the
corporate  tax will distort  the investment  side of the capital market, and will leave finns with an incentive
to finance by debt rather than by equity. This could  only be avoided if all countries were to move from
a system of foreign tax crediting  to one of deductibility  of foreign taxes. In this case, imputation  would
be better done by a dividend-paid  deduction, and corporate taxes would effectively be levied on a- 14 -
residence basis.  This system could be achieved if  creditor nations would move unilaterally (and
independently)  to a system of deductions. What is unclear is why they have not done so already.
B.  The Effidency of Capital Markets
Investment  incentives involve interfering  with capital markets to encourage  particular types of
investment. The jusdfication for this would seem to imply some sort of inefficiency  in the way capital
markets allocate investment. In this section, we summarize  the various sources of market failure on
capital markets. This will serve as a basis for considerng the rationale for investment  incentives  in the
following  section.
1.  Capital  Income Taxes
We have already seen that in an open economy a corporate tax will impose an unavoidable
distortion  on investment,  even if it is imposed  optimally. This is part of the consequence  of using the
corporate tax as a withholding  device both against foreigners and against domestic residents on their
accrued  capital income  earned in corporations. In a closed economy,  this distortion  could be avoided  by
reducing capital income  tax rates.  The extent of the distortion  on capital markets would  be determined
by trading off the equity gains of taxing capital income  with the efficiency  costs of distorting  investment.
In an open economy,  the distortion  arises partly because  the corporate  tax is being  used to transfer fiuds
from foreign  treasuries  to the domestic  one.  Because  of tax crediting  arrangements,  this does not affect
the allocation  of foreign-owned  capital, but domestic capital accumulation  is discouraged.
Investment  incentives  could only represent an effective  policy instrument  to the extent that they
could  be made to apply to domesdcally-owned  capital rather than foreign-owned  capital. If they applied
to the latter, they would only serve to reduce the tax transfer from foreign treasuries by reducing
creditable  tax liabilities. Also, tax measures  operating on the personal tax side, such as imputation  and
tax sheltering, would  have no effect on the investment  distortion, though they would encourage  saving.
2.  Dynamic  Inefficiency
Inefficiency  exists when it is possible to make some persons better off without making anyone
worse off.  The so-called Fundamental Theorems of  Welfare Economics state that, under a set of
conventional  assumptions,  i) all competitive  equilibria  will be efficient  and ii) all efficient  allocations  can
be supported  by a competitive  equilibrium. In a dynamic  setting, this principle  is applied  to an economy
evolving over an indefinite period of time.  Dynamic inefficiency  exists if it is possible to make one- 15 -
cohort better off without making any cohort worse off.  The basic result in the literature is that a
competitive  allocation  which is efficient  in the static s#tting  will be dynamically  efficient unless the rate
of return on capital is below the rate of growth of the economy  into the indefinite  future, that is, unless
the economy  is  over-capitalized". In a finite-horizon  economy, or in an infinite-horizon  one in which
the rate of return on capital is at least as grat  as the rate of growth (or becomes so in the future), the
two fundamental  theorems of welfare economics  apply.
Empirically, it would be virtually impossible to  make the case that  actual economies are
dynamically  inefficient, especially  developing  ones.  Rates of return on capital (before tax) seem to be
well above rates of growth of modem economies.  Furthermore, in principle, to  know whether an
economy is dynamically  inefficient would require knowing  the relationship  between the rate of growth
and the rate of return on capital into the indefinite  future, and that is clearly not possible.  Thus, it is
difficult  to base arguments  for capital  market failure on dynamic  inefficiency.  Moreover, even  if dynamic
inefficiency did  exist, investment incentives would not be  called for.  On the contrary, dynamic
inefficiency  is associated with too much capital accumulation  so measures would have to be taken to
reduce investment.
3.  Intergeneradonal  Externalites
A common  form of market fUilure  is externalities  or public goods. Some economists  have argued
that saving for bequest purposes may have a positive externality associated  with it.4 The argument is
that part of saving is for bequests and this is motivated  by altruism toward future generations. If each
saver gets utlity from the well-being  of all members of future generations  and not just their own heirs,
saving will yield external benefits  which are not taken account  of by individuals. This will lead to too
litde saving, or  equivalently a market discount rate which is higher than the social discount rate.
Government  intervention  to increase saving will be called for.
Valid though this argument may be, it is not clear that it could be used to make a case for
investment  incentives, especially  in an open economy.  If the root of the problem is undersaving,  the
appropriate  remedy would be to provide incentives  for saving rather than for investment. In an open
economy,  where the saving and investment  side of the markets  are segmented,  investment  incentives  will
do little to increase  saving, except  through general equilibrium  effects. They would  primarily encourage
investment financed by foreign capital inflows.  A furiher difficulty is that if altruism does exist,
4  This  argumet  is  due to Sen  (1967) and Marglin (1963) who made the point in the context of the social discount  rate
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measures  to facilitate intergenerational  transfers may be fairly ineffectual. As Barro (1974) has argued,
attempts  to make  pure redistributive  transfers among  generations  will be undone by rationale households
with an intergenerational  altruistic  motive. Thus, saving for future generations  can only be increased  by
providing  relative price incentives.
Related  to the possibility  of intergenerational  externalities  are intergenerational  equity arguments.
Some generations  will be better off than others depending  simply on their date of birth.  If one applied
some  intergenerational social  welfare function,  equity  arguments may  well  call  for  a  set  of
intergenerational  redistributive  transfers from better off to less well off generations. This possibility  was
recognized  as long ago as Ramsey  (1928) and was made  operational  by Eckstein (1957). The simple  idea
is as follows. Suppose  that the growth rate of consumption  Qifetime  wealth)  across generations  is g, and
the elasticity  of lifetime utility with respect to wealth is e.  Suppose also that r is the rate of return on
capital, n is the rate of growth of population and a  is the rate at which the social welfare function
discounts per capita utilities across generations.S Then the optimal rate of growth of wealth across
generations  would  be that for which
ge=r-n-a.
In the long run, the economy  should approach  a steady state in which r - n = a.  Per capita consumption
should be rising over time as long as r - n >  a, that is, as long as the economy  is out of the steady  state.
The rate of approach  to the steady state depends  upon the elasticity  of the marginal utility of income, e.
The policy instrument for implementing  the optimal policy in this case should be intergenerational
transfers, not investment  incentives.
Of course, the whole notion of optimal  policy in this context is fraught with difficulties  since it
depends upon social values which are not objectively given. Two dimensions  of social value enter the
determination  of optimal  policy. One is the degree of social discounting,  a, which affects  the steady  state
to which the economy should move in the long run.  The other is the degree of intergenerational
inequality  aversion,  e, which affects  the path to the long run steady  state. There is unlikely to be general
agreement  on what these should  be, especially  since some of the persons involved  are not yet borne.
S  a could be defined  so that cohorts  with larger populations  have proporionately higher weights. For example,  a could
equal  *  - n  where  a  is  the  rate  of  discount of  the  future.  Thus the  social  welfare function  would be:
W  i  s  ^  (I  + n)U
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4.  Externaldes  of Growth
The above  type of capital market failure invol,ved  externalities  on the saving side of the market.
Externalities  may also occur on the supply side.  Recently  several economists  have stressed  the possible
importance  of externalities  in the process of economic  growth.  For example, Romer (1986) has argued
that capital accumulation  generates external benefits (e.g., technological  improvements)  to firms other
than those undertaking  the investment. The results hark back  to those of the growth  theories of the 1960s
where the rate of technological  change was made endogenous  and dependent  on the rate of investment. 6
They also bear some resemblance  to the infant industry  arguments  of trade theory.  In the context of
growth theory, they are interesting because they can account for differences in the rate of growth of
economies  as well as differences in the levels of income  achieved. To the extent that they are true we
would expect to see a correlation  between  rates of investment  and rates of growth in per capita incomes.
Scott (1989) examined  the causes of the rate of growth of output in pooled data on 26 period
averages  for ten developed  countries (with 19 out of 26 observations  for UK, USA and Japan). He used
a simple ordinary least squares regression with share of investment  in output and the rate of growth of
quality-adjusted  employed  labor  force and the ratio of output  per quality  adjusted  in non-residential  output
excluding  agriculture  in the country  to that in the U.S. in a base year (considered  as a "catch-up"  factor)
as the only explanatory  variables.  He found that, for the sample as a whole, nearly half of the growth
in non-residential  business  output can be explained  by changes  in the share of investment. Scott further
estimates  that marginal  social rates of return to investment  in the U.K. (1951-73)  and USA (1948-73)
exceeded  the marginal  private retun by about  seven percentage  points with the former averaging 12.6%
and the latter 5.3%.  A third of this gap is accounted  for by taxation. Three other factors explain the
rest  of the gap:  the "learning  externality" (firms other than the investment  undertaking firm benefit
disproportionately  from inceased opportunities);  the "demand externality" (firms selling in imperfect
markets receive lower marginal than average returns because of higher marginal selling costs) and
"animal  spirits" (a positive externality  based  on a tendency  for firms to value increases  in output  by more
than their value to shareholders)  (see Scott (1989), p.xlvi).
Since it is the act of investment  per se which yields an externality, the appropriate  would be to
implemert measures which influence  investment  directly. Policies operating  on the saving side will not
be effective. This may be the strongest argument  for investment  incentives. Indeed, it might also be the
argument for incentives  for investment  in human capital  and R&D as well.  For example, Lucas (1988)
6  Some  key references  are Kaldor  and Mirlee  (1962), Arrow (1962)  and Kennedy  (1961). This  literature  i  surveyed  in
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has argued that precisely the same sorts of externalities  may be involved  with human capital investment
as others such as Romer have analyzed  for physical i,nvestment.
S.  Incomplete  or Imperfect Capital  Markets
Capital  markets  may not be perfectly  functioning  or complete  for institutional  reasons. A number
of examples  of these may be as follows.
a.  Liquidity Constraints.
Households  or firms may be liquidity-constrained.  If households  are prevented from borrowing
early  in life against  their future  labor income, they will  be forced  to consume  less than the desired  amount
and aggregate  saving will be higher.7 Again, policies  operating on the saving side of the market would
be appropriate  here rather than investment  incentives.
Firms may be liquidity-constrained  as well, especially, as noted above, young growing firms.
Corporate  tax policies can be of some help here to the extent that *hey  make cash available  to firms who
are strapped  for funds.  Since many such firms are in a negative  tax liability position, full refundability
of tax losses  would  be helpful. Refundable  investment  incentives  would also offset the effects  of liquidity
constaits.
h.  Incomplete  Markets  for Risk.
Complete  markets for the trading of risk require that the number of assets be as least as great as
the number of possible states of nature.  Given that the latter can be large, it is quite likely that such
markets  are incomplete. Furthermore,  since  government  policy  itself contributes  to the risky environment
in ways that cannot be foreseen, it would be very difficult  to insure against future government  policies.
By offering less than full loss offsetting, tax policy itself may contribute  to the inefficiency  in trading in
risk.  There is no particular reason why the government  should be any better informed  than the private
sector so it is not clear that the government can improve the efficiency of allocating risk except by
making sure that tax policies do not distort it further.
One particular form of risk trading that the government may have a role in influencing  is the
sharing of risks across generations. Strictly speaking  this is not an efficiency  argument but an equity
argument. However, it may be analyzed  precisely  as an insurance  problem when cohorts are put behind
7 The  consequences  of ftis have becn analyzed  by Hubbard  and Judd (1987).- 19 -
the "veil of ignorance". 8 The argument goes as follows. Some cohorts are luckier than others because
of their date of birth.  The larger the cohort  of a perspn, the less well off will that person be since they
have lower wages in working periods when labor is more plentiful and lower capital incomes in
retirement when labor is scarcer.  In addition to this demographic  effect, there will be productivity
differences and other shocks, as well as business  cycles which have a systematically  different effect on
some cohorts than others.  Although there is a risk associated  with when a particular person is born, it
is "insurable"  to society since  the risks of being born at different times largely cancel  out across different
generations. However, there will be no market for insurance  against  time of birth because  such insurance
would have to be acquired before one knew their date of birthl  However, the possibility exists for the
government  to provide "social insurance"  by a set of intergenerational  transfers from those who are less
lucky to those who are more lucky.  The existence  of such intergenerational  transfers will naturally
influence  saving and investment  behavior. However, investment  incentives  per se are not involved.
6.  Iqformational  Asymmetries
Different  participants  in the capital  market may be differently  informed. The most common  case
is that in which the profitability  of an investment  or a firm is better known  to some agent than to others.
For example,  persons  in the firm may know more about  the prospects  of the firm than outside investors.
Or, managers  may know more than shareholders. These asymmetries  in information  will cause  persons
to behave differently  than if everyone were perfectly informed. We are particularly interested in how
investment  is affected  by asymmetries  in information. In the literature  there are two sorts of asymmetries
of information  which affect investment,  adverse  selection  and moral hazard.  We discuss each in turn.
a.  Adverse  Selecdon  Models
Adverse selection  occurs when some characteristic  of the firm, such as its quality, is known  to
the firm but not to outsiders. In this case it will be to the advantage  of the "high" quality firms to signal
their quality  by engaging  in some activity  which  the lower quality  firms find costly  to mimic. Originally,
signaling  models  were used to explain  why firms might prefer one financial  structure over another, given
tCat  with fill information  the Modigliani-Miller  (1958) Theorem implied  that the financial  structure was
irrelevant. For example,  Ross (1977) argued  that if managers  face a loss in welfare when their firms go
bankrupt, managers of firms with low probabilities  of bankruptcy can signal their quality by taking on
F  For  examples  of such an analysis  seo  Smith  (1982)  and Gordon  and Varian (1988).- 20 -
more debt.  Signaling  models  of the financial  structure of firms typically  take the level of investment  as
fixed. However,  their implication  for investment  can r,eadily  be inferred. Since  signaling  using financial
instruments  entails a cost, it will raise the cost of financing  and thereby reduce the level of investment.
Investment  per se may be used as a signal.  For example, Miller and Rock (1985) consider a
model where higher quality firms have higher cash flows and argue that finns will signal their quality
(cash flow) by the size of their net dividend  defined to be the payout  of dividends  less the use of external
funds. To prevent  lower quality firms from mimicking  their behavior, they underinvest. Lower quality
firms can only mimic  higher cash flows by taking  funds away from investment. Williams (1988)  obtains
a similar underinvestment  equilibrium  by considering  a model in which the firms solve for an optimal
mix of costly signals.  Myers and Majluf (1984)  also obtain a signaling equilibrium  in which profitable
investments  may be forgone to avoid taking on external financiers who can benefit from the existing
(known)  wealth of firms.
In all of these cases of adverse selection, the fact that signaling is costly raises the cost of
undertaking new investments and results in  an equilibrium in  which investment is below the full
information  level.  This might be expected  to give a prime facie rationale for encouraging investment,
though the literature  has not really addressed  the issue.  One  problem is that the government  Is not likely
to have any better information  that the private sector.  Any investment  incentives will have to apply
uniformly to all firms, both high and low quality.
There have, however, been some models in which overinvestment  can result from adverse
selection.  For example, Heinkel and Zechner (1990) suggest that overinvestment  can occur in the
presence of adverse  selection  when  securities are priced at the averagt  v'  Apected,  value. In such cases
a firm with a negative  expected  present  value project may be able to sell overvalued  securities that more
than compensate  its equity holders for taking a negative  present value project.  John and Senbet (1988)
consider the case where limited liability of equity holders induces overiuvestment. Overinvestment  is
perhaps less plausible  than underinvestment  if only because firms always have non-negative  (i.e., zero)
net present value investment  options available  to them outside  the firm.  It is not clear how it could be
in the interest of shareholders  to undertake negative  net present value investments  in the firm (that is, to
overinvest)  when zero present value assets could always be obtained  on the capital market.
b.  Moral  Hazard  Models
The effects of moral hazard (or agency  problems) for investment  have been analyzed  for in two
main contexts-conflicts of  interest between equity holders and  debt holders,  and  between inside- 21 -
(sometimes owner-managers)  and outside (sometimes new) equity holders.  Several papers in this
literature argue that agency  problems  are likely to lea4 to underinvestment. The classic papers are those
by Myers (1977) and Jensen and Meckling  (1976). Myers shows that there is a potential moral hazard
problem between  the firm (whose  management  is assumed  to operate in the best interest of shareholders)
and debt holders that can lead to underinvestment.  The problem arises because  the firm will raise capital
for investment  only if there is positive net present value to the existing shareholders.  If the capital
structure includes  debt whose  owners must be reimbursed  before shareholders,  new capital will  be raised
only if the returns are great enough  to cover both the required repayment  of debt and the required outlay
for investment. This will lead to underinvestment  since it would be efficient  to undertake  any investment
with returns great enough to cover the outlay alone. The Jensen and Meckling  paper is somewhat  more
general since it includes in addition to the conflict  between equity holder and debt holders of Myers a
conflict between insiders and outsiders.  Managers who are fractional owners of the firm will want to
consume  too many perquisites since they receive all the benefits but bear only part of the cost.  This
possibility  leads equity capital suppliers to pursue methods  such as monitoring, covenants and the like
which induce optimal  behavior on managers. These additional  costs lead to lower levels of investment.
Other papers in the literature have come to the same conclusion  of underinvestment,  including  recently
Jensen (1986) and Schleifer and Vishny (1986).
One recent  paper, Darrough  and Stoughton  (1986), has included  both adverse  selection  and moral
hazard in the same model.  The adverse selection involves an unknown quality of manager while the
moral hazard  is the manager's unobservable  effort. The equilibrium  involves  the owner-manager  making
an optimal  trade-o.f among  excess risk incurred, effort provided and communication  of information. In
doing so an optimal nmix  of debt and equity financing  are used to shed risk, leading to real agency costs
which again reduce investment.
7.  International  Tax Compedtion
From a national  perspective,  there may  be gains from attracting  capital  from the rest of the world.
In the literature, policies for attracting capital from other countries is often treated as being purely
strategic  in the sense that inflows  of foreign  investment  will reduce the domestic  rate of return and cause
part of the burden of the taxes on the investment  to be exported. 9 Alternatively, if there are rents
associated  with investments,  governments  will  have a private incentive  te reduce the tax on rents to attract
9  Soe,  for example,  Bond and Samuelson (1989).- 22 -
more capital and thus generate more domestic rents. 10 Finally. there may be terms of trade effects
associated  with capital inflows, as has been stressed  "in the trade literature." 1 In each of these cases,
wasteful  ("beggar-thy-neighbor")  tax competition  will be the result. Investment  incentives  are obviously
the prime policy instrument for attracting foreign investment into a country.  As mentioved, the. 
effectiveness  is contingent  upon foreign tax crediting  systems not merely causing  them to transfer tax
revenues  abroad.
Informational  asymmetries may also characterize international capital flows.  Thus, foreign
invtstors may  not have full information  about  which countries  are high profit  countries  and which  2!e not.
This is especially  true if there is some uncertainty  about  future government  policies.  In this case, high
return countries may want to "signal"  their quality by offering special incentives  to potential investors.
Bond and Samuelson  (1986) have used this as an argument for tax holidays La  developing  countries, a
phenomenon  which appears to be quite widespread. Since much of the uncertainty about investment
returns in developing  countries might come from uncertainty  about future government policies and its
effect  on after-tax  cash flows, incentives  which improve  cash flows up-front would  probably be the most
effective signals.  It is not clear that tax holidays fall into this category, especially when marginal
effective  tax rates are low to begin with as discussed  below.  Refundable  investment  incentives,  such as
investment  tax credits, would be more effective.
8. Distortions  on Other  Markets
So far our discussion has been entirely about market failure on capital markets.  However, in
developing economies, other markets may be  significantly distorted and this may be  relevant for
evaluating  the effects  of investment  incentives. Two markets  in particular  are liable  to be distorted-labor
markets  and foreign exchange  markets. The literature  on project evaluation  in developing  countries  deals
largely with the issue of investment  criteria when there are distortions  on these markets.  12 On the basis
of first principles, we know that distortions  should be dealt with directly on the markets involved.
However, where this is not possible, their implications  for investment  decisions  should  be dealt with on
0 'eczlassic  paper in this  area is MacDougapl  (1960).
11 See the survey in Harris (1989).  £
12 For  a general  treatment,  see Boadway  and Bruce  (1984b)  and Drdze  and Stern  (1987).  See also the variou!s  manuals
for project evaluation  in developing  countries.- 23 -
a case by case basis.  Some general results which may be of relevance  for investment  incentives  are as
follows for each type of market distortion in turn.
a.  Labor Market  Distortons
The efficiency  implications  of labor market distortions  depend  upon the nature of the distortion.
Labor  market distortions, most of  which show  up  as  unemployment, can  take  several  forms.
Unemployment  may be frictional and a result of the costly search process observed on labor markets.
In this case inefficiencies  may result from search externalities  (Diamond  (1981))  and a case can be made
fsr subsidizing  search, say through unemployment  insurance  schemes. Unemployment  may be structural
resulting from the adjustment  of the economy  to shocks  of productivity,  terms of trade, shifting  tastes,
etc.  In this case, as shown by Mussa (1978), it is not obvious that the public sector can do any bette.
than the private sector in adjusting to change.  Unemployment  may be temporary as modeled in the
implicit  contract literature  (Baily (1974),  Azariades (1975),  Feldstein (1976)).  In  this  case,
unemployment  may be exacerbated  by government  schemes  such as unemployment  insurance. Finally,
there are efficiency  wage types of arguments  for unemployment  where wages are set above the market
clearing level to deter shirking  or voluntary  turnover,  both of which involve  costs to firms.  As Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984) have shown, efficiency wages cause unemployment  inefficiencies  which can be
addressed  by wage subsidies, at least to those sectors subject  to the problem.
In the context  of developing  countries,  unemployment  has often been modeled  as a dual economy
phenomenon  arising from an exogenously-given  high wage in the urban sector with unemployment  as a
migration  equilibrium  device. Harberger (1971)  has argued  convincingly  in the context  of this model that
the market wage and the shadow wage are identical in the urban sector, and that therefore no special
employment  incentives  are called for.13 However, once the wage rate is made endogenous, say, by
an efficiency  wage argument the case for employment  subsidies  reappears. 14 One must set against this
the theoretical arguments against efficiency wages as  a  source of unemployment.  For  example,
Carmichael  (1985)  has argued  that efficiency  wages  would not be necessary  as a worker discipline  device
if workers could be required to post bonds (explicitly  or implicitly)  when hired.
13 See, however,  Boadway  and Flatter (1981)  where a case is made for regional  employment  subsidies  in a more general
venion of the Hanris-Todaro  mode.
14 In fact,  one of the  ealiest models  of efficiency  wages was due  to Stiglitz  (1974)  who used it to explain dual economy
fcatur  of a developing  economy.- 24 -
In an efficiency wage context in which employment  subsides are not available for whatever
reason, investment  subsidies  may  prove to be a useful second best instrument  for increasing  employment.
For example, efficiency  wages may be relatively more important  in capital-intensive  industries. If so,
investment  incentives  may be a more selective  instrument  for dealing with the problem than employment
incentives. If this is the rationale  for investment  incentives,  it wonild  call for permanent  incentives  rather
than short-run  ones so as to raise the level of employment  permanently. Of course, investment  incentives
would not be fully efficient  since they would serve partly to cause firms to substitute capital for laboe.
9.  11me  Inconsistency  of Government  Policy
A key feature of investment  is its intertemporal  nature.  Capital invested at one period of time
yields returns into the future.  To the extent that investment  is irreversible, capital, once acquired,
becomes a quasi-fixed  factor.  This gives rise to  a  well-known problem of time-inconsistency  of
government  policy.  A far-sighted  government which is planning its future tax policies would naturally
want to take into  consideration  the effect that future  taxes  have on current investment  decisions  and design
them accordingly. However, if current governments  cannot commit future ones to a predetermined  set
of tax policies, the quasi-fixed  nature of accumulated  capital stocks will provide an incentive  for future
governments  to renege on the those tax policies.  In particular, there will be an incentive  to try to tax
"old capital", whose return now takes the form of a quasi-rent.
lf the government  is unable  to commit  future  governments  to a tax policy, and if decision-makers
correctly  anticipate  that this is the case, the result will be a rational  expectations  equilibrium  in which the
inability  to commit  is taken into account by all persons. This result has been analyzed in the literature
in various guises (e.g., Fischer (1980), Chamley (1986), Bond and Samuelson  (1989b)).  The general
result is the in the no-commitment  equilibrium,  capital tax rates are higher and investment  is lower than
in the full commitment  (optimal  tax) equilibrium.
In the context  of developing  countries,  this has been  thought  to be a particular  problem in the case
of foreign firns  operating in the country, presumably both because foreign investment is particularly
important and because foreign investors might have less direct influence on government policy than
domestic firms.  The phenomenon  is more widespread than tax policy.  The use of expropriation  is
another way in which future governments  can capture the quasi-rents  of foreign  investors. This has been
analyzed  by Eaton and Gersowitz  (1981).  More generally, the incentive  to renege on foreign debt is
another example  of time inconsistency  in developing  countries.  In all cases, the result is likely to be
underinvestnent, perhaps of a significant  amount.- 25 -
C  The Role of Investment Incentives
Given this discussion  of the role of the corporate  tax and the efficiency  of capital markets we are
now in a position  to summarize  the arguments  for using investment  incentives  as policy instruments. The
various arguments  will also suggest  some principles  of design for investment  incentives.
1.  Offsetting  the Corporate  Tax  Distortion
We have mentioned  that in an open economy,  if the corporate  tax is used as a withholding  device,
it will impose a distortion on domestic investment. This will be the case regardless of whether an
imputation  system is in effect for domestic  residents. The distortion  will only apply on domestic-owned
capital  as long as the corporate  tax rate does not exceed that which can be credited abroad. This suggests
that investment  incentives  that apply  at source to domestically-owned  capital will offset the corporate  tax
distortion.
The difficulty with applying investment  incentives  for this purpose is that it should either be
applied to domestic investment  alone, or if it applies on foreign investment  it should be such as not to
reduce the foreign tax credit.  Otherwise, much of the force of the incentive as it applies to foreign
investment  will be dissipated as a tax transfer to foreign treasuries.  If a country tried to impose an
incentive  selectively on domestically-owned  fiums it is likely that foreign countries would see this as
discriminatory  and would disallow  the normal foreign tax credit.  On the other hand, it is not clear how
investment  incentives  could be applied on foreign firms which would not reduce the foreign tax credit.
Thus, it is not clear that investment  incentives  could do much to eliminate  the unavoidable  distortion  of
the corporate tax without undoing the withholding  purpose of the tax in the first place.
One imperfect way in which this might be done would be to target investment  incentives to
specific sectors, in particular, those which are relatively highly domestically-owned. This would
minimize  the tax transfer abroad without  at the same time appearing  discriminatory. At the same time
it would be  distortionary since it would make the tax distortion different in different industries.
Furthermore,  if this were desired in the first place, it would be more sensible  simply to have differential
corporate  tax rates across sectors, with higher rates in those sectors in which foreign ownership is the
highest. In other words, the investment  incentive  should take the form of reduced tax rates.
2.  Attracting  Foreign  Investment
Related to the above is the desire to attract foreign investment  because of the net benefits of
foreign investment  such as the increase in tax base, the generation of employment, the transfer of- 26 -
technology,  and, where possible, the strategic  exploitation  of terms of trade and rates of return on capital.
Again, the ability to do this is limited  by the extent to which investment  incentives  applying on foreign
investment  can actually  affect the behavior  of foreign firms rather than simply transferring  tax revenues
abroad. If the investment  incentives  can be applied  in a way which does not affect the foreign  tax credit,
then foreign investment  can be attracted and all of its benefits (including the exploitation  of foreign
treasuries) can be achieved. However, it is unlikely that this can be done.
It may still be possible  to attract foreign investment  using investment  incentives  even though  they
reduce the foreign tax credit.  Because  foreign tax crediting  is not instantaneous  but only occurs when
dividends  are repatriated, the exploitation  of foreign treasuries cannot be perfect.  The existence  of tax
deferral implies  that, even if foreign firms have not fully exploited  their foreign  tax credits, the domestic
tax system  will still have a marginal  effect  on investment  financed  by the retained  earnings  of the firm. 15
Thus, investment  incentives  will have some effect  in attracting  foreign investment,  though at the expense
of some tax transfer forgone when the earnings  are repatriated.  Once again, the way to exploit this is
to set the corporate tax rate in the first place so as to achieve the appropriate  trade-off between the
distorting  effect of the corporate tax, the induced  inflow of foreign investment  and the tax transfer from
foreign treasuries. The setting of the tax rate will vary from country to country. Presumably  it will not
necessarily  be optimal to mimic the foreign tax system.  Instead there will be an incentive  to set the
domestic  tax rate lower than that of the home countries  of investing  firms.
Since the imperfection  of the foreign tax transfer arises because of the deferral of foreign tax
liabilities  until repatriation  of dividends,  this suggests  that tax incentives  might well be based on retained
earnings  specifically. In other words, the corporate tax system might apply differentially  to dividends.
Unfortunately  this comes  into conflict  with the domestic  withholding  role which involves  taxing retained
earnings to prevent shareholders  from postponing  taxes by keeping their funds within the corporation.
To the extent that capital income is taxed at the personal  level, it will not be desirable to treat retained
earnings  preferentially  in order to improve  the withholding  properties against foreigners.
3.  Infant Industry  Arguments
To the extent that infant industry  arguments  are valid, temporary investment  incentives  may be
an effective device for assisting firms just starting up.  From the point of view of instrument design,
investment incentives will be superior to,  say, tariff protection.  To  be  effective such investment
IS  This  is analyzcd  in Lecchor  and Mintz (1990).- 27 -
incentives  must be designed  to be of specific use to small growing firms.  Many of these firms are in a
non-taxpaying  position and may be involved in risky projects.  They may also be strapped for funds
because  capital markets may be characterized  by asymmetric  information  such that creditors cannot tell
"good"  p.ospects from "bad" ones. These considerations  would seem  to imply that investment  incentives
should provide funds up front to young firms, and that refundability is a necessary feature.  As we
discuss later, reduced tax rates or temporary  tax holidays  may not have the required preferential effect.
If marginal tax rates are low to begin with, tax rate reductions will not provide much incentive  at the
margin. If there is not full loss offsetting,  it may provide'no  incentive. The benefit  of tax rate reductions
may also occur to far into the future to be of much  help to liquidity-constrained  firms.  Measures  which
provide funds up front, such as investment  tax credits, would be much more effective, though only if
refundability  is a feature of them.  To the extent that infant industry arguments are the rationale, the
incentives  need only be temporary.
Again, it is worth stressing  that in an open economy  setting the use of tax incentives,  temporary
or otherwise, will be partly dissipated  as tax transfers to foreign treasuries. This will be the case to the
extent that foreign firms can take advantage  of them. If it is possible to targct temporary tax reductions
to domestic firms without jeopardizing the tax credit status of foreign firms, the tax transfer can be
avoided. This may be possible in practice.  Some countries apply temporary tax incentives  (e.g., tax
holidays)  on a discretionary  basis.
If, in so doing, they can apply them discriminately  to domestic firms rather than foreign firms,
there will not be any reduced tax transfer from foreign treasuries.  Of course, even for foreign firms
temporary  tax incentives  are likely to have some stimulative  effect on investment. Since these  firms may
not be in a profitable position when the incentives apply, any tax loss to foreign treasuries will be
deferred.  Thus, it may be still worth applying temporary incentives  to them.  Indeed, they may be
preferable to permanent  ones.  We return below to another reason why it might be desirable to apply
temporary tax incentives  to foreign firms.
4.  Exernallties of Investment
One of the most convincing  reason for encouraging  investment  is the argument that investment
generates benefits for the economy over and above those which are captured privately by investors.
These may take the form of innovation,  learning by doing or labor training and can affect both the level
and rate of growth of the economy.  To the extent that this is true, there is a case for encouraging
investment  to be higher than it would otherwise be.  Implementing  policies to encourage investment- 28 -
involves taking into account the open economy consequences  of investment incentives.  In an open
economy, incentives  for investment  applied  at source pan be undertaken  with little regard for the way in
which capital income is treated at the personal level. The main constraint is the conflict between
investment  incentives  and the role of the corporate tax as a withholding  device against foreigners.  A
reduction in corporate tax liabilities  will encourage investment, especially for domestic corporations.
However, to the extent that they must be applied in a non-discriminatory  way to domestic and foreign
firms alike, they will involve a relatively large revenue loss on foreign firms compared with the extra
investment  they generate.  This is the trade-off that must be judged when designing the corporate tax
system.  The more important  are the externality  arguments  for investment  incentives,  the more would a
country be willing  to forgo the tax transfer of revenues from foreign governments  and the lower would
tax rates be relative to those in the home countries  of foreign investors.
5.  Creadon  of Employment
We  have argued  above  that some  forms of unemployment  may reflect  distortions  on labor markets
that can be offset by government  policies. For example, if unemployment  is caused  by efficiency  wages,
employment subsidies would be appropriate.  Also, frictional unemployment may be  treated with
subsidies  to search. Typically  these sorts of labor market distortions  are best corrected  by labor market
policies. The use of investment  incentives  would  generally  be a second  best policy.  However, for some
reason, political or administrative,  labor market policies may not be available.  Also, as mentioned,
efficiency wage sectors may also be capital-intensive  ones. There may therefore be a case for using
investment  incentives  as a way of creating employment.
If this is the case, exactly  the same issues  are relevant  as in 4 above. The employment-generating
benefits of investment  along with externality  benefits will have to be set against the possible loss of tax
revenues  to foreign treasuries, assuming  one cannot discriminate  against  foreign firms.
6.  Risk-Sharing  and Financing  Problems
To the extent that capital  markets are imperfect,  some firms may be liquidity-constrained  or may
find it costly to undertake risky projects. This may be especially  true for small growing firms who are
short of internal  finance and who cannot self-insure. These  firms may be sensible  targets for investment
incentives, especially  since the corporate tax itself may discriminate against them.  As with 3 above,
incentives  which provide funds up front and in a refundable way are particularly attractive  relative to,- 29 -
say, tax reductions.  The incentives  could be limited to smaller, younger firms and could be temporary.
The same conflict  with the foreign withholding  role ap before also exists here.
7.  Tax Incentives  as Signals
As Bond  and Samuelson  (1986)  have argued, temporary tax incentives  may be used by countries
as signals of their "quality" as locations for foreign investment. 16 To the extent that this is a valid
argument, such tax incentives  would presumably be more effective if they were designed like other
temporary  tax incentives;  that is, if they  got funds to the firm up front in a refundable  way. The trade-off
with the foreign  withholding  function, which was not part of the Bond-Samuelson  analysis, would have
to be addressed. The fact that tax incentives  to foreign firms involves  lost tax revenues to the foreign
treasury makes them a costly, and therefore more effective, signal.
9.  Tax Incentives  to Overcome Thne-Inconsistency  Problems
Finally, as mentioned  above, underinvestment  can occur as a result of the inherent inability  of
governments  to commit  to future tax policies, especially  those which effectively expropriate  the future
returns on quasi-fixed  capital stocks. Since it is unlikely that mechanisms  can be found which commit
future governments  to pre-determined  tax policies, one is left with measures which work to offset the
disincentive  effects of time inconsistency. An obvious example  of this involves  investment  incentives
applied  up-front. Tax holidays  and investment  tax credits would be good examples  of such instruments.
Again, the effectiveness  of these would be contingent  on them not being offset by foreign tax crediting
regimes.
In  summary, there are arguments both  for permanent investment encouragement and  for
temporary incentives. In the case of the latter, the effect on cash flow is often very important.  The
effectiveness and cost of  investment incentives is tempered considerably by  foreign tax  crediting
arrangements. Investment  incentives  will  typically involve  an unavoidable  loss in tax revenues  to foreign
treasuries, unless discriminatory provisions can be applied or  unless the incentives can be applied
selectively  to sectors which rely less heavily on foreign capital.
16 Bond  and Samuelson  used tax holidays  as the government's  choice of instrument,  but others would  do as well.- 30 -
IV.  The Conceptual Impact of Investment Incentives
Investment  incentives  are intended  to induce  fArms  to invest more by increasing  the rate of return
from holding assets.  They can do so in a wide variety of ways.  Firms take a large number of capital
decisions  and investment  incentives  can affect each of them differently. Firms decide how much  capital
of various types to hold, when to acquire the capital, how durable the capital should be and how long to
hold it.  There are many different types of physical  capital including  depreciable  capital of various sorts
(e.g., machinery,  buildings), inventory, depletable  assets (minerals, oil and gas), renewable resources
(forest), and real estate.  In addition, There are various forms of intangible  assets that firms invest in,
such as R&D, advertising,  human capital, and goodwill. The tax system can affect all these decisions.
It can also affect the financial structure of firms, that is, the decision to finance using debt or equity
instruments  of various sorts. The choice of financial  instrument,  by affecting  the cost of funds, will also
affect real investment  decisions. Finally, the tax system will affect in different ways capital decisions
taken  by different  types of industries  or firms. All of this suggests  that the effect  of investment  incentives
can  vary greatly for different types of investment  decisions  in the economy. In fact, the same investment
incentive  can have quite different effects on different decisions. Any attempt to measure the impact is
bound to be imprecise.
One useful summary device for measuring  the impact of investment  incentives  is the marginal
effective  tax rate, hereafter the METR.  The METR measures  the tax wedge at the margin for a given
type of capital demand,  that is, the extent to which the tax system affects the marginal  rate of reurn from
holding  the asset.  The impact  of investment  incentives  can be inferred by computing  how the METR is
affected  by the incentive. In this section we outline the computation  of METRs with special emphasis
on some  of the problems  encountered  with investment  incentives  in developing  economies. Some sample
calculations  are presented.
Before  doing so, it is useful to review some of the limitations  of METRs. First and foremost  is
the fact that the METR measures  only the size of the impact  of tax measures  on the rate of return.  It
does not measure the responsiveness  of investment. This means that its usefulness will ultimately be
limited to  making qualitative judgments and to  comparing alternative incentives.  This  drawback
essentially  arises from the fact that there is currently no acceptable  and reliable technique  for estimating
investment  demand empirically. It would therefore be futile to try and extend the use of METRs to
determine the impact  of investment  incentives  on actual investment. Our state of knowledge  does not
permit that. At the same time, the METR does have the offsetting  advantage  that it isolates completely
tax considerations  from others.- 31 -
Another limitation is that there are potentially an almost indefinite number of METRs in the
economy, each one associated  with a different type of investment  decision. This means that there must
necessarily  be some selectivity or aggregation  involved in presenting METR calculations. In the end,
METR calculations  are essentially  illustrative.
METR measures  also presuppose  a great deal about  the structure  of the economy  and the process
by which production  and investment  decisions  are taken. For example,  they typically  assume competitive
conditions  and use some variant of the neo-classical  theory  of investment  without adjustment  costs as in
JorgensQn  (1963).  They can, however, be extended to include adjustment  costs with some additional
assumptions. METRs are often computed  for a risk-free environment,  or at least one in which firms
maximize  only expected  returns. When the costs of risk-taking  are taking into consideration, it is in a
fairly rudimentary  way.  The financial structure  of firms is usually  taken as given, though it is possible
to measure the incentive  effect of the tax structure  on the financial  structure of the firm.  In the absence
of an accepted  financial  theory, it is typically  necessary  to adopt some arbitrage assumption  for the firm.
That is, because the tax structure treats different types of financing  differently, there will be a different
tax wedge for different types of financial  instruments. One must specify which side of the market bears
the differential  tax.  (We return to the arbitrage  assumption  below.) The behavior of the firm is modeled
quite  simply  as that of maximizing  the present  value  of the stream  of dividends  to shareholders. Problems
of management  and labor, such as incentive problems  of the principal-agent  sort that have figured so
prominently  in both labor economics  and the theory of finance, are essentially  assumed  away.  Finally,
the theory typically treats capital decisions  as being perfectly divisible.  In actual fact, many types of
capital  decisions  are lumpy and the usual problems  of non-convexities  arise. These can probably  be best
dealt with on a case by case basis.
Despite these limitations, the METR is probably the best available indicator of the incentive
effects of the tax structure. There are two other alternatives. The first is to measure average  effective
tax rates.  The other is to do rate of return calculations  on a project-specific  basis.  Consider the latter
first.  Calculating  the pre- and post-tax  rates of return for specific projects is a feasible thing to do and
certainly gives a good indication  of the proportion  oF  a project's return that accrues to the government.
As well, it might indicate for the project whether tax considerations are critical in determining the
viability  of the project, that is, whether  taxes turn the project from having a positive present value to a
negative  one, or vice versa.  Unfortunately,  the results are not likely to be of more general applicability.
The general incentive  effects of a tax system depend  upon how it affects marginal decisions. Marginal
investment  projects are difficult  to identify, and it is not likely that the specific projects analyzed  are32 -
marginal. That means  that at least a portion  of the rate of return accruing  to the government comes  from
infra-marginal  profits.  One of the great advantages  of METRs is that they are designed  to measure  the
tax rate on the marginal  project.
The other alternative  is to measure  average effective  tax rates, by which is meant the ratio of tax
liabilities  to capital  income, where capital income is typically adjusted  for inflation  and true depreciation
and may include both equity and interest income before taxes.  17 These will differ from METRs for
a variety of reasons.  Since  they are average rates they will include both the tax collected  on marginal
projects and that collected  on infra-marginal  projects. They also measure  taxes collected  ex post on past
investments whereas the METR is that applicable on currently undertaken marginal projects.  Thus,
average tax rates include  windfall  gains and losses  resulting from unexpected  changes  in parameters  and
statutory tax rates.  Average tax rates also fail to account for deferred tax liabilities resulting from
temporary losses or favorable tax treatment.  For these reasons, the average tax rate is not a useful
measure of the incentive  effects of the tax system.  Typically, average effective tax rates are calculated
to be higher than METRs. 8
We proceed now to summarize  the basic theory of METRs and then to consider its application
to the measurement  of the effect of investment  incentives  in developing countries.
A.  Measuring Incentive Effects Using METRs
The METR is the amount  of taxes collected  on the marginal investment,  sometimes  expressed  as
a proportion  of the rate of return on capital. In absolute  terms it is defined  to be the difference  between
the before-tax  rate of return on capital  rg and the after-tax  rate of return on savings rn.  The task of the
investigator  is to compute rg and rn.  The measurement  of rn is conceptually  straightforward  since one
can, in principle, observe market rates of return on savings  and deduct from them the relevant  taxes on
savers.  However, the measurement  of rg is more difficult. To observe it directly one would have to
identify the marginal  project and measure its rate of return.  This would be impossible  to do.  Instead,
what is done is to deduce it indirectly  as follows. Using a theoretical  model  of investment,  an expression
is derived showing  what the marginal  product of capital  would have to be in order to cover all costs (the
user cost of capital). This is converted  to a rate of return expression containing  the components  of cost,
17 Examples  of these  calculations  may be found in Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux  and Poterba (1983) and Fullerton,  King,
Shoven  and Whalley  (1981).
18 For  cxample, see King and Fullerton  (1984).- 33 -
including  taxes,  that  must  be covered  by the marginal  project. Tbis  rate  of return  is then  calculated  using
the various tax, depreciation  and financial  cost pagameters  faCing  the firm.  As can be seen, this
procedure  is contingent  on the  behavioral  model  used  to derive  the user  cost of capital  expression  of the
firm. We  present  a simple  version  of that  next  for the  case  of depreciable  capital  incorporating  a simple
system  of capital  income  taxes.
1.  Deriving  rg and  rn - lhe  Depreciable  Capital  Case
Much  of the theory  of taxation  and  investment  has been  developed  in the context  of depreciable
capital  so we begin  with  that  case. The marginal  tax rate represents  the difference  between  the pre-tax
rate  of return  on the marginal  investment  and  the after-tax  return  to those  who  finance  it.  To derive  an
expression  for the pre-tax  rate of return, we use the conventional  dynamic  neo-classical  theory  of the
firm.
Consider  a firm which produces  output  according  to the strictly  concave  production  finction
F(Kdi  where  Kt is the capital  stock  at time  t.  All  other  arguments  are suppressed  for simplicity.  In the
absence  of new  share  issues,  the dividend  stream  *  of the firm  may  be written:
D  - (1-u)PP(K,)  - (1-OQ,(,  + 6K)  + uaA,  + A  - i(1-u)B,
(,1)
Where
Pt=  price  of output
w  =  price of investment  goods
u  =  corporate tax rate
0  =  investment  tax credit  rate
5  =  depreciation  rate on capital
i  =  nominal  interest  rate
At =  undepreciated  value  of capital  for tax purposes
Bt=  debt  of the fum.
This  formulation  makes  particular  assumptions  about  the tax structure  which  could  easily  be revised.  19
19 'Me tax bue  is revenue  less nominal  intrest (fB,)  less tax deprection eA
wh.reA  o  A4  AO + Ifed4)  (1  - I.  ds and  Mt,  - t.  8K  is gros  invesment  The  base  for tx  depeciation is- 34 -
A "dot" over a variable indicates  its time rate of change. Thus,  B, - dB/dt  . We work in continuous
time purely for convenience,  though in practice both the tax system and capital markets operate on a
discrete time basis.  All rates of return and tax rates are treated as constant for simplicity.
It is convenient  to write (1) in the following  form:
Dt  =  Xt  +  ft  - i(l  - u)Bt
(2)
where X, is called  the cash flow  of the firm. The latter two terms capture the financial  flows of the firm
with non-shareholders.
Assuming  competitive  capital markets, capital market equilibrium  requires:
pEt = (1-c)9,  + (1 - O)Dt  (3)
where  p  is the nominal after-tax  rate of return on equity to existing shareholders,  E, is the value of
equity in the firm, c is the shareholders'  personal  tax rate on capital gains (converted  to an effective  rate
on accruals) and  0  is the shareholders' tax rate on dividends. Solving (3) for Et gives:
= t i)(t)s(  a  Et =  . {  c  D,(l  @ds.
(4)
Thus, the equity value of the firm is the tax-adjusted  dividend stream discounted  by  p/(1 - c)  , which
is the pre-tax return on equity (retained  earnings)  held in the firm.
The equity value defined  by (4) would be a suitable objective function for the firm.  However,
as  it stands  it will  not  yield  an internal  solution. Both an investment  policy  (k)  and a financial  policy (i)
reduced  by the investment  tax credit,  which  is commonly  the case.  Other  variants  could  be readily  incorporated.- 35 -
must be determined. However, as is obvious from inspection, the objective function is monotonic in
B,.20 To avoid this problem, we treat the financial structure.  as exogenously  given, a procedure which
is  common in  this  literature.  In  particular, we  assume that  the  debt-equity ratio  is  given as
b  D  B/B,  21  Using this definition  of b in (2), substituting  the result in (3) and again solving for (4)
yields:
E  (b+ (l  c))lf  JXs
where
(IP)+  i(l  - )B (1  a))
r  -(I-c)  -c)  (6)
I  + bi1_-
(1 - c)
We can think of r as the nominal  cost of financial  capital to the firm. It is a weighted  average of the cost
of equity finance  (p/(t-c))  and the cost of debt finance  (1(i-u)).  Furthermore, the weights can be
shown to be the proportions in  which additional investment is financed by new debt and retained
earnings. 22
20 The financial  part of the objective  function  may be written:  |e  '  (1, -i(l  - u)B,) 
21  This procedure of assuming  that a  firm's optimization  can be treated as a  two-stage problem with the first stage
representing  the choice of a  financial structure and the second stage  a real capital structure can be justified under certain
restrictive  assumptions.  For example,  if the frm's  costs of debt  and/or equity  capital  are increasing  functions  of the debt-equity
ratio, that will be the case.  (rhis is demonstrated  analytically  in Boadway  (1987).)  It will also be true if the finn is quantity
constrained  in debt, or if the financial  structure  of the firm is determined  by its cash flow according  to the 'pecking order' of
costs of various sorts of finance.
22  From the capital market equilibrium  condition  (3), for a given value  of E,, reducing current dividends  by S1 causes
share values  to rise by  (I  )  dollars. Therefore,  increasing  retained  eamings by (1 -P) will cause the value of equity  to rise
by (1 - O)'M)  . The fixed debt-equity  ratio requires that B  = bE.  Therefore, to keep b fixed, the debt in¢rease.p
(I  C)
accompanying  the,  increase in retained eamnings  is given by P - b(1 - P) (~.Solving this expression forfl  gives
(1  C)- 36 -
The incorporadon  of new  issues  as a source  of equity  flnance  can  readily  be done. The nominal
cost  of new  equity  finance  can  be shown  to equal  )  .sS  (1-  IL  -c))  where  a is the required  return
(1-0)  (1-8)
to new  shareholders.23  If a proportion  a of equity  finance  is from  retained  earnings,  the cost  of capital
can be written  as:
r  =  uP(l  - u) + (  - p)[a  P  +  (1 a)((  + a(  (1-)(7)
where  p a  u  2  is the proportion  of new  investment  which  Is  debt-financed.
I  +b  (14)
By (5), the equity  value of the firm is proportional  to the present value of the cash flow
discounted  by the cost of capital  r.  If we take  this latter  to be the objective  function  of the firm, the
first-order  condition  on the real investment  decision  of the firm  can be shown  to equal: 24
PF'(C)  I  t  +  - 4  Q/  - - ua)  (8) Q  1~~~-u  r+9
1  8  (1 - 0)1(1  - )  in th  text.
23  Tho  logic  behind  thi  is  follows. Treat (4) as referring  to value  per  share.  Let d  mDc'  be the flow  of real
dividends  per share. If d were  constant  over  time,  integration  of (4)  would  yield  E - d(1  - 0V)/(1  - C)  . For genelity we
(ai(I  - c) -it
allow  the required  rate  of return  to  new  equity  owner a to  differ  from  existing  shareholder  p.  From  the point  of view  of new
equity  ownrs tho  analogous  expression  for the  value  per share  would  beE  - - 0)/(1  -)  )  Consider  now  a new  share
isue of 3.l.  In itself,  this  will  cause  the  value  of existing  equity  to fall  by S1. Using  the above  expression  for  E, a change  in
E of  $1 i equivalent  to a change  in the pepetuallow of  dividends  of d - a  - x O  . This  is the flow  cost  to
exing  sharholder of raing  one  dollar  of new  oquity.  See  also  Auerbach  (1979).
24  Thc atuai  problem  of the firm is:
mA  fo  -1PR(K)l  - u) - (I  - )Q.(k,  + 8KI) + uaA]d
st. A, +cA,  = (1  - oQft, + air- 37 -
where  time  subscripts  have  been  suppressed  for simplicity.  Next,  denotingp  and  q as real  prices  obtained
by deflating  P and  Q  by  c-  where  X is the inflatibn  rate, (8) becomes:
pFR'(K)  r  - i  +  4/g (I  I  -(  {  (9)
q  1 -u  - r  a)
Ihis  is a standard  user cost of capital expression  incorporating  taxes.  It  represents  the
gross-oftax  marginal  product  of capital. To convert  it to a rate of return we subtract  the economic
depreciation  rate. The gross  rate  of return  rg is defined  as:
r=  r  _  _  + 6  _  _  _-  _  ue  )  -(8 - 41q)  (10)
The measurement  of rg (i.e., the components  of  ts right-hand  side) is an essential  ingredient  of the
marginal  effective  tax calculation.  The definition  of the  marginal  effective  tax rate is simply t - rg  - r.
where  r,, is the real  after-tax  rate of return  to savers. In the context  of this model,  rn is given  by:
r,  =  i(l  - m) + (1 - 0)(ap  + (1 - a)a) -:  (11)
where  m is the personal  tax rate on interest income. Equations  (10) and (11) form the basis for
measuring  marginal  tax rates, the details  of which  we return  to below.
This  basic  formulation  has made  a number  of rather  restrictive  assumptions.  Before  turning  to
other  sorts  of capital  decisions,  it is worth  considering  the implications  of relaxing  some  of them.
2.  lhe Implications  of Relaxing  Some  Assumptions
a.  Non-exonential  depreciation
Neither  the rate of real depreciation  nor the rate of tax depreciation  need  be exponential. We could
define a depreciation  finction  A(E) , for example, such that  X - ±  + &(K . In this case, the term a
in (9)  and  (10)  would  be replaced  by  A'(E)  . Similarly,  vintage  capital  could  also  be incorporated.  The- 38 -
tax depreciation  rate could take on any arbitrary pattern as well.  The term  ua/(r + a)  is the present
value of the tax savings from future depreciation  deductions  when an exponential  depreciation  schedule
is used. For other depreciation  schemes,  this would  simply  be replaced  with the appropriate  present  value
expression.25
More generally, it is convenient  to write rg in a slightly more concise way.  Define Z as the
present value of the future tax savings from depreciation  allowances per dollar of gross investment.
Then, r8 may be written:
r.  +  41q -it  (1  - 0)(  - Z)  - (8  - 4q)  (10') 1u
Note that (10') could  be obtained from the following  simplified  maximization  problem for the firm:
)  ^f Je  '¶P 1F(K 1)(1 - u)  - (1 - O)(1 - Z)QA(K  +  WK*]t
The term  (1 - o(l  - z)  can be interpreted as the effecdve purchase price of capital goods taking
account  of the tax saving due to the investment  tax credit and future depreciation  deductions.
b.  7hne-varylng  tax parwmeters
For some of the tax incentives  we are interested  in, the firm will face a set of tax provisions  that
vary over time.  The simplest case of this is the tax holiday, but other temporary tax provisions are
similar in that regard.  As well, tax parameters  may vary because the status of the firm changes  over
time.  For examnle, the firm may change from having negative to  positive taxable income.  For
illustrative  purposes we consider the tax holiday case.  Define the effective statutory corporate tax rate
of the firm to be u, at time t.  This may also be the actual statutory tax rate and will be elaborated on
further  below.  The firm's after-tax  net revenue  at time t is then  PF(K)(I - u)  . The after-tax  net cost
25  For example, indexing the book value of capital for depreciation  would change the present value expression to
ual(r + a  - i).  Alternatively,  straightline  depreciation  over a length  of life T  would give a present value  of tax savings of
u(l  - ejfrT.- 39 -
of investment  to the firm is  QO,1 - Z)  , where  Z, is the present  value at time t of future tax depreciation
allowances  per dollar of gross investment. For simplicity,  we exclude  the investment  tax credit, although
it could easily  be added.
The representative  firm maximizes  the present value of its after-tax cash flow.  Following  the
above simplification,  its problem can be formulated  as follows:
fT |;NP,F(K)(I  - u,) - (1  -Z,)Q,(K, + 8K,)
where R, is the nominal discount factor in period t and satisfies  A,  I/R,  -r,  . Here r. is the nominal
after-tax  cost of finance to the firm at time t defined  as above  to be a weighted  average of the cost of debt
and the rate of return on equity.
The solution of this problem yields a set of conditions characterizing the long run
profit-maximizing  choice of K, at each point of time:
;  F'(I4,)  rt  8-~+  41 /IQ,  (I  Z  4  +  t'  (12)
_____at  - us  (2
The last  term involving  the change  in Zt reflects the fact that an additional  cost of holding  an incremental
dollar of capital is the fact that postponing  the purchase  of capital will increase future tax savings  by  2,
(which could be positive or negative). Using this expression,  rg becomes:
=  r,SI  4I  I  ( 1 - Z)  +  lt  -5  +  (13)
To apply this expression to particular cases, we need to  specify the path of u,, rp, and 4
Consider  the case in which  the firm  operates  under  a tax holiday  for the time period 0  ** H.  No
taxes are paid by the firm over the tax holiday period.  Also, suppose that, as in some countries (e.g.,
Malaysia  until 1988), depreciation  allowances  can be delayed until the end of the tax holiday.  At that
time, all accumulated  tax savings  from annual depreciation  allowances  could be set off against  revenues-40  -
earned by the firm in the first tax year following  the tax holiday period.  Assume  that the profits of the
firm at the time immediately  following  the tax holid4y are sufficiently  large t,o  absorb all depreciation
allowances  that have accumulated  over the tax holiday period.  Should the firm decide to distribute its
profit during the holiday period, the dividends received by its shareholders are also exempted  from
personal  income taxes.
These features  of the treatment of tax holiday firms make the computation  of the before-tax  rate
of return on investment  complicated. The tax holiday  provisions make  Zt, r, and ut all vary over time.
Consider  the computation  of u,  rt and Zt in turn. 26 The effective  statutory corporate tax u, to the firm
over the tax holiday period is zero since the firm is completely exempt from paying any tax on its
income.  However, the corporate tax rate will revert to the standard rate u after the tax holiday.
Therefore,
= tfor  0 s t  s H(
u,  for t  2H  (14)
The cost of finance to the firm is given by:
r,  - P1(1  - u)  +  (I  - p(1
where we have neglected  new equity issues and we treat the parameters  fi, i and  p  as fixed. The cost
of funds to the firm will differ between the taxable and tax holiday firms because of the differences  in
Ut.
The calculation  of the present value of tax savings due to depreciation  Z must take into account
the carryforward  from the tax holiday to the taxpaying  period of accumulated  depreciation  expenses  as
well as the variable discount rate.  The value of Z, will vary depending  upon when the investment  is
undertaken. For investments  made during the tax holiday period, Z, will be given by:
Z,  - m(Ro-  *  d  . u,  a  iJDds  (16
For t >  H, the expression  for Z7  is the same as in equation (9) above.  Note that Zt is a monotonically
increasing  function with respect to time t within  the pioneer period. Using equations  (14), (15) and (16)
along  with (13), the time profile of the before-tax  rate of return on capital rg(t) for a pioneer firm can
26 This  computstion  is adopted from  Boadway,  Chua and  Platers (1989).-41  -
be euaily  calculated. It will vary over the tax holiday period and will become constant  after the transition
to full taxpaying status.  Below we provide some sanlple calculations  for this tax holiday case.
c.  Monopoly  behavior
If the firm is a monopolist,  the left-hand  side of (8) becomes the marginal revenue product per
unit of capital, (P + PIF(K))F 1/Q, or  (I -/il)PFI/Q  where  'i  is the elasticity  of demand. Calculating
the marginal  distortion  using (10)  would  capture  only the tax distortion,  the difference  between  the private
gross rate of return and the net return to savings. Ihe  social gross rate of return would have to include
the monopoly  distortion and would  be given  by:
r+-/qj  )-'-8-/  (17
O  (1-1/Ii)(1-u)  r+a(
Monopsony  power in the purchase  of capital inputs is a special  case of adjustment  costs to which we turn
next
d.  Adjustment  costs
Ihe  implication  of adjustment  costs for measuring  the marginal  tax rate depends upon the form
of the adjustment  costs and upon the extent to which they are tax deductible. Consider as an example
the case In  which adjustment  costs  are separable  and are given  by the function  y(t,K).  We denote  by  y,
the derivative of the adjustment  cost function with respect to its Lth  argument.  If a proportion x of
adjustment  costs are tax-deductible,  the objective  function of the firm must include as part of the cash
flow the term  -(I -xu)y(KK)  The first-order conditions  then simplify  to:
PFI(K)  I- x(y2+ry-1)  . Q( 1 ,  0(1  ua )--!  (18)
Q  1-u  Q  I1-u  41-rx-42  -
The left-hand side represents  the gross marginal  product  of capital after adjustment  costs.  If adjustment
costs were independent  of tax, the procedure suggested above for measuring rg would appropriately
capture the social rate of return after adjustment  costs.  A sufficient  condition for this would be that
x =  1 (so adjustment  costa are tax-deductible)  and ra is independent  of taxes.  Failing this, the proper
measurement  of rg would require terms involving  the adjustmnent  cost function  which is not observable.
In practice, we are typically  able only to measure  rg without  accounting  specifically  for adjustment  costs.
To that extent, the METR will inaccurately  neglect  the interaction  of the tax system  with adjustment  costs
and would  only given an approximate  measure  of the full distortion due to the tax.
Auerbach (1990) argues that the usual assumption  of instantaneous  capital stock adjustment  is
quire restrictive  as the firms attempt  to dampen  the swings in capital stock due to changes in the rental
price of capital. Thus, a forward-looking  investment  behavior  would depend  upon the weighted-average
of current and future costs of capital, taking into account the adjustment  costs of additional  investment.
He suggests  that the introduction  of time-variant  tax parameters and convex adjustment  costs would be
consistent  with such behavior.  This can be accomplished  by introducing  an adjustment  cost parameter
in the marginal  cost of capital goods to capture increase in effective capital goods prices to the firm per
unit of additional  investment.
3.  METs for Other  Investment  Decisions
In principle, an effective tax rate could be derived and measured for any sort of decision for
which taxes impinge at the margin.  We present below the derivation  of rg for three different cases -
non-depreciable  capital and depletable resource properties.  Other interesting cases which could be
worked out include  research and development,  investment  and harvesdng of renewable  resources, labor
training, advertising and marketing, etc.  IN each case what would be involved is a derivation  of rg
which, in turn, requires a theory about the way the capital decision in question is determined.  The
computation  of an effective  tax rate as t=rg  - rn is as before.
a.  Non-depreciable  capital
The rate of return on non-depreciable  capital (e.g. land) is simple  the special case of depreciable
capital where 6 =  a  = 0.  Thus (10) reduces  to:- 43 -
rf=  -0l-O+4,/q.  (19)
1-u
Recall the taxes generally influence  r as in (7).  In general taxes will have an ambiguous  effect on rg.
In the absence of inflation and the investment  tax credit (Or,  =  0), rg would be higher than in the
absence  of taxation because only part of the cost of holding  the land would be tax-deductible  (i.e., the
interest cost).  However, the ability  to deduct nominal interests costs when inflation is present and the
ability  to claim an investment  tax credit would both reduce the effective  tax rate.
b.  Inventory  capital
A completely  general theory of the holding  of inventories  can be very complicated  indeed  owing
to the dynamic nature of the problem.  We make some reasonable  simplifications  to make the problem
both manageable and intuitive.  In particular, we model the firm in the steady state. 27 The firm
produces an output X using as an some raw material.  An amount R of the raw material Is held as
inventory  (or work in progress). The average holding  period of a unit of inventory is T = R/X, chosen
by the firm.  The firm produces a unit of output using a unit of raw material drawn from inventory  and
incurs  cost of C (X, R) where C1 >  0, C2 < 0.  The price of output is Q and the purchase  price of raw
materials  P.
The corporate  tax base includes  total revenues  (QX) less current costs (C) less interest costs less
the First-In-First-Out  (FIFO) value of raw materials taken out of inventory. 28 We denote P-T as the
FIFO value of goods taken out of inventory  after being held there a length of time T.  The problem of
the firm at time zero is:
Mx, flo e -((1-u)(Qx-C(X,R))-P(X+A)  +uP.X)t  (20)
27The  following  analysis  is adopted  from Boadway,  Bmee and Mintz  (1982). It might  be noted  that from an analytical  point
of view, the tratment  of renewable  resources  would be similar to that of inventories.
2SWe nalyzethe caseof FIFO tax accounting  for iDlustrative  purposes. Some  countries  (e.g. the United  States)  allow firma
to use LIFO accounting  for taxes.-44 -
where  T-R/X  and PX.+*)  represents  the new acquisition  of raw materials. The first order conditions
for this problem reduce to
-C(X,R)  r-(I  -ue6)y  1)
p  1-u
where  y  , the rate of change  in the nominal  price of the good held as inventory. This expression
gives the marginal  benefit of a unit of inventory  holdings. To convert it to a rate of return, we subtract
the real capital loss on holding a unit of inventory  (which is the analog of true depreciation  here), so:
1  __(I  -u__I  P  (22)
where  OMp4P-u  , the rate of change in the price of inventory relative to that of other goods in the
economy.
C.  Depletable  resources
We with inventories, we must make some simplifying assumption to render the problem of
exploiting  non-renewable  resources manageable. We consider  a firm which is simultaneously  involved
in exploration,  investment  in mining  facilities,  and extraction. Inventories  are excluded  so that sales equal
extraction; it would be  relatively straightforward  to  add inventories.  The taxation of resources is
notoriously  complex  in practice. For illustrative  purposes  we consider a relatively simple scheme which
incorporates  most of the key issues. 29
In the exploration  state the firm hires current inputs L at a price W and produces a depletable
asset according  to the strictly concave production function  S(L).  It then invests in mining capital K at
a price Q to make the asset ready for extraction. The production function is Z(K, F) where F is the
current use of the previously  discovered  asset. This is the only state at which depreciable  capital is used,
though it would be straightforward  to allow for it at either of the other two states.  Finally, the firm
extracts  an amount  Y of the resource  according  to the strictly  convex  nominal  cost function  C(Y) and sells
it at a price P.  The dividend flow resulting from this three-stage  process is:
29n# folwing  anlysis is adopted from  Boadway,  Bmce, McKenzie  and Mintz (1987).- 45 -
D-PY-C(Y)-WL-Q(k  +6K)+  -iB-T  (23)
where  T is the tax liability.
The expression  for tax liabillties  can  vary widely  from  jurisdiction  to jurisdiction  and  from one
resource  to another.  Typically,  firms  will  be liable  both  for a special  resource  tax  and  for a corporate  tax.
We assume  the resource  tax is of the form  of a severance  tax (or loyalty)  based  on the output  produced.
The  corporate  tax generally  involves  generous  write-off  provisions  as well  as some  deduction  or for the
use of the asset itself (a depletion  allowance). We assume  a severance  tax rate of g based  on total
revenues.  The corporate  tax liability  will be written:
T. -u[PY-C(Y)  -WL - aA -R -iB] +4Q(  +  8K).  (24)
Here, R is the depletion allowance  and is defined to be R =  t (PY - C (Y) - aA), though most tax
systems  are more  complicated  than  that. All  other  variables  in (24)  are the same  as defined  earlier.
Proceeding  as before,  using  the expression  for taxes  and the severance  rate, we define  the case
flow  of the firm  to be:
X  =PY(1  -u(l -t)-g)-C(Y)(1  -u(1  -t))-WL(1  -u)
-Q(1  -,O)(fC+8K)+aAu(I-).  (25)
The firm maximzes  the present  value of its cash flow discounted  by r as in (7) and subject  to the
equation  of motion  on A and  the following  two  resource  constraints:
f "(Y -Z(,K))dtiO
(26)
f  "(F  -S()dttO.  2
The  first  states  that  the total  resource  extracted  cannot  exceed  the  total  developed,  while  the second  states
that  the total resource  developed  cannot  exceed  the total found.  In a more general version  of this
problem,  this constraint  would  have  to hold  at each  point  in time.
The first  order  conditions  for this problem  on  kAL  ,œ  Y  respectively  reduce  to:-46  -
=  Z  (r-w  +8  -4/q)  (I -+)(1- au(1 -t)  (27)
q  K  1-u0 -0 -gp/Wp-c )  r+a
(-ct  AZ  aS  l-u  (28)
w  aP aL  1-u(1-t) -gp/(p-c0)
-4'  P  (r-x)g
p-c'  P  (1-u(1-t))(1-(cW/p))
The  first  of these  is simply  the before-tax  gross  marginal  product  of capital. To convert  it to r, subtract a -4/q
as before. The second equation  is the social value  of marginal  product per unit of input L.  An effective
tax rate can be  obtained directy  by subtracting unity from (28).  The final equation is a form of
Hlotelling's  rule.  It gives the gross rate of return to society  from not extracting  the resource. It can be
converted  to an effective  tax wedge by subtracting  rn.
3.  Some  Issues  in Applying  MEMRs
Effective  tax rate computations  are based on calculating  values for rn as given by (11) and rg as
given  by (10) or its analog for other sorts of capital. The procedure typically  followed is to attempt to
evaluate  all the parameters  in, say, equations  (10) and (11) for some level of aggregation  and for some
assumed  values  for the various parameters. Before  outlining  the method  used to obtain  parameter  values,
it is worth  mentioning  some important  conceptual  Issues  and assumptions  used as well as their limitations.
a.  lhe level  of aggregaion
Given the specificity  of most tax structures, there are in principle a large number of marginal
distortions  on investment in the economy.  Some aggregation is inevitable.  On the asset side, the
minimum  amount  of disaggregation  often used is by type of asset (machinery,  building, land, inventory,
and depletable  assets). Beyond  that, METRs  may  be variously  disaggregated  by industry, by size of firm,
by location  (e.g., province  or region), and by year.  On the financing  side, some disaggregation  may be
done by type of asset holder, for example, income class, tax status, type of financial institution,  etc.- 47  -
There are two alternative  procedures for obtaining aggregate effe, a  tax rates from data which are
available  at varying  degrees  of disaggregation. One procedure, follow .ig by King and Fullerton (1984),
is to calculate  effective  tax rates at the lower levels of aggregation  and aggregate  the METRs  up by some
weighting  procedure. The other Is to aggregate  the underlying  parameters  up first and then calculate  the
aggregate  METR at the higher level of aggregation. This is the procedure followed  by Boadway,  Bruce
and Mintz (1984).
b.  The  arbitrage  assumption
A key distinguishing  feature of alternative  effective tax calculations concerns which arbitrate
assumption  is chosen  and consequently  which  rates of return are taken as given. The need for an arbitrate
assumption  arises because of the fact that tax systems impose varying burdens on different sources of
finance  - debt, retained  earnings  and new issues. This implies  that differential  burdens  must be imposed
on some agents  in capital  markets. The arbitrate  assumption  stipulates  which agents  in the market are able
to compete  away differential  tax burdens. We outline four arbitrate assumptions  that have been used in
the literature.
King and Fullerton (1984) adopt  two alternative  arbitrage assumptions  and present the results of
each in their inter-country  comparisons. They are the so-called  fixed-p and fixed-s cases.  Their fixed-p
assumption  involves  comparing  projects with the same before-tax rate of return.  This is analogous  to
assuming  rg is the same on all projects (and =  10% in their calculations). Given the characteristics  of
the tax system, one can then work backwards  and compute  for each firm the cost of funds r and also the
after-tax  return to savers i, p and a.  Notice that this implies that different firms face different interest
rates and rates of return on equity.  Thus, the fixed-p assumption cannot correspond with market
equilibrium. Therefore, it cannot succeed  in picking out those investments  which are truly marginal  in
a given  economy. It does measure  the effective  tax rate across  similar projects in different  circumstances.
However,  those different circumstances  involve  both different tax systems and different costs of finance.
Their fixed-s case is that in which all arbitrate occurs at the household level so that, in our
notation, i(l-m) = p =  ao. Households  in different  tax brackets can still face different after-tax  returns,
but for any asset the return is the same to a given household. Starting with given values of the after-tax
return to households  (King and Fullerton  assume  5%), the cost of funds  to firms can be calculated.  Under
the fixed-s assumption,  firms will face different costs of all three sources of finance.
The fixed-p assumption  could probably not be described as an arbitrage assumption  since all
agents are receiving  different returns from the same assets.  As well, the fixed-p assumption  does not- 48 -
represent  a market  equilibrium,  as mentioned  above. A variant  of the fixed-p  case  was  used  by Bradford
and Fullerton  (1981)  who  assumed  that arbitrate  occqrred  at the firm  level. This implies  that  the firm
faces  the same  cost  of finance  from  all sources,  so:
i(  -) lC)  '  (1_)  +  O(  -0  ))
Given  the cost  of funds  to the firm,  the rate  of return  received  by savers  in various  assets,  and thus  rj,
can  be calculated.
The fourth  arbitrate  assumption  is that  used  by Boadway,  Bruce  and  Mintz  (1984). It is referred
to as the open economy asswuption and seems particularly  appropriate  for the case of developing
countries. The basic assumption  is that the cost of debt and equity  finance  facing a country  are
determined  by international  capital  markets. More  particularly,  for debt  and after-tax  return  to fbreign
debt-holders  is given  exogenously.  If starred  refer  to foreign  ones,  the following  international  arbitrate
conditions  must  hold:
0+100 -m I-(I  -c *)(W  -X  = O*+U)(1 -m I.  (30)
This arbitrate  equation,  which  determines  i, assumes  that exchange  rate movements  reflect  differences
in expected  inflation  (and  are taxed  as capital  gains).
On the equity  financing  side, a further  assumption  is made  for data  reasons. The rate  of return
on equity  is calculated  from observed  stock  market  data in a manner  which  does not allow one to
distinguish  the rate of return  on retained  earnings  from that  on new  share  issues. The rate of return  on
equity  paid  by firms  is therefore  assumed  to be the same  for both. Denoting  it by  ps , it is given  by:
1  lc  1_@ (  1  -e)  (1
The  value  of  p 8 must  satisfy  an international  arbitrage  condition  analogous  to (30)  with  p,  replacing
i.  The  net  return  received  by household  savers, p  and  a  , can  then  be computed  from  (31)  and  used
to obtain  rn.  The value  of r paid  by firms  is simply:-49-
r=pi(1 -u) +(1-P)p 8 . (32)
Thus, given observed measures of i and  p,  , all financial rate of return variables can be computed.
Also comparative static or counterfactual  computations  can be done by considering changes in tax or
inflation  rates domestically  given that the right-hand  side of (30) is exogenous.
One advantage of the open economy arbitrate assumption is that it allows us to disaggregate
METR  .calculations into that due to the corporate tax and that due to the personal tax.  In an open
economy facing fixed world rates of return, corporate taxation effects mainly the investment  decision
while  personal  taxes affect savings. The magnitudes  of the relevant  distortions  can be obtained  by taking
the difference  between the world cost of funds r* and either rg or rn as appropriate, where r* = ,i  +
(l-P)p -.
C.  Loss offsetting  and risk
The above  formulations  were based on two implicit assumptions. The first is that negative  tax liabilities
are treated symmetrically  with positive ones.  The other is that the analysis  is based on a deterministic
model  of household choice.
The absence  of full loss offsetting can, in principle, be incorporated  into the above theory.  In
theory, its effect can either increase  or decrease marginal  tax rates, though the former seems most likely
to occur. In the context  of depreciable  assets, the absence  of full loss  offsetting  reduces  the present value
of depreciation  write-offs  and the investmnent  tax credit  (ua/(r+a),O)  and reduces the value of interest
write-offs  ui (thereby increasing  the effective  cost of debt finance). Both these increase rg to the extent
that depreciation  or interest write-offs  are postponed. On the other hand, to the extent that revenues  are
earned while the firm is in a non-taxpaying  position, rg will fall (since  the grossing-up  of the user cost
in (10) will be at a rate greater than (1-u)).  The methodology  for taking these difference into account
is similar to that presented  above for the tax holiday firm.
The incorporation  of risk is somewhat  more difficult. One simple  way to think of the way affects
*  is through its effect on the rate of return to equity, p (or a).  One can think of the return to equity p
as comprising  a safe return i* plus a risk premium  h which can be estimated  under certain circumstances.
It has been established in the literature (e.g.Mintz (1982), Gordon (1985)) that full loss offsetting is- so  -
equivalent  to allowing  a deduction  for the cost of risk-taking. To the extent that loss offsetting  of risks
does occur, the risk premium itself ought to be reduce%l  by the tax, h(1-u).  Since our methodology  does
not reduce the risk premium by the tax, it will yield an overestimate  of rg to the extent that loss offsetting
of risk occurs.
Whether or not loss offsetting  occurs  depends on the source of the risk.  If the risk takes  the form
of capital risk as discussed  in Bulow and Summers  (1984), loss offsetting does not occur.  On the oth3r
hand, risks reflected in varying  revenues will almost certainly be partly offset.
Risk can also take the form of uncertainty about future government policy, i.e.,policy risk.
Auerbach (1990) underlines  the importance  of the credibility  of tax regime for the effectiveness  of tax
policies. If an announced  tax policy  change  is seen as a temporary change  only and likely to be reversed,
it will not have the same effect as a possibly less stimulative alternative but one which is seen as
permanent. Also with an uncertain tax climate, investors are likely to demand higher expected  return
from investments.
d.  lhe data
We briefly outline here the manner in which numbers can be attached  to the variables in rg and rn.  The
exact manner in which data are obtained depends upon the level for aggregation  at which effective  tax
rates are being computed.  Nonetheless  the same general approach can be followed in all cases.  The
following  summarizes  the principle  followed  in constructing  the various types of data.
(1)  Flnancing  Ratios (a,a). King and Fullerton  calculate  effective  tax rates separately  for different
sources of finance so they do not really need to use financing ratios.  However, some studies have
incorporated  financial  ratios for different types of firms as an element  of their calculations  thus picking
up the way in which the interest deductibility  provision benefits some types of firms more than others.
These can be constructed  using the structure of liabilities  from published  balance sheets. Depending  on
the application,  either differences  between end-of-year  values of liabilities  of debt, retained earnings  and
new issues, or the stock values themselves  can be used to estimate  1 and a.
ui)  Rates of Return (i,p.o). As mentioned,  King and Fullerton simply  present their effective  tax
rates for arbitrary financial rates of return.  Alternatively,  one can try and measure the actual effective
tax rates for a given year by using observed  financial  data.  The bond rate I can be obtained using long-
tern nominal  corporate  bond yields. The required return on equity before  personal tax can be calculated-51 -
from the inverse  of price-earnings  ratios, where  book  earnings  are corrected  to account  for inflation's
effects  on the capital  stock,  inventories  and  debt  liabijities.  The arbitrage  assumption  requires  that this
also  equal  the  before-tax  return  on new  issues. For calculations  at the industry  level,  an industry-specific
risk  premium  can  be calculated  from capital-asset  pricing  model  studies  and adjusted  for leverage.
(ii) Inflation  Rate (ir).  Again, King  and Fullerton  simply  assume  a given rate of inflation.
Alternatively,  the expected  inflation  rate can be estimated  using an ARIMA  forecast  based  on the
consumers  price  index  as in Boadway,  Bruce  and Mintz(1984).
r*v)  Real Capital  Gains  (4Iq,p/p).  Expected  capital  gains on capital  goods and resources  can, in
principle,  be estimated  by the same  source  procedure  ,.3  for inflation,  using  the appropriate  capital  good
series  or resource  price  index. For resources  subject  to royalties,  it is also  necessary  to know  the profit
margin  (p-c)p.  These  can be calculated  by using  estimates  of the short run cost function. In most
applications,  real capital  gains  have  simply  been  ignored  since  their estimates  are regarded  as not  being
reliable.
(v) Depreciation  Rate (5). Depreciation  rate  calculations  are typically  based  upon  length  of life data  for
various  types of capital.  Where necessary,  service  lives can be aggregated  using as weights  the
proportions  of gross  investment.  Service  lives  L can  be converted  to equivalent  exponential  depreciation
rates  by the formula  6=2/L.  See  Hulten  and  Wykoff  (1981).
(vi) Holding Period  for  Inventories (7).  These can be calculated  from the ratio of average
monthly  inventories  to average  monthly  shipments.
(vii) Corporate  Tax Parameters (Cf,  u, O).  In most  countries,  the corporate  tax rate and the
investment  tax credit  rates  depend  upon  the type  and size  of industry,  and  the type  of investment.  For
each  type  of capital  good, statutory  tax rates  can be aggregated  appropriately  according  to the share  of
income  taxable  at various  rates. A similar  procedure  can be used for the investment  tax credit. For
depreciation  rates, when  the tax system  allows  declining  balance  write-offs,  a  can be calculated  as an
average  of th-e  rates applicable  to various types  of capital  using as weights  the amounts  of gross- 52 -
investment. When straight-line depreciation  is allowed, the expression for rg has to be amended as
indicated  earlier.  0
(Wit)  Personal Tax Returns (m, 0, c).  Typically,  very little disaggregation  occurs on the saving
side.  The personal  tax rate on interest  income is calculated  as an average of marginal  tax rates on capital
income across all income classes.  In the case of dividends,  this must be corrected  for any dividend  tax
credit that exists. The capital gains tax rate is somewhat  more difficult  to calculate  since c is an accrued
tax rate whereas capital gains are actually  taxed on realization. The accrued tax rate c is calculated  such
that the present  value of capital  gains tax payment  based on realized  taxation is equal  to the present  value
of taxes levied on accrued gains discounted  by the shareholders' after-tax cost of equity finance.  The
average holding  period of shares can be taken as the ratio of shares floated to volume of shares traded.
The realized capital  gains tax rate itself may differ from the personal tax rate on other forms of capital
income.
B.  Using MEIRs to Evaluate Investment Incentives
In principle,  it should be relatively  straightforward  to use the MEMT  methodology  to determine
the size of incentive  offered by various types of measure design to encourage investment. Once can
calculate  the METR in the presence and the absence  of incentives  and see explicitly by how much the
incentive  changes  the marginal  tax rate on investment  decisions  of various sorts.  As mentioned  there are
limitations  to using METRs and they  apply equally well here.  For one thing, there will be a large
number of potential METRs corresponding  with the many  types of capital decisions undertaken by the
many  different agents  in the economy. Most METR  studies show considerable  dispersion  of rates across
the economy.  The same incentive can have very different effects on different types of investment
decisions. Thus, it is difficult  to characterize  the effects  of investment  incentives  in a simple and general
way. Instead, one may be left with  presenting  a series of essentially  illustrative  calculations  of the effects
of investment  incentives  in different  circumstances. It is naturally  quite important  for evaluative  purposes
to select the appropriate  sample calculations  for illustrating  the effects of incentives.
For another thing, the information  content  of MEIR effects is limited. While it shows the size
of the incentive  imposed  at the margin on a particular sort of investment  decision, it does not show the
magnitude  of response of investment  to the incentive. Nor does it show the tax revenue effects to the- 53 -
government. This means that, while METR calculations  will be useful for analyzing  tax reform issues,
they will be less so for the positive analysis  of the effect of incentives  on economic  activity.
The use of the METR methodology  for illustrating  the effect of investment  incentives  can be
illustrated  by some sample  calculations. Below  we report on a selection  of effective  tax rate calculations
designed  to illustrate  a number  of different effects. Before  doing so,  it is worth discussing some of the
key dimensions  of the effect of investment  incentives  that are likely to be of interest in evaluating  them.
These will influence  the sorts of METR calculations  that are most worth doing.
1.  Comparatlve  effects of alternative  instruments
Different ways of encouraging investment  can have very different impacts on the incentive to invest
depending  on the circumstances. Indeed, some measures  which on the surface might appear to provide
incentives  to invest  may actually  do the opposite. This can be illustrated  by some examples. Consider
first measures  involving  reductions  in tax rates, either permanently  or temporarily. The effect of this on
investment  incentives  to a great extent on the sign of METR.  This can be either positive or negative
depending  on the generosity  of deductions  and credits for capital  costs. A result that has been established
in the literature is that, in the absence of investment  tax credits, a corporate income tax will be neutral
if the present  value of deductions  for capital costs(i.e., interest and depreciation)  just equal  the initial  cost
of capital. 30 If the present value of deductions  exceeds  the initial capital cost, the METR is negative,
and vice versa.  In these circumstances,  a reduction in the statutory tax rate will typically reduce the
absolute  value of the METR, but will not change its sign.31 Thus, if the effective  tax rate is negative
to start with, reductions  in tax rate will make it less negative,  thereby reducing  the incentive  that already
exists for investment.
This ambiguous  effect of tax rate reductions arises because of the fact that the tax rate applies
both to deductions  and to revenues. Measures  which apply  only on the deduction  side would  be expected
to have unambiguous  effects on the direction of change in incentive to invest.  These would include
investment  tax credits, accelerated  depreciation,  enhanced  deductions  for the cost of finance, and the like.
30Mi  is originally  due to Smith  (1963), but is discussed  more fully in Stglitz (1973) and Broadway  and Bruce (1984).
It can be generalized  to include investment  tax credits.
31We suy 'typically' because  r8 is non-linear  in the tax rate u and in some circumstances  the effect can go the other way.
A reduction  in u will increase  the cost of funds r and reduce  the present  value of tax saving  from depreciation  Z, but wiil also
reduce  the taxation  of revenues. The outcome  of these opposing  tendencies  might be expected  usually  to be to reduce  METR,
but neod not always  do so.- 54 -
2.  lhe absence  offull  loss offseting
Most tax systems  allow only partial offsetting  of losses. Losses can usually be carried forward
for a specified  period of time, and perhaps backward  also.  In these circumstances,  the effect of various
investment  incentives  will  depend  upon the tax status of the firm and upon  the nature of the tax incentive.
A distinction  might be drawn here between  three different types of investment  incentives. One is a tax
rate reduction as already discussed.  Another is an incentive which changes the timing but not the
magnitude  of deductions,  such as accelerated  depreciation. The third is an incentive  which increases  the
amount of deduction, such as investment  tax credit.  These three types of incentives  can have quite
different relative effects on taxpaying  and non-taxpaying  firms.
For example, temporary  tax reductions(e.g.,  tax holidays)  will have very little, if any, effect on
the incentive  to invest for a firm in a tax loss position.  Since the firm is not taxpaying when the tax
reduction is in effect, the tax rate is essentially  irrelevant. The exception  to this is if the tax holiday is
accompanied  by some measures  which allow for the selective  carryforward of some capital cost.  For
example, if depreciation  deductions  are elective, as they are in some tax systems, the firm can choose
not to take them until the end of the tax holiday period.  In this way, they can have an incentive  effect
on investment.
Similarly,  measures which essentially  accelerate  the timing of a given stream of deductions  will
have minimal  impact  if they accelerate  them into  periods when the firm is non-axable.  In this case, the
firm cannot take advantage  of the acceleration  and at best simply carries forward the deduction into
taxable  periods later on.  Incentives  which increase  the total amount  of write-off  will continue  to provide
increased  benefit to the investing  firm, though not at the same level as if there were full loss offsetting.
If the incentives  like the investment  tax credit were refundable,  this discrimination  against  tax loss firms
would be eliminated.
The implications  of tax losses for investment  incentives  varies depending  upon the pattern of
taxable income  for the firm.  There is an indefinite  number of time paths of tax losses that are possible
depending  upon the nature and history of the firm. For example,  young growing  firms might  be expected
to face a period of negative  taxable  income  while  they are undertaking  investnents and getting  themselves
established  in the market.  For  them, the  absence of  loss offsetting provisions is  particularly
damaging. Large established  firms are more likely to be in a taxpaying position,  though older declining
firms may well be in a phase of tax losses. For the latter, carry forward provisions are unlikely to be
of mush use.  The best that can be done is to base illustrative calculations  on typical patterns of tax-55  -
losses, though some attempt  has been made in the literature to use data on the actual  histories of firms
as a basis for effective  tax calculations.32
3.  The treatent  of risk
The treatment  of risky firms is related  to the issue of loss offsetting  since risky ventures can give
rise to negative  taxable income  in some  periods. As mentioned,  two types of risk have been  distinguished
in the literature-income  risk and capital risk.  Income risk involves  uncertainty about the future stream
of net revenues  because  of such things as output  price, wage rate and demand  uncertainty. It is reflected
in fluctuations  in taxable income.  As mentioned  earlier, full loss offsetting is equivalent to allowing
deductibility  for income risk.  .However, in the absence of full loss offsetting, firms faced with income
risk would be put at a disadvantage  relative to non-risky firms.  For the same reason, investment
incentives  will apply  differentially  to the greater advantage  of less risky firms in the absence  of full lopss
offsetting.
Full loss offsetting is not sufficient  to guarantee  neutrality with respect to capital risk.  Capital
risk is defined to be uncertainty with respect to the rate of economic depreciation  of capital after the
capital has been installed. 33 Depreciation  schedules  for tax purposes are predetermined  at the time of
the investment,  and are not adjusted  for changes  in subsequent  actual depreciation  rates.  Indeed, given
the fact that depreciation  rates are not observable  as market prices, it is not obvious how they could e
adjusted  to account for capital risk.  In practice, the only way the deductibility  of capital risk could  be
achieved would be  by  allowing depreciation writeoffs to  occur up-front. 34 By the same token,
incentive measures which accelerate the writing off  of  capital depreciation, such as  accelerated
depreciation,  would simultaneously  reduce the discrimination  against risky investments  and provide an
incentive  to investment. On the other hand, measures  which do not accelerate  the pattern  of depreciation
would not remove the discrimination  against  capital risky investments.
4.  The  cash  flow effects  of various  Incentives
32See,  for example, Auerbach  and Poterba  (1986).
33Capital  risk was first  analyzed  by Bulow  and Summers  (1984).
34one such scheme  which would  accomplish  this would  be the Auerbach  and  Jorgenson  (1980)  proposal  for  capital  write-off
which  is to allow  the firm  to deduct  the present  value  of its future of depreciation  allowances  up-front. This  scheme  would  also
be a subadtute  for the indexation  of depreciation  allowances  in inflationary  periods.-56 -
According  to the neo-classical  investment  theory on which effective  tax calculations  are based,
firms can obtain financing for investment  at the going costs of finance for various sorts of finance.  In
practice,  some firms, particularly  small young  ones may find it relatively  difficult  to raise external  finance
and may be viewed as being liquidity  .constrained.  Presumably  there would be a price at which they
could  obtain  outside  finance, but that price will be different  from the going market price and may be very
difficult for the investigator to determine.  Under these circumstances, METRs may not be fully
informative  about  the effects of investment  incentives  on the firm. It might be equally important  to know
the effects of the incentives  on the cash flow position  of the firms.
Given this, investmnent  incentives  will be more effective the earlier they get funds in the hands
of the firms.  A comparison  of the time profile of the tax savings  of various incentives  will be important.
From this perspective,  investment  tax credits  would be the most beneficial,  but, for non-taxpaying  firms,
only to the extent  that they are refundable. Accelerated  depreciation  will be less so, and reduced  tax rates
even  less so (since  their benefit is greatest when revenues  are highest, which is later than when the capital
costs are incurred). The Auerbach-Jorgenson  scheme mentioned  above would also be beneficial  to the
cash flow of firms if refundability  of tax losses exists, even though it is not an investment  incentive  as
such.
5.  The effect on the costs offlnancing andflnancial structure
In the MEIR methodology,  the determination  of the financial structure is suppressed  from the
analysis  because of the lack of a widely  accepted  theory.  Two alternative  approaches  to accounting  for
the differential  tax treatment of different forms of financing  are as follows.  First, some studies (e.g.,
King and Fullerton (1984)) calculate  separate METRs for different sources of finance.  In this way the
magnitude  of the differential  treatment  of the different  types of finance  can be observed directly. Second,
some studies use observed financial  structures to calculate  costs of capital for different types of firms.
Since  different  types of firms systematically  use different  proportions of debt finance, the use of different
weights for debt and equity finance in the cost of capital enables one to capture the effect of the
differential  tax treatment of debt and equity fnance in METR calculations  across industries.
In a sense, this is not an entirely satisfactory  state of affairs.  Measuring  the differential effect
of taxes by source of finance is not sufficient for indicating how firms will change their financial
structures  in response. In that sense, the tax effects cannot form the basis for a positive analysis  of the
effects  of taxes  on the financial  structure  of firms. At best, the direction  of tax incentives  can be deduced
as well as prescriptions  for tax reform.  Some studies take the extreme  view that only taxes matter in- 57 -
determining  financial  structures. 35 This leads one to the so-called  It cash  flow or it pecking  order
theory of finance whereby firms use up the least cost,  source of finance first.  Again, by concentrating
solely on tax explanations  as determinants  of the financial  structure, tax policy arguments about  how to
avoid distortions  of the financing  decision  can most readily be seen.
Perhaps more importantly, by taking the financial structure and the costs of various sources of
finance  (tL,  p and a)  as given  to the firm, one may not be capturing important  differences  between  the
marginal and average costs of various sources of finance.  If firms are optimizing their financial
structures, one might expect that the marginal  cost of various sorts of finance will be the same. In this
case, it might seem inappropriate  to attribute different costs of finance to debt and equity in MEMR
studies. 36 However, as has been argued in Boadway, Bruce and Mintz (1987), if financial decisions
are separable from investment  decisions, the optimizing  choice of financial structure will give rise to
different equilibrium  values of the costs of various sources of finance which are appropriately  used in
MEIR calculations.
Consider, for example, the cost of funds given by equation (32) above.  In it, i(a - u) and pg
represent the average costs of debt and equity finance to the firm, but note the marginal  costs.  The
marginal cost of funds will take into account the effect of an extra dollar of financing  of either sort on
the amount the firm must pay its creditors as a result of a marginal change in the firm's  financial
structure. Suppose  that the rate of interest the firm must pay increases  with the debt-equity  ratio.  The
marginal cost of raising a dollar of debt exceeds i(1 - u) because an extra dollar of debt raises the
debt-equity  ratio and the interest rate the firm must pay on all its debt.  Similarly, the marginal cost of
an increment in equity financing is less than  p,  because this extra equity financing lowers the
debt-equity  ratio and reduces the cist of debt.  Thus, the firm will hold a diversified stock of financial
liabilities  even though  the average costs of the two sorts of finance differ. It can be shown  that when the
cost of finance  depends only upon the debt-equity  ratio, the firm's financial  structure will be determined
independendy  of investment,  and the marginal  cost of funds will exactly  equal the weighted average of
35 Examples  include  Stiglitz  (1976),  Auerbach  (1983).  Poterba  and  Summen  (1983)  and  Boadway  and Bruce  (1992).
36 This  point  has  been  made  by Hansson  and  Stuart  (1985).- 58  -
i1( - u) and  p,  .37  This would, therefore, justify the procedure used in the METR analysis of
treating  the cost of finance as a weighted  average of the average costs of debt and equity finance.
The relevance  of this discussion  of financing  for investment  incentives  is rather limited  since most
investment  incentives  do not apply to the financing  costs.  At the same time, investment  incentives  may
well play an important  role in providing finance to the firm as we have already pointed out.  Probably
the cash flow effects  of investment  incentives  are the most important  ones.
6.  The  interaction  of inflation  and investment  incentives
Most corporate taxed have very little provision  for inflation  built into them.  Interest deductions
tend to  be  based on  nominal interest rates and depreciation is  calculated in  historic rather than
replacement  terms.  This implies that inflation affects the real value of the tax base.  The effect of
inflation on the METR is, however, ambiguous  a priori.  The lack of replacement cost depreciation
implies that increases in inflation  will reduce the value of the depreciation write-off, thereby tending to
increase the METR. 38 At the same time, the ability to deduct nominal interest means that in times of
inflation  firms are effectively  able to write off part of the principle  of their debt.  This reduces the cost
of finance and tends to reduce the METR.  Depending  on the relative magnitude  of these two effects,
inflation  could  increase  or decrease the METR. It is more likely to increase it the more important  is debt
as a source of finance and the slower is the write-off  for depreciation. This ambiguity  has been borne
out in various studies of  METRs.  The absence of full loss offsetting will also be  important in
determining  the effect of inflation  on the METR.
Naturally  investment  incentives  will have differing  effects  depending  on the rate of inflation. Tax
rate reductions  tend to reduce the absolute  size of the METR so preserve whatever inflation  bias already
exists.  Accelerated  depreciation  reduces the disadvantage  of historical cost depreciation so should be
especially  beneficial in times of inflation. Investment  tax credits  provide an additional  advantage  which
is independent  of the rate of inflation  (since it occurs up front) without affecting  the existing  interest and
depreciation  deductions. Thus, its effect will be relatively independent  of the rate of inflation, at least
as long as the benefit of the tax credit is not postponed  because  of imperfect  loss offsetting. This may
be viewed  as another advantage  of investment  tax credits  over other forms of investment  incentives.
37 This is demonstrated  formaUy  in Boadway  (1987)  and discussed  in more detail  in Boadway, Bruce  and Mintz (1987).
38Simil&r  arguments  apply to the deduction  for inventory  usagc.- 59 -
Z.  The interaction  wth other policies
The corporate tax system is not the only source of policy influence  on the incentive to invest.
Other taxes will also have an effect, such as indirect  taxes.  As well, tariffs will have an obvious effect
on protected activities.  Very few attempts have been made to  incorporate other taxes into METR
calculations,  though, in principle, it should be straightforward  to do.39 In th3 context of developing
countries, it might  be particularly  useful to include  other distortions  in the computation  of METRs when
evaluating  investment  incentives.
8.  Effects on the timing and durability  of investment
Taxes can affect investment  in ways other than simply  the size of the demand for capital. They
can effect that path of accumulation  of capital as well as the durability of capital.  In the case of
temporary investment  incentives,  part of the effect may simply be to accelerate  the holding of a given
amount  of capital. This might be the case for a tax holiday, for example. Effective  tax rate calculations
can be done on an annual basis over the period of the tax holiday to see how the incentive to invest
changes. We present some sample calculations  of this below.
Permanent incentives  will affect the long run demand  for capital. However, they may influence
the chosen  durability  of capital. It is known  from the literature  that accelerated  depreciation  schemes  are
neutral with respect to the durability of capital, while investment  tax credits induce firms to employ
shorter-lived  capital.  The reason for the latter is that investment  tax credits apply on gross investment
thus reducing  the cost of replacement  capital. The subsidy  to replacement  capital means firms will have
an incentive  to choose capital which depreciates  more quickly. This may be viewed as a disadvantage
of investment  tax credit schemes  to be set against the advantages  already listed.40
There may be other types of decisions  involving  capital  expenditures  which firms will take.  One
important  one may be technique  of production, especially  capital intensity.  Incentives which apply to
capital  purchases but not to other inputs will give firms an incentive  to substitute capital for the other
inputs, including labour.  To the extent that the creation of employment is an objective, this is a
39 One exception  is Chua  (1991)  who  has incorporated  the system  of indirect  taxes  into  calculations  of METRs  in Malaysia
using  input-output  data.
40 Bradford  (1980)  analyzes  the design  of investment  tax credits which are neutral  vis-&-vis  the durability  of capital. He
shows  that no simle general rule is possible. In general, a credit varying  with the durability  of the investment  is required.- 60 -
disadvantage. The ability to do depends  upon the elasticity  of substitution,  which may vary from sector
to sector.
9.  Special  problems  arising  In open  economies
Some additional considerations arise in  economies whose capital markets are  exposed to
international  capital  markets. In these cases, capital may move across international  borders in response
to tax measures  affecting  investment. If there were no impediments  to capital moving in and out of the
country and if the country were small relative to the rest of the world, the required rate of return on
capital would effectively be predetermined for the country by international capital markets.  An
implication  of this is that the saving and investment  sides  of the domestic  capital market  would effectively
be segmented. That is, in any given year there would be no need for domestic saving to equal domestic
investment. Tax measures  applying  to firms, such as investment  incentives,  would affect  the investment
side of the market but not the saving side.  Similarly,  tax measures  applying  on households  would affect
saving alone. Thus, imputation  measures  which are implemented  through the personal  tax system would
have no effect on domestic  investment. Any induced  changes  in the capital  account  balance  would  be met
by net inflows  or outflows  of capital from foreigners.
One of the implications  of this is that the METR on a capital decision  can be disaggregated  into
that applying  on the investment  side and that applying  on the saving side. Let r* be the international  cost
of finance in real terms.  It can be defined as follows:
. = Pi*  +  (1  - )p'  - i  (33)
This represents the opportunity cost of funds to the country as determined on world capital
markets. The marginal  effective  tax rate applying  on investment  decisions  can then be defined  as follows:
= rg - r,  (34)
where rg is defined as before.  Similarly,  the marginal  effective  tax rate applying  on saving decisions  is
defined as:
ts = r  -r  (35)
By construction, METR equals the sum of rg and rn.- 61 -
The open economy assumption  makes matters simpler for us when investigating investmnent
incentives. If the incentives  operate on firms, their fVll  effect can be captured by looking solely at tl.
In other words, personal taxes become irrelevant.  Incentives operating through the personal tax side
(such as dividend  tax credits to domestic  shareholders)  do not affect investment  decisions. 41
While that simplification  is possible, the ability of capital to flow across borders introduces a
number of other issues to be considered. They include  the following:
a.  the effect of tax incentives  onforeignfirms.  Foreign firms typically are liable for taxes both in the
host country and the home country. However, some credit may be given in the latter for taxes paid in
the host country. Most countries  operate a foreign  tax crediting  system under which taxes paid abroad
are credited against domestic tax liabilities up to the amount of the latter.42 This means that to the
extent that host country tax liabilities are within the limit set by home country taxes, revenues are
transferred from foreign treauries to that of the host country.  This provides an incentive for host
countries  to design their tax systems  so as to exploit the transfer of tax revenues  from foreign treasuries
to domestic ones to the fullest.  In these circumstances,  the host country tax system may have limited
effect on the investment  behaviour  of foreign firms unless host taxes are high enough to exceed home
country  tax liabilities. If they do not, any effect that host country taxes have on the incentive  to invest
will be limited  to that arising from the deferral nature of home country taxes and tax crediting. 43
In these  circumstances,  investment  incentives  which reduce  the tax liabilities  of foreign  firms may
have limited  effect on the incentive  of foreign  firms to invest, and may serve largely to transfer funds  to
home country treasuries.  This could only be avoided if, for some reason, the foreign tax crediting
provision did not apply to the investment  incentive.
2.  The implicatons of alternative  crediting arrangements
One of the reasons for levying  corporate taxes in developing  countries is to effect a tax transfer
from treasuries in home countries  of foreign corporations. This is a consequence  of offering a foreign
41 That  is not  altogether  true. They  will  have  some  general  equilibrium  effect  on investment,  but  that  will  presumably  be
of second  order  importance.
42 Often  the domestic  tax liabilities  are.  not calcuiated  until  funds  are  repatriated  and  crediting  does  not occur  until  then.
There  are other  complicating  features  of these  systems  involving  averaging  of credits  over  time  and  countries  as well. For a
full discussion  see  Alworth  (1988).
43 See  Leechorand  Mintz  (1990)  and  Hines  (1989)  for formal  analyses  of this.- 62 -
tax credit for taxes paid in the host country  as is done, for example,  by the United States. Host countries
can raise revenue  almost costlessly4 by setting their tax rates close to those of host countries.
This ability to transfer revenues from foreign treasuries is contingent  on the foreign countries
operating  a credit system. As has long been recognized,  if foreign  treasuries allowed  firms only to deduct
foreign tax liabilities  from taxable income rather than crediting  them, a tax transfer would no longer be
possible. Under these circumstances,  the corporate  tax would  be fully absorbed  by a higher required rate
of return on capital, and the tax will effectively  be borne by other domestic factors of production (such
as labour).  In these circumstances,  the corporate tax would discourage foreign investment, and thus
investment  incentives  would encourage it.
At the moment, tax credits are the norm.  However, that situation may not persist.  From the
point of view of creditor nations, deduction systems make much more sense than credit systems, as
Feldstein and Hartman (1979) have pointed out.  Deduction systems avoid the turning over of tax
revenues  to capital-importing  countries. One of the mysteries  in the literature  on the international  taxation
of capital income  is how credit systems  ever came into being  given that it seems not to be in the interest
of  capital-exporters  to  have such systems.  As  countries such as the  United States review their
arrangements  it might not be surprising  to see some changes  from crediting  to deductions. If so, the role
of the corporate  tax and the efficacy  of investment  incentives  would change significantly.
3.  Tax Haven  and Conduit  Countries
The ability of firms to  siphen profits through tax haven countries will also  influence the
effectiveness  of investment  incentives. Tax havens are low tax countries  which have some other special
features such as rules governing confidentiality  and secrecy, a lack of currency controls, and highly
developed  banking  and financial  activities. Tax havens can be used to reduce tax liabilities  to the extent
that firms can set up in the tax haven  and arrange to shift earnings  to it via one of a variety of arbitrage
mechanisms (financial transactions, transfer pricing, etc.).  A disproportionate  share of holding and
investment  companies  and shipping companies  have been set up in tax havens.  Many countries  have
enacted  provisions  to attempt to limit the extent of tax avoidance  through tax havens. 45
44  Given  the advantages  of deferral,  host country  taxes will impose  some distortion,  as mentioned  above.
45 Some discussion  of the prroblems  arising with tax haven countries  may be found in Alworth (1988).-63  -
C.  Some Illustrative Calculations of METRs:  The Case of Malaysia
In this section, we present some sample calculations  of the effect of investment incentives  on
METRs for the case of Malaysia. The Malaysian  case is instructive  since the types of incentives,  as well
as the basic tax structure  itself, are typical  of what one finds in many developing  countries. As well, the
system underwent  a reform in 1989  whose effects we can calculate. We begin with a brief description
of the tax system as it affects capital income at the personal  and corporation levels.46
Most forms of capital income (e.g., interest and dividends)  are fully taxed at the personal level
at ordinary rates.  The rate structure is progressive, with rates rising from 5% to 40%.  The main
exceptions  to this are dividends received from firms operating under a tax holiday (so-called  pioneer
firms) and capital gains.  Both are tax exempt. As well, there are various forms of sheltered savings as
in most countries, such as pension savings and housing.  For dividends from non-pioneer  firms, the
personal  and corporate  tax systems  are fully integrated. That is, a dividend  tax credit is given  to resident
corporations for corporate taxes paid at the corporate level.  The dividend tax credit rate is 40%.
Dividends  paid to foreigners  are subject  to a 40% withholding  tax on dividends. The tax reform of 1989
did not affect these provisions.
Before 1989,  the company  tax rate was 40% plus an additional  5% development  tax. Companies
with income  in excess of M$2 million  paid a 3 % excess profits tax.  In the 1989  Budget, the income tax
rate was reduced to 35% and the development  tax was to be phased out over five years.  Firms do not
pay tax on  capital gains or on intercorporate dividends, so corporate income is taxed only once.
Corporation  taxable income is defined  the way it is in most tax systems to include business income less
current and capital costs, where the latter include nominal interest costs and depreciation. Depreciation
rates vary by type of asset and by type of industry. Typically, an initial allowance  is given followed  by
straightline  depreciation  of the remainder  of the original cost.  While taxpaying  firms incur tax liabilities
immediately,  tax loss firms are not treated symmetrically. Tax losses may only be carried forward
indefinitely  without interest.
Investment  incentives  take a variety of forms.  As mentioned,  different industries face different
rates of depreciation. As well, there are two special types of incentives. First, there is an investment
tax credit available  to non-pioneer  firms. The investment  tax credit is given on a discretionary  basis and
is awarded at varying rates ranging all the way up to 100%. Second, there are tax holidays granted to
firms who apply successfully  for pioneer status.  Firms granted pioneer status are free of corporate
46  A more detailed description can be  found in Boadway, Chua and Platters (1989), from which these illustrative
calculations  are drawn.-64  -
Income  tax for a period of time (usually  five years) following  the investment  in question. Pioneer  status
may be extended  for up to five further years when the,first period expires. Before 1989, pioneer firms
were perrnitted  to carry forward without  interest  their depreciation  allowances  cumulated  from the  pioneer
period  to the year following  this period. No other component  of taxable  income could  be carried forward
in this way.  The 1989  Budget  eliminated  this carry-forward  provision.
As can be seen, the tax treatment of firms depends upon the industry in which they operate,
whether  they are taxpaying  or tax loss firms and for how long, and whether  they are pioneer firms or not.
In evaluating  the effects  of the 1989  reforms, a separate calculation  should  be done for each type of firm.
In what follows, we distinguish  only between taxpaying and tax loss status, and between pioneer and
non-pioneer  status.  For simplicity. inter-industry  differentials  are ignored. The calculations  are based
on rather crude data.  However, our purpose here is to provide illustrative calculations, not definitive
results.
We begin by adopting  our earlier  theory to the institutional  setting at hand.  First, we invoke  the
open economy  arbitrage assumption  discussed  earlier. This involves  asumming  that the rate of return on
capital is determined on international  capital markets and allows us to disaggregate  the METR into a
corporate tax distortion, tc, and a personal  tax distortion, tp.  Consider  the derivation  of tc first.
To calculate tc we need an expression for the pre-tax rate of return on investment  rg.  Our
procedure is to adopt equation  (13) derived earlier to a discrete-time  setting which corresponds  with the
Malaysian  tax system.  The firm's problem can be written as:
Mt  Rj [P, F(K 1)(1  - u)  - Q-  (Kt  (1  - 8)Kt)(1  - Zn)]
where the discount  factor R) can be written:
R,=.01  +,
where rs is the nominal after-tax cost of finance to the firm in period s.  It is a weighted  average of the
one-period interest cost (cost of debt) and the rate of  return on equity, where the weights are the
proportions of debt and equity used in the financing  of cash flows.
Solving this problem as discussed  earlier, the analogy to equation (13) is:- 65 -
rt  (r 1 - I+  8  - (Aq/q),)  (1  - Z)  + 1 + r  - xt  - (Aq/q)  t)  (Zt  - Z-
,  1~~~~~~~-  ut
- + (AA) t  (36)
a
Here, (Aqlq) t  = AQ, IQ, - x, and the rest of the variables  are defined  as before, except that now they
are defined for a discrete period rather than for a point in time.  It will simplify matters if we assume
that  (Aq /q), = 0  and if  we ignore (r, - it)(Zt  - Z, _ t)  since it will be  very small.  Then the
expression  for rg simplifies  to:
(r, - xt,  4  8)(1  - Z1)  (Zt  - Z  (3
rs (t)  =  I__  __  __  ___  __  __  __37___
To implement (37) we need to compute for each type of investment  each of the parameters  on
the right-hand  side, distinguishing  especially  how they vary with tax status of the firm.  The expected
inflation  rate wr  and the depreciation  rate 8 are independent  of the tax status of the firm and are computed
Ls already discussed. We need only discuss how the nominal cost of finance r,, the present value of
future  depreciation  write-offs  Zt and dhe  effective  statutory  corporate  tax rate ut vary with tax status. We
do so for firms with three types of tax status-fully taxpaying  non-pioneer  firms, profit-making  pioneer
firms, and tax-loss non-pioneer  firms.47
1.  Taxpaying  Non-Pioneer  Firms
A taxpaying  non-pioneer  firm is simply  one which earns positive taxable income in present and
future periods. It is taxed at the full rate in each period. Therefore, the effective  statutory corporate  tax
rate facing  the firm is simply  the statutory rate u which we assume is not expected  to change.
The nominal cost of funds r 1, faced by the firm is the weighted combination  of its after-tax
borrowing costs and the cost of raising equity from the financial market.  Again, assuming these are
expected  to be constant over time, the cost of fiinds for all periods will be given by:
r  =  13i(1  - u)  + (1  - ,B)p
47  Tax-loss pioneer firms are not explicitly considered since they are similar to taxpaying pioncer  firms if they become
profitable before pioneer status is finished, and to tax-loss non-pioneer firms others%ise.-66 -
where these variables  are defined  as before. Note that with capital  gains untaxed, and the full imputation
of corporate taxes  essentially  ensuring  that dividends  are not taxed at the personal  level, the cost of equity
p  is the same whether  it comes  from new issues or retained  earnings. At the same time, since interest
is tax-deductible,  the cost of debt financing  is i(1 - u).  This reflects the tax preference  given to financing
by debt over equity at the corporate level. 48
Finally, consider  the present value of tax savings due to depreciation, Z7. As mentioned,  firms
are  given an  initial allowance and  then allowed to  depreciate the  remainder under  straightline
depreciation. If r is the rate of initial allowance  and T is the length of time over which the asset can be
depreciated  (so IIT is the annual rate of depreciation),  Z, will be given by:
Z  = uy  +  (1  Y)u( 1 _ (1)T)  (38)
We have dropped the time subscripts  because  here Z, and Z,- 1 will be the same under the assumptions
we are making. The first term is the tax benefit from the initial  allowance  and the second is the present
value of the tax savings from the straightline  write-off  of the remaining  (1 - r) of the investment.
2.  Profit-Making  Pioneer Frnns
Next, consider  the case where a firm is granted a five-year tax holiday.  No taxes are paid by
the firm over the tax holiday period.  We begin with the pre-1989 Budget case in which initial and
depreciation  allowances  could be delayed until the end of the tax holiday.  All accumulated  tax savings
from the initial  and annual depreciation  allowances  could be set off against revenues  earned by the firm
in the first tax year following the tax holiday period.  We assume that the profits in the period
immediately  following  the tax holiday  are sufficiently  large  to absorb  all depreciation  allowances  that have
accumulated  over the tax holiday period.
These features  of the tax treatment  of pioneer firms make the computation  of the before-tax  rate
of return on investment  considerably  more complicated  than case 1 above  since u, r, and Z, will all vary
over time.  Consider  the computation  of the three in turn.
48  Note that, given the taxability  of interest  but not equity  income  at the personal level, households  have an incentive  to
hold equity.- 67 -
The effective  statutory  corporate tax to the firm over the tax holiday  period is zero since the firm
is completely  exempt from paying any tax on its incomie.  However, the corporate tax rate will revert to
its full statutory rate u after the tax holiday. Therefore,
|O  for 0 s  t  s 4
|  ufort  >4
where t  =  O  4 represent the tax holiday periods.  Given these values for u,, the cost of finance
to the firm is given by:
rt  =  Oi(l  - ut)  + (1  - p
Finally, given u1 and rp,  the value of Z, will be given  by:
(  I  )  (uy++(5  - O-  Y)u  u(1  Y)  T - S  )-5  t))  (9
(UY  T  t~~~T  I  1 TStf
0  s t  g 4
This equation  takes into account  the fact that Z, will  vary according  to when within the tax holiday  period
the investment  is undertaken.  Note that in the tax holiday Z  is a monotonically  increasing  function  of
t.  This implies that rg will vary over the pioneer period, becoming constant with the return to full
taxpaying  status.
We have mentioned  that firms may also obtain an investment  tax credit.  Typically, this will be
in lieu of the initial allowance  and of the tax holiday.  Like the latter it is granted on a discretionary
basis. We discussed  earlier how the investment  allowance  enters into METR calculations  so we do not
repeat it here.
Subsequent  to the 1989  Budget, firms were no longer allowed to carry depreciation  allowances
forward from the pioneer period to the fully taxpaying  period.  This causes the expression for Z,, (39),
to change  to:
Zt=(l  1  )  (  lY)(  _  I)  Osts4  (40)
The depreciation  and initial  allowances  from the pioneer  period are lost now. The expressions  for u, and
r, remain the same as before.  The statutory  tax rate u was also reduced by the reform and this must be
taken into account in the calculations.- 68 -
3.  Firms in Temporary Loss Positions
Consider now the case of a firm that is making a temporary  loss over the first few periods of its
operation  and a profit thereafter. For illustrative  purposes, assume  the firm which is incurring  tax losses
years 0 to 4 of its operations. These losses are carried forward into year 5 and set off against income
in that year before taxes are paid.  Suppose taxable income is large enough in year 5 to absorb all
cumulated  losses.
Consider  first the cost of finance  to the firm. Since  the firm is in a loss position, it cannot  obtain
the full instantaneous  benefits of the interest deduction.  Instead, the benefit is deferred until future
periods when the loss carryforward  is offset by taxable income.  This deferral reduces the value of the
tax saving  of the interest  deduction, and therefore increases  ti e after-tax  cost of finance  to the firm.  The
exact amount by which Jie tax advantage  is reduced is rather complicated  to calculate. To explain it, it
is useful first to consider a firm that finances new investment entirely with debt.  In this case, the
effective  tax rate applying to the interest deduction  will be less than u because of the deferral of the
interest write-off. The cost of interest finance  in a period in which the firm is making losses is given by:
rt  i(  1  I'  (X  |  )  t  = 0,  *  ,4  (41)
This expression reflects the fact that the tax savings from interest costs incurred in an early time period
are postponed until period 5.  This tax saving must be discounted  back to period t to yield its present
value as of the time that the interest  cost is incurred. The tax saving in period 5 is evaluated at the full
corporate tax rate u applying  to the firm at that time.
Equation set (41) gives relations  among  the ri for each of the five loss periods. It must be solved
simultaneously  for the values of rt.  To do so, we proceed recursively backwards. First, solve for the
cost of funds in the last period, t  =  4.  In this period, equation (41) is quadratic in r4 alone.  Then,
substituting  this solution  for the positive root of r4 back into (41) we obtain a quadratic equation in r3,
which can also be solved for its positive  root.  The entire set of ri's over the loss period can be obtained
by substituting  recursively into (41) one at a time.  At period 5, once the firm is profit-making,  the usual
expression  for r1 applies.
The same principle can be extended  to the case when the firm uses some equity finance.  In this
case, rt is given by:
p,=fit  +  (  I  p  t  =  ,*  ,  4- 69 -
where
t  (  jnu,t  (+  rt= )  =O.",  4  (42)
As above, this equation can be solved recursively  for r 1 during each loss period.  This is the set of ri's
we use in our computations.
A similar derivation  applies  to u,.  Since  tax liabilities  are carried forward without  interest from
the loss periods to period 5, the effective  tax rate that the firm faces during the period of losses is less
than the statutory  rate.  Using the cost of finance as derived from (41), the effective  corporate tax rate
applying  to the revenues  of the firm is:
u, =  ut  = °  4
I:.t  (1  + r 8 )
Given r,, this is straightforward  to compute.
Finally, the present value of ta.  depreciation allowances  Z, will also be modified slightly to
account  for the fact that unabsorbed  depreciation  allowance  may also be carried forward  to year 5. It will
be given by:
,  4t  (I  1  (  + (5 -t)u(1  -Y)  + u(  - (  ( 1)Tr)  ) )
t = 0,  - -;, 4  (43)
For t  a 5  the expression for Z. .s again given  by (38).  As before, Zt increases with time over the loss
period.
Using these expressions  for r,, u, and Z., the time profile for rg(t) can be calculated  for each of
the three cases.  For t  2  5, the values  of rg(t) will  all be the same as in case 1.  The  marginal  effective
corporate tax rate will then be given by
tc=  tg - r,
where  r*  is  the  cost  of  funds determined on  international capital markets  and  is  given  by
r  = ,Bi + (1  - P)p - ,,asdiscussedbefore.- 70  -
We could  also calculate  the marginal  effective  personal  tax rate tp as discussed  earlier. However,
given  our open economy  arbitrage  assumption,  it would  be irrelevant  for evaluating  investment  incentives.
Its effect is felt entirely on the saving side of the domestic capital market.  As mentioned, given the
absence  of taxation  of capital  gains and the imputation  of corporate  taxes to domestic  savers, the effective
personal  tax rate would be near zero for equity funds.  Indeed, saving through purchases of new equity
could be subsidized  given that the corporate tax rate can exceed the personal tax rate so the imputation
more than offsets any personal  taxes owing on dividends. However, the marginal  effective  personal tax
rate could be substantially  larger for interest since interest is not only fully taxed, but it is taxed in
nominal  terms. Therefore, the tax system  gives a sizeable  incentive  for domestic  residents  to hold equity
over bonds. Since the corporate  tax system  does precisely the opposite,  there is a net incentive  to import
debt capital and export equity capital.  The reduction in the corporate tax rate by 10 percentage  points
with the tax reform of 1989  reduces the magnitude  of this relative financing  incentive  for equity but not
its direction.
Some marginal  effective  corporate  tax rate calculations  are presented  for the three cases in Tables
1, 2 and 3 respectively.  Each Table reports tc for machinery for five consecutive  years under the
pre-1989 and post-1989  tax systems. The main differences  in the tax systems  are that the rate is reduced
from 45% to 35% and the deferral of depreciaiton  allowances  for pioneer firms is eliminated  by the tax
reform.  The data used in the Tables also differs from one to another.  For the fully taxpaying firm,
actual  data for the years 1983-87  are used for financial  variables, while  for the tax loss and pioneer  firms,
1983  data are used. For all examples,  tc is calculated  separately  for debt-financed  and retained-earnings
fnanced investments 49 as well as for a weighted combination  of the two, where the weights were
computed  from Kuala Lumpur Stoc&  Exchange unpublished  data.  Rates of return on equity were also
calculated  from the same source using the return  to shareholders'  fund. Corporate lending  rates were not
available  so a base case of 12% was used for illustrative  purposes. Actual inflation  rates were used as
expected  ones and therefore  perfectly  anticipated. Again, it should be stressed that these calculations  are
intended  to be illustrative  only.  A summary  of results for each of the cases follows.
a.  Taxpaying  Non-Pioneer  Firms
As the first column  of Table 1 indicates,  tc is consistently  negative  for debt-financed  investments
owing to the deductibility  of nominal interest payments.  Fluctuations from year to year are due to
49  From the point of view of the corporation,  the tax system  affects new equity and retained  eanings in the same  way.- 71 -
changes in the rate of inflation.  Apparently, the benefit of nominal interest deductibility in times of
inflation  more than offsets  the disadvantage  of historic,cost  depreciation,  which tends to reduce the value
of Z,.  Conversely,  t* for retained  earnings  is positive  as shown in the second column. The cost of equity
flnancing  is not tax-deductible. In these cases, years of lower inflation (1985 and 1986) tend to lower
tc. The last column  uses observed  weights  of debt and equity  financing  to calculate  tc when both sources
are used at the margin. Naturally, tc falls between  the pure debt-financed  and equity-financed  cases, but
is negative in all years.  Thus, the corporate  tax system actually  subsidizes investment  at the margin.
The last three columns of the Table report what tc would have been had the post-1989 tax
structure been in place.  Essentially  this involves a reduction in u from .45 to  .35.  The qualitative
comparisons  among the various cases remain exactly as before, but the absolute magnitudes are all
reduced. Positive  values of tc become smaller and so do negative  values.
b.  Profit-Making  Pioneer  Firms
Table 2 shows tc's for a firm granted pioneer status in 1983. Ideally we would show the rates
applying to margiral investments  undertaken in each of the five years of the tax holiday period; but
absence  of pertinent  data for 1982  precluded this, and so we report rates for only the final four years of
the tax holiday. The last entry in each column  shows  Xc  in the absence  of pioneer status using 1983  data.
(Here S.S. refers to steady state.)  It is taken from Table 1.
Note that pioneer firm investments  financed  from all sources are subsidized  by the tax system.
However, the size of the subsidy  is quite small. For debt-financed  investments,  the tax-induced  subsidy
is actually  less than for non-pioneer  firms.  Such investments  are penalized  by pioneer status. Basically,
the advantages  of interest  deductibility  during the tax holiday  no longer exist. For equity financing,  this
is not the case.  Pioneer status converts tc from positive to negative.  There is no loss in foregoing
interest deductions. At the same time, firms benefit from being able to carry forward their initial and
depreciation  allowances  until after pioneer status is finished. Thus, in principle it seems that pioneer
status might serve either to increase  or decrease investment  incentives. Which way it works in practice
will depend on which of these two effects is most important  for the firm in question. If the tax burden
on current revenues  less interest deduction  is larger (in a present value sense) than the tax savings from
depreciation  allowances,  the first effect would  be expected  to dominate,  and pioneer status would  increase
investment  incentives,  and vice versa. More generally,  the granting  of pioneer status tends to reduce the
impact  of the tax system on marginal  investmnent  decisions. If investment  is penalized under the general
tax laws, then pioneer status will reduce this disincentive. But if investments  are subsidized, pioneer- 72 -
status will reduce the size of the subsidy. For Malaysian  firms it turns out that pioneer status eliminates
the bias of the tax system in favor of marginal inves,tments  financed by debt rather than equity, and
provides a net additional  subsidy only to investments  with sufficiently  low debt-equity  ratios.
Table 2 also reports effective  corporate tax rates under the post-1989  tax structure.  In addition
to the reductioa in u, the ability  of pioneer firms to defer initial and annual depreciation  allowances  until
the end of the tax holiday period was removed. As can be seen from Table 2, pioneer firms now face
a large positive t.  as compared with the net subsidy  received  under the previous system.  Not only has
the sign of the distortion  been changed in this case, but its absolute  size has been increased considerably.
Debt-financed  marginal  investments  continue to be treated more favorably  for non-pioneer  than
for pioneer firms after the tax reform.  In the case of equity-financed  investment, machinery is now
slightly  better treated for non-pioneer  firms.  This is also for the reason mentioned  above, that the loss
of depreciation  tax savings  during the pioneer period is more important  for machinery. The tax reforms
also have the effect of reducing  the differences  in distortions  between pioneer and non-pioneer  firms.
3.  Tax  Loss  RFms
Table 3 presents estimates  of tc for firms in a temporary loss position for five years.  We take
1983  as the presumed  initial  year of the firm's operations. As in the case of a pioneer firm, we calculate
t  during the final four years of the loss period and the steady  state for both the pre-1989 and post-1989
tax regimes.
Under the pre-1989 tax rules, debt-financed  investments  receive a small subsidy during the tax
loss period, but it is considerably  less than that received for a fully taxpaying firm.  The size of the
subsidy  increases over time (during the tax-loss period).  In the case of equity-financed  investments,  tc
is positive. It declines  over time, but remains  more than double  that facing tax-paying  firms on the same
investments. For firms financing  investments  through a combination  of debt and equity, the tax system
discourages  investment  for loss firms, while subsidizing  investment  for tax-paying  firms.
The 1989 tax reforms do not change any of the qualitative  patterns of investment  distortions
facing  tax loss firms, but they have the uniform  effect of reducing  the magnitude  of all the positive and
negative  tax incentives. This is the same thing that was observed earlier in the case of taxpaying firms.
To summarize, the corporate tax system plays an important role in determining the relative
profitability of different types of investments. For some investments, it provides a considerable  net
subsidy.  But many other investments  are faced with sizeable tax penalties.  The overall pattern of- 73 -
incentives  and disincentives  bears no obvious relation to social economic  goals that might in principle
guide the construction of  an incentive system.  The unintended consequences of these distortions,
therefore, almost certainly include significant  waste of investment  resources.  As well, some incentives
can have the opposite effect to what is intended. The example  of tax holidays is very instructive  since
many  developing  countries  resort to it.  Our calculations  show that tax holidays  can actually impose  a net
penalty on investors in some cases.  It is of possible value orly to firms with sufficient taxable profits
against which to use the benefits of the tax holiday; i.e. it is highly unlikely to be of value to the weak
or infant investors or to the industries which usually are the intended beneficiaries  of the measures.
Similarly,  tax rate reductions can reduce the incentive  to invest, especially  for finns which already have
negative marginal effective  tax rates.  Finally, many measures  have very differing effects according  to
the type of firm and investment  under consideration. This is especially  true of comparisons  between  tax
loss and taxpaying  firms.
V.  The Impact  of Tax Incentives on Investment:  A Brief Survey of the Empirical Approaches and
Applications in Developing Countries
The empirical analysis  of tax incentives  for developing  countries is of recent origin, and only a
few published  studies are available  as of this date (see e.g. Agell, 1985, Ebrill, 1987). In industrialized
nations, empirical approaches to evaluation of tax incentives have varied from opinion surveys to
rigorously  derived testable models;  from partial equilibriurn  to general equilibrium;  and from macro- to
microeconomic  analysis. This Section  provides an overview  of the principal  approaches,  notes their key
assumptions  and caveats and discusses  the findings  of recent developing  country applications.
A.  Surveys  of Firms
Opinion surveys of company  executives  have been frequently used to evaluate  the effectiveness
of tax incentives  (see Guisinger and Associates, 1985). An objective assessment of the impact of tax
measures is not possible through opinion surveys.  Opinion surveys do not provide data on observed
behaviour both before and after a policy change, and, hence, the validity of their results are doubtful.
In spite  of these limitations,  opinion  surveys  can serve as a useful complement  to more rigorous  empirical
analysis  of these issues.
Two recent opinion  surveys  have  explored  the effectiveness  of investment  incentives  in developing
countries. Guisinger  and Associates  (1985)  sought  to examine  the policies  of governments  and companies
towards foreign direct investment  in both developed  and developing countries.  In an attempt to be-74  -
comprehensive,  the study examined incentives  ranging from tariffs to free trade zones.  The study,
however, failed to provide any hard evidence  on the effe,tiveness of one or more such incentives. It
relied on a survey of opinions of company executives selected arbitrarily to  measure the impact of
incentives  on business location  decisions. The executives  were simply asked whether they would have
still located  in a particular country if no incentives  were offered to them by the country in question  but
competitor countries maintained their incentive  packages at their traditional levels.  The responses in
general were expectedly  negative. The respondents  indicated  that "in this hypothetical  case, the absence
of incentives would have affected their decision, even though, in the real instance, the presence of
incentive  was not a major factor in their decision"  (see Guisinger  and Associates, 1986, p. 166). In brief,
the Guisinger  study suffered from a poor choice  of questions  for the opinion  survey and purely arbitrary
sampling design 'i,e.,  stratified random sampling  procedures were not followed), and it failed to shed
any new light on the effectiveness  of tax measures  to stimulate  foreign direct investment.
Halvorsen  (1992)  has also analyzed  the Thailand  Board  of Investment's survey data on responses
by investors.  It is interesting  to learn that investors ranked exemption/reduction  of import duties on
machinery  and equipment  and of business  taxes as the most important incentive followed  by reduction
of import duties and business taxes on raw materials.  The corporate tax holiday was ranked third.
Permission  to bring in foreign technicians  was ranked as fourth.
B.  Estimation of Ad Hoc/Edectic Equations
This approach usually specifies private investment  to be a function of a host of independent
variables  including  tax related variables. Variables  selection  and model specification  is most often based
on a  'fishing expedition' for a high coefficient of multiple determination, R2. Ebrill (1987) uses
cross-section  data on 31 developing countries for  1980 to examine the effect of cost of capital on
investment.  The dependent  variable  was  the share of gross domestic  investment  in gross domestic  product
for 1980. Other than the cost of capital, independent  regressors included: average annual growth rate
of exports; share of minerals in exports; average annual growth rate of GDP; current account balance;
inflation  rate; and per capita GDP. He found that the coefficient  of the cost of capital was negative  and
significant  for the sample as a whole but when Argentina  and Chile-two high-inflation  countries-were
excluded, the cost was capital had the negative  sign but it was statistically  insignificant. Thus, Ebrill's
results only confirmed  a weak relationship  between  the cost of capital and the level of investment.- 75 -
C.  Investment Models
Investment  models could  be broadly classified  into the following  five categories:
(i)  The Flexible Capital  Stock Adjustment  Model, or the Accelerator  Theory of Investment;
(ii)  The Q-Theory;
(iii)  General Forwvard-Looking  Models;
(iv)  Effective  Tax Rate and Return-Over-Cost  Models; and
(v)  Marginal Effective  Tax Rate Models.
The above list of investment  models is not exhaustive. For example, the corporate finance literature
suggests that cash flow and pay-back period could be important considerations  in business investment
decisions. These ideas have not yet found application  in the empirical work on tax incentives. A brief
description  of the approaches  listed above is given in the following  paragraphs.
1.  The Flexible Capital  Stock Adjustnmnt  Model
The simple, or naive, form of the acceleration  principle postulates a certain fixed relationship
between the desired capital stock and output.  It is argued that tax incentives  affect investment  through
changes  in desired capital stock by reducing the relative price of capital.  Changes in the desired capital
stock then lead to changes  in net investment  (or disinvestment). Shah and Baffes (forthcoming)  utilize
this principle  in a production  structure approach  to examine  the effectiveness  of tax incentives  in Pakistan.
2.  7he Q-7heory
The essence  of Tobin's Q-theory model  is that a firm will invest  as long as a dollar spent buying
capital raises the market  value of the firm by more than one dollar.  Since q is defined as the ratio of the
market value of existing  capital  to its replacement,  then investment  will take place as long as q is greater
than unity.  Q-theory has not yet been used to analyse the effectiveness  of investment incentives  in
developing  countries.
3.  General  Forward-Looking  Models
The decision rule governing  investment  in General Forward-Looking  Models (GFL) is identical
to that in the Q-theory, but the two theories differ in how the unobservable  expectations  are related to
observable variables.  Unobservable expectations have been defined in  either one-  or  two-step
transformation  procedures.  The two-step procedure is based on a decomposition  of the investment- 76 -
problem into expectation formation, and given these expectations,  the decision to acquire investment
goods.  Expectations are based on lagged variablqs, and the parameters derived from expectations
equations  are used to forecast future variables that replace unobservable  expectations. These variables
are then used to estimate production and adjustment  parameters.  Rajagopal and Shah (forthcoming)
incorporate aspects of these models into a production structure framework to evaluate investment
incentives  in place in Mexico, Pakistan  and Turkey.
4.  Effective Tax Rate and Return-Over-Cost  Models
Feldstein  (1987) is the proponent  of an average  effective  tax rate approach  to incentive  evaluation.
Feldstein  posits that net investment  is dependent  on the net-of-tax  real return to capital.  The net-of-tax
real rate of return depends on the effective  tax rate which is defined as the ratio of a comprehensive
measure  of all taxes  assessed  on capital  income  to operating  income  less depreciation. Shah and Slemrod
(1991) explored  the relationship  between average effective  tax rate and inward foreign direct investment
and found it to be negatively  correlated.
The return-over-cost model (also presented by Feldstein) quantifies investment incentives by
contrasting  the maximum  potential  net return (MPNR) on a standard  investment  project with the cost of
funds (COF).  MPNR is influenced  by tax incentives. Whenever the MPNR exceeds the COF, firms
have an incentive  to acquire more capital.
S.  Marginal  Effecive Tax Rate Model
This broad approach attempts  to capture the provisions of the tax code that affect a marginal
investment. Tax incentives lower the marginal effective tax rate and thereby encourage additional
investment  in  the  tax-preferred  activity  until  after-tax  rates  of  return  are  equalized.
Industry/sector-specific  marginal effective  tax rates are often used to stimulate  investment  behaviour  on
an ex ante basis.
Marginal  effective  tax rate methodology  has been applied  to examine  the incentives  through the
corporate tax system in a number  of countries. Recent applications  include Brazil (Estache and Gasper,
1992),  Malaysia  (Boadway,  Chua and Flatters, 1992),  Mexico  (Shah and Slemrod, 1991), Korea (Kwack,
1988), ASEAN (Manasan, 1988), Philippines (Manasan, 1988), Sri Lanka (Shah, 1988), Colombia
(McLure and Zodrow, 1991), Thailand (Leechor and Mintz, 1991).  These studies conclude that tax
incentives  as currently  structured  in these  countries  generally  lead to windfall  gains to investment  actvities- 77 -
that would  have taken place anyway,  and have  little impact  on generating  new investment. Instead, often
the prevailing  incentives  accentuate  intersectoral  and ir,terasset  distortionary  effects  of taxation. Boadway,
Chua and Flatters find that tax holiday in Malaysia  imposes a penalty on the firms that are going to be
unprofitable  during the holiday  period, and therefore is highly unlikely to be of value to weak or infant
investors. Thus, while tax incentives  matter, they must be properly  designed  and targetted  to be effective
instruments  in furthering  public policy objectives.
The application  of marginal  effective  tax rate methodology  to determine  the incentive/disincentive
effect of Indirect  tax system has recently  been pioneered  by Boadway, Chua and Flatters (forthcoming).
They develop and apply such a methodology  to an examination  of the effects of indirect tax system in
Malaysia  and find that the distortionary  effects  of such taxes on investment  far exceeds  the distortionary
impact  of the direct tax system.  Such taxes were seen to penalize the export sector but provide a net
subsidy to import substitution  industries  and thereby undermine Malaysia's competitiveness. Boadway
et at's  conclusions  highlight an important  aspect of tax policy for investment  that is often overlookad  in
policy  debates. Their work  strongly  underlines  the importance  of elimination  of tax disincentives  through
the indirect  tax system as a first priority for investment  and export  promotion in most developing  nations.
Shah and Slemrod  (1991) examine  the tax sensitivity of foreign direct investment  in Mexico by
incorporating  marginal effective  tax rates on transfers and retained earnings in investment  equations.
They conclude that FDI in Mexico  is sensitive  to tax regimes in Mexico and the U.S.A., to the credit
status of multinationals,  to country credit ratings, and to the regulatory environment.
A major limitation  of the marginal effective  tax rate analysis is that it tells us nothing about the
actual behavioural responses to various incentives  per dollar of forgone revenues.  To  answer this
question,  one needs to use marginal effective  tax rates in further analysis  as done for example  by Shah
and Slemrod (1991).  Marginal effective tax rate analyses also usually ignore tax capitalization  and
foreign tax credit provisions.  These calculations can also be in error for ignoring other taxes and
non-tax  policies.  A cost of capital framework  embodied  in the production  structure models overcomes
the standard limitations  of an effective  tax rate analysis.
D.  The Production  Structure Approach
The essence of this approach is that taxes influence factor utilization, adjustment  and output
expansion  through changes  in factor prices and through  their impact  on technological  change. A dynamic
version  of this approach  (the  variable  profit  function)  recognizes  capital  as a quasi-fixed  factor in the short
run, so adjustment  can only take place at a cost and with significant  lags.  Thus the short-run impact  of78 -
tax policy would be signiflcantly  different from its long-run impact.  The approach  provides estimates
as to the stimulative (direct and induced) effects of public policy measures per dollar of foregone
revenues. It also yields as a by-product  shadow  prices of quasi-fixed  inputs, estimates  of elasticities  of
factor substitution,  output elasticities  of factor demand and own price elasticities  of product demand.
These elasticity  parameters  are useful for studies dealing with tax analysis, trade liberalization, cost of
capital and general equilibrium modelling of public policy changes.  Much of production structure
modelling  is of recent origin (see Bernstein and Nadiri, 1988) and Its applications  to tax incentives
evaluation in both industrial and non-industrial countries have just  begun (see Bernstein and Shah,
forthcoming,  Rajagopal  and Shah, forthcoming, Shah and Baffes, forthcoming  and Shah, 1992).
In order to estimate the impact of taxes on factor substitution,  technological  change and output
expansion,  one needs cost or profit functions  which embody  flexible  functional  forms with fewer a priori
restrictions. Typically,  the production  structure  of the economy  is unknown  to a policy analyst,  and often
Cobb-Douglas  and C.E.S functional  forms are assumed, as is common  in most CGE work. This choice
runs the risk of choosing a specification  that places inaccurate restrictions on output and factor price
elasticities and hence yields misleading  policy conclusions. Fortunately, in recent years, significant
advances  have taken place in modelling  production  structures  but empirical work is significantly  lacking
in tax policy implications  of this new technology  both in advanced  countries and developing  nations.
To estimate  the cost structure, one is faced with several modelling  strategies. Broad choices in
this respect include static and dynamic dynamic  formulations. A static equilibrium  framework  is easier
to implement  but is useful only under a special set of circumstances  when there are no indivisibilities  and
rigidities  in the system, and adjustment  is costless and instantaneous. These conditions  are unlikely to
be fulfilled in any practical economic  environment,  let alone in a developing country. This framework
would lead to misleading  policy prescriptions if quasi-fixed  factors indeed diverge from their static
equilibrium  levels in the short run.  Thus, it is essential  that appropriate  tests of static equilibrium  must
precede actual estimation  in this framework. This framework, in any case does not distinguish  between
short-run  and long-run behavioural  responses.
In an explicitly dynamic framework, on the other hand, factor disequilibrium  is recognized,
adjustment  costs  are explicitly  modelled,  and an expectation  hypothesis  is specified. The adjustment  costs
are usually  treated  as internal  to the firm, and are measured  by the reduction in output supply  that results
when  variable  factors are pulled away from producing  output  to adjust firm's capital  stock.  Thus, a firm
increases  its stock of a given quasi-fixed  factor as long as the present value of future additions  to output
is at least as great as the cost of bringing new capital  on stream as measured by the sum of the after-tax- 79 -
user cost of  capital and the reductions in current output attributable to  capital adjustment.  This
framework enables the researcher to  trace the dynamic adjustment  path under specified conditions.
Explicitly dynamic framewc ks have recently been utilized to address tax policy issues for developing
countries. These studies and their results are briefly reviewed  here.
Bernstein and Shah (forthcoming)  c. -elop a dynamic model of production (variable profits
function) to analyze the impact of tax policies on output supply and input demands for producers
operating in selected industries in Mexico, Pakistan  and Turkey.  Tax instruments considered include
corporate income  tax rate, investment  tax credit rate, investment  allowances,  capital cost allowance  rate,
payroll tax rate and sales tax rates on intermediate  inputs.  The dynamics of production in their model
arises from internal adjustment costs associated with the installation  of capital stock into production
process. Capital  inputs  differ from other  factors  of production  because  there are costs arising from capital
adjustment. Tbe model formulation  allows the speed of capital adjustment  to be estimated internally.
Besides the dynamic nature of the model, there are other interesting featulres.  Output supply is
endogenous  and is not solely a function of factor demand or of investment. Product markets are not
assumed  to be purely competitive. The nature of firm interdependence  governs the structure of product
markets. Lastly, there are financial capit.a mar.'ets imperfections,  as firms are constrained  by the rate
of return that can be earned on their financial capital. This model was applied to M. -can, detergents
and other chemicala  industries  using data for the period, 1970 to 1983; to Pakistani app irel and leather
products industries for the period 1966 to  1984; and to Turkish electrical machinery, non-electrical
machinery  and transport equipment  industries  for the period 1973  to 1985. Tax incentives  evaluated  for
these industries  included: investment  tax credits, investment  allowances,  accelerated  capital  consumption
allowances  and corpo.ate income  tax rate reductions. For each of these incentive  measures  estimates  on
revenue  losses per dollar of investment  were derived in short, intermediate  and long runs (see Table 4).
Bernstein-Shah  model  results suggest  that taxes  did matter  for production  and investment  decisions
for the six industries  analyzed in the three countries and further that some tax incentives  were more
effective  than others in investment  stimulation  per dollar of revenue loss to the treasury.  Among the
incentive  measures examined, investment  allowances  available  only to Turkish industries  proved to be
cost-effective instruments for  investment promotion; and  investment tax  credit  and  accelerated
depreciation  provisions  had a mixed success while corporate tax reductions  met with dismal failure in
promoting  investment  in a cost-effective  manner in all cases for all countries. In terms of their long run
impacts, investment  tax credits were cost-effective  in two of the four industries  studied but were only
marginally  cost-effective  in one of these two success cases. Accelerated  capital consumption  allowances- 80 -
also registered  a similar  performance  and had incremental  benefit-cost  ratio exceeding  one in the long run
for four out of seven industries studied with the r,atio being close to  1 in one of these four cases.
Corporate tax rate reductions stimulated investments but resulted in  revenue losses exceeding this
stimulative impact in all cases and in all runs considered  in this study.  Note that corporate tax rate
reductions  apply  to a larger base of pre-tax profits than the smaller base of current investments  relevant
for investment  tax credits.  In terms of the effectiveness  of tnese incentives by location, investment
allowances  worked well in Turkey while  in Mexico  both the investment  tax credit and accelerated  capital
consumption  allowances  met with mixed results and none of the incentives  worked well in Pakistan. In
Pakistan failure of the tax incentives regime in part may be attributable to political instability and
economic  uncertainty  for a significant  part of the period studied.
Shah  and Baftes (forthcoming)  employ  a flexible  accelerator  type dynamic  factor demand models
with endogenous  capacity  utilization  to examine  the effectivess  of tax incentives  available to large-scale
private manufacturing  industries in Pakistan using data for the period 1956 to  1985.  Tax incentives
measures evaluated include:  investment  tax credit, full expensing  of R&D investment  and corporate
income tax rate reductions.  They find that while investment  in physical and knowledge  capital were
sensitive to tax  measures, the elasticity values were without exception quite small.  Further, the
incremental  benefit-cost  ratios associated with changes in investment  tax credit and corporate tax rate
were smaller than one  in the short  run.  The full-expensing option for  R&D was found to  be
cost-effective  (see Table 4).
Rajagopal  and Shah (forthcoming)  argue that analyses  of the effectiveness  of tax incentives  can
be considerably  enriched by explicitly  incorporating  into the analyses  the industrial market structure of
the industry at hand.  They propose an empirical  procedure to test the market power hypothesis. Such
a test has important  implications  for the effectiveness  of fiscal incentives  for investment. If the producers
in an industry have market power, they may be able to shift taxes forward completely  so that any tax
incentive  would  simply result in windfall gains for the firms in such an industry.  On the other hand, in
a competitive  industry  producers are not able to shift taxes forward completely  so that tax incentives  can
stimulate investment. Rajagopal  and Shah test the market power hypothesis empirically  using data for
selected ir iustrits:  in Turkey, chemical and petroleum derivatives; in Pakistan, textiles as well as
chemicals and pharmaceuticals. In addition, they also examine the impacts of investment  tax credits
(credits against tax liability), investment allowances (deductions against taxable income) and R&D
expensing  on production and investment  decisions  and government  revenues. They introduce  three- 81 -
empirical innovations in this study.  First, they specify an expression for the rental price of capital
consistent  with rational  rather than static expectations. Second, instead  of assuming  perfect competition,
they implement an empirical test of market power.  Third, they empirically derive an  incremental
benefit-cost  ratio for each of the incentives  evaluated. They conclude  that firms in those industries  had
limited market power and were thus able to shift taxes forward only partially.  Thus, tax incentives  did
have an impact on production and investment  decisions  of firms in those industries.  These impacts,
however, varied greatly across  different industries  and in three out of five cases, tax incentives  measures
resulted in higher revenue losses as compared to their stimulative  impacts on investment  in physical or
knowledge capital (see Table 4).  Investment tax credit showed a mixed performance.  It was cost
effective for Pakistani chemicals and pharmaceutical industries but was ineffective for the textiles
industries.  Investment allowances also had little impact on  investment in Turkish chemicals and
petroleum derivatives industries.  R&D expensing was  stimulative for  Pakistani chemicals and
phatmaceuticals  industries  but was of minor consequence  for stimulating  investment  in Turkish chemicals
and petroleum  derivatives  industries.
In conclusion,  these econometric  results  suggest  that investment  promotion  objectives  are not well
served by corporate tax rate reductions in developing countries.  The use of investment  tax credit,
investment  allowances and accelerated capital consumption  allowances as a part of this strategy also
requires careful attention to their design (refundability  of investment  tax credits and carry forward of
investment  allowances  and accelerated  depreciations)  and close  monitoring  of their impacts  on investments
and government  revenues.
E.  Computable General EquiUbrium Models
A large majority of complex interactions in an economy are assumed away by partial equilibrium
analysis. An applied general equilibrium  model, on the other hand, can provide a disaggregated  view
of the economy  and thereby yield quantitative  estimates  of all important  interactions. It is, therefore, a
valuable  tool in assessing  relative merits of alternative  tax policy changes.
Applied general equilibrium analysis entails several sequential steps.  First,  basic data are
collected  from a variety of sources. These  data are then adjusted  for microconsistency. Next the choice
of model, functional  forms and elasticity  parameters  are specified. Parameter  values for model functions
are then determined  through calibration. A replication  test is carried out to check that the calibration
parameter values are consistent with the original data on quantities  and prices and the assumed model
structure.  Once this replication test is passed, a policy change is specified and a new (counterfiactual)- 82 -
equilibrium  is computed. Policy evaluation  is then  based on pairwise  comparison  between  the benchmark
and new equilibrium.
Four recent studies have employed computable general equilibrium analysis to  evaluate the
impacts of tax incentives. Clarete (forthcoming)  utilizes  a static general equilibrium model to examine
the effects of tax rebates and duty drawbacks on imported machinery and equipment by priority
industries. The author observes a strongly stimulative  impact  of these incentives  on investment. These
conclusions,  however, must be considered  tentative,  as the author employed  a static model.  The use of
a dynamic model might well lead to different qualitative  and quantitative  conclusions.
Trela and Whalley (1991) also utilize an applied general equilibrium model to exaqmine the
impact of rebates of direct and indirect taxes on exports, investment  tax credits, and tax holidays on
Korean growth performance.  They conclude that tax policy accounted for less than one-tenth of the
growth of the Korean economy during 1962-82. These results are, however, tentative as the model
developed  for this purpose did not explicitly  take into account  savings, investment  and the accumulation
of human capital. The authors nevertheless,  expect  these results to stand in a more complete  analysis  of
Korean growth performance.
Feltenstein and  Shah (forthcoming a,  forthcoming b) examine the relative efficacy of  tax
incentives by using disaggregated  dynamic computable  general equilibrium models for Mexico and
Pakistan. In both applications,  they find that while the investment  tax credit was more stimulative  in its
impact  on private capital  formation,  corporate  tax rate reductions  appeared  superior in terms of its impact
on aggregate  output and consumer  welfare.
VI.  Concluding Remarks
ITis has been a rather wide-ranging  survey  of some of the effects  of tax incentives  on the decision
to invest in developing  countries. Much of the discussion  has been of a conceptual  nature. This reflects
the fact that the investment decision is inherently  a rather complicated one which is not completely
understood. There are obviously  many factors which affect the decision to invest.  Only some of them
are conventional  price and income effects that economists are used to analyzing.  Our analysis has
concentrated  heavily on these effects.
At the same  time, there are many more intangible  influences  on the decision  to invest, many of
them specific to  a  given country.  These include the political  clinate,  the  reliability of  fiscal
commitments,  capital markets and the availability  of cash, and both economic  and political uncertainty.
It is very difficult  to capture all of these factors in an analytical  framework,  though some advances  have- 83 -
been made on a piecemeal  basis. It will ultimately  be up to empirical analysis  to indicate  how successful
investment  incentives  are likely to be in a given setting. To date, such empirical analysis  has been rather
limited, thoughi  that which exists is quite suggestive. We have provided a brief survey of some of the
more recent work.  Obviously,  much remains  to be done.
Even in the absence  of convincing  empirical  analysis,  there is much  to be learned from theoretical
reasoning  about the design of investment  incentives. In particular, the following  factors are important
considerations  to be addressed  in evaluating  and designing  investment  incentives  in developing  economies:
1.  The Effect on the METR.  Even simple tax incentives can have perverse effects on the marginal
incentive  to invest.  Many schemes  have relatively generous write-offs to begin with, so generous that
a negative  marginal effective tax rate is not uncommon. In these circumstances,  tax rate reductions
(including  tax holidays)  can discourage  investment. Investment  tax credits  are more likely to be effective.
2.  lhe Effect on Loss Firms.  Many of the firms that investment  incentives  are intended to assist are
those which are more likely to be in a loss position. These include small growing firms and finns in
risky environments. Incentives which do not have generous loss-offsetting  or refundability  provisions
will be of limited use in these circumstances.
3.  lhe  Effect on Cash Flows.  Firms in need of assistance may also be those which are relatively
strapped financially.  Imperfections  in capital markets may make it difficult to get outside financing.
Again, incentives  which improve the cash flows of firms may be much more effective  than those which
do not. The presence  of refundability  may be especially  important  here.  Simply  adopting cash  flow type
costing  principles with refundability  may be much more effective  than reducing  tax rates.
4.  Ihe Effect on Foreign  Firms. A significant  amount  of investment  in developing  countries is done by
foreign-owned  firms.  Since these firms are typically liable for taxation in their home countries, the
manner in which foreign tax crediting arrangements  apply is important  in designing  tax incentives. If
the value of the incentive is fully offset by reduced foreifn tax crediting, the incentive effect will be
minimal.
5.  Inter-Asset  Effects.  Many tax incentives  affect different types of investment  decisions in different
ways.  Thus, some measures may favor short- versus long-lived  capital, others may affect machinery- 84 -
relative  to inventory, while  others may favor some industries  relative to others.  In these case, while the
incentive  may encourage investment  selectively, it w,ill  also cause inefficiencies  from distortions in the
way in which capital is allocated.
More generally, there are a variety of other factors that must be considered in designing tax
incentives.  For one, inflation is typically quite high in developing  countries, and investment  can be
adversely affected by that  The system of incentives  should offset the effects of inflation.  Another
problem common in developing  countries is that of tax evasion. There has been relatively little work
done on the implications  of tax evasion  for investment  activity, but presumably  it is important. Also, one
of the more important  roles of investment  in developing  countries, especially  foreign investment, is to
facilitate  the transfer of technology. Investment  incentives  should be designed  with that in mind. There
may also be other non-economic  objectives  fulfilled by investment, such as social, environmental  and
regional.  Finally, taxes can have effects on the organization  of firms, and can encourage takeovers,
mergers  and bankruptcies. This should also be borne in mind in designing  tax incentives. Unfortunately,
the analysis  of investment  incentives  has not itself been developed  far enough  to take these considerations
into account.Table 1:  Marginal Effective  Corporate  Tax Rates for a Profit-making  Firm, 1983-87
Pre-1989 Budget  Reform
Year  Debt Financing  Retained  Earnings  Debt and Ret.Earn.
1983  -.0436  .0112  -.0223
1984  -.0433  .0098  -.0231
1985  -.0272  .0066  -.0155
1986  -.0277  .0054  -.0158
1987  -.0308  .0091  -.0118
Post-1989  Budget  Reform
Year  Debt Financing  Retained  Earnings  Debt and Ret. Earn.
1983  -.0331  .0073  -.0173
1984  -.0329  .0064  .0179
1985  .0207  -0043  -.0121
1986  -.0211  .0035  -.0123
1937  -.0235  .0060  -.0095
Source: Boadway, Chua, and Flatters
85Table 2:  Marginal  Effective Corporate Tax Rates  for a Profit-Making  Pioneer Firm, 1983
Pre-1989  Budget  Reform
Profile  Debt Financing  Retained  Earnings  Debt and Ret. Earn
Yr 1  -.0118  -.0135  -.0124
Yr 2  -.0158  -.0176  -.0165
Yr 3  -.0204  -.0219  -.0209
Yr 4  -.0255  -.0263  -.0258
- S.S.  -.0436  -.0112  -.0223
Post-1989  Budget  Reform
Profile  Debt Financing  Retained  Earnings  Debt and Ret. Earn.
Yr 1  .0302  .0365  .0325
Yr  2  .0301  .0353  .0320
Yr  3  .0300  .0339  .0315
Yr 4  .0296  .0324  .0307
S.S.  -.0331  .0073  -.0173
Source: Boadway,  Chua, and Flatters (1989)
86Table 3:  Marginal  Effective Corporate  Tax Rates for a Tax Loss Firm, 1983
Pre-1989 Budget  Reform
Year  Debt Financing  Retained  Earnings  Debt and Ret. Earn.
Yr 1  -.0022  .0294  .0101
Yr 2  -.0041  .0277  .0083
Yr 3  -.0064  .0259  .0061
Yr 4  -.0092  .0240  .0037
S.S.  -.0436  .0112  -.0002
Post-1989  Budget  Reform
Year  Debt Financing  Retained  Earnings  Debt and Ret. Earn.
Yr 1  -.0018  .0205  .0069
Yr 2  -.0030  .0191  .0056
Yr 3  -.0045  .0176  .0041
Yr 4  -.0062  .0160  .0024
S.S.  -.0331  .0073  -.0173
Source: Boadway, Chua, and Flatters (1989)
87Table  4
Investment  in Physical  and Research  Development  Capital
Per Dollar of Lost Tax Revenue
A Summary  of Empirical  Evidence  Based  on Dynamic  Production  Structure  Models
Authors  Intermediate
Tax Instrument  Short Run  Run  Long Run
Bernstein  & Shah  Investmnent  Allowance
(forthcoming)  Turkey: Electrical  Machinery  Industries  0.51  0.84  1.43
Turkey: Non-Electrical  Machinery  Industries  1.17  1.92  3.27
Turkey: Transport  Equipment  Industries  0.72  1.19  2.02
Investment  Tax Credit
Pakistan: Apparel Industries  0.16  0.29  1.07
Pakistan: Leather  Industries  0.07  0.12  0.27
Mexico: Detergents  Industries  1.29  1.71  1.90
Mexico: Other Chemical  Industries  0.50  0.66  0.74
Accelerated  Capital  Consumption  Allowances
Turkey:  Electrical  Machinery  Industries  0.36  0.60  1.02
Turkey! Non-Electric  Industries  0.83  1.37  2.33
Turkey: Transport  Industries  0.51  0.84  1.44
Pakistan: Apparel Industries  0.13  0.25  0.90
Pakistan: Leather Industries  0.06  0.10  0.23
Mexico: Detergents  Industries  0.96  1.26  1.41
Mexico: Other Chemicals  Industries  0.37  0.49  0.55
Corporate  Income  Tax Rate Reductions
Turkey: Electrical  Machinery  Industries  0.02  0.03  0.05
Turkey: Non-Electrical  Machinery  Industries  0.06  0.10  0.16
Turkey: Transport Industries  0.13  0.29  0.37
Pakistan: Apparel  Industries  0.001  0.002  0.007
Mexico: Detergents  Industries  0.03  0.04  0.05
Mexico: Other Chomicals  Industries  0.01  0.01  0.01
R*agopal & Shah  Investment  Tax Credit
Pakistan  Textile Industry  0.02  - 0.10
Pakistan  Chemical  & Pharmaceutical  Industies  2.60
Investment  Allowance
Turkish Chemicals  & l-etroleum  Derivatives  Industries
R&D Expensing
Paklstan  Chemical  & Pharmaceutical  Industries  1.75
Turkish Chemical  & Petroleum  Derivatives  Industries  0.008
Shah & Baffe  Investnent Credit
Pakdstan  Total Private Manufacturing  Industries  0.95
R&D  Expensing
Pakistan  Total Private Manufacturing  Industries  1.49
Corporate  Tax Rate Reductions
Pakistan  Total Private Manufacturing  Industries  0.71
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STATUTORY CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES














Greece  46  Productive  Inv.
under 1892 law  40
Ireland  40  Manuf.  10  20
Italy  36
Netherlands  40
Norway  state  27.8  prod or pipeline









Congo  49  public  & agricult.
business  36.4
Ivory Coast  40
Gabon  40  5
Ghana  50  real estate dev.
& farming  45




Mauritius  35  medical  & agriculturel5
Morocco  40
Nigeria  40  manuf, agric
& mining  20
97Table A.1 (cont.)
Standard  Special  Surcharge
Countrv  (%)
Senegal  35
South  Africa  50  9
Swaziland  37.5  mining  27




China, People's Rep.  40  10
Fiji  37.5
Hong Kong  16.5
India  45  private corp  50  15
Indonesia  35  public corp  40
Korea, Republic  of  34  7.5
Malaysia  35
Pakistan  30  10
Papau New Guinea  48  mining  35
petroleum  50
Philippines  35
Singapore  31  15
Taiwan  25
Thailand  35







Egypt  42  industrial  & export  34




Saudi Arabia  45
98Table A.1 (cont.)




Barbados  35  residential
construction  co.  20
Belize  45  oil prod. co.  50
public  co.  35
Bolivia  3  petroleum  40
Brazi1  30  agriculture  25  5
Chile  15
Colombia  30
Costa Rica  30
Dominican  Republic  46  3
Ecuador  25
El Salvador  30
Guatemala  34
Guyana  35  investment  co.  Nil
Hondurs  35  15
Jamaica  33.33  life insurance  7.5
Mexico  35




St. Lucia  33.3
Trinidad & Tobago  40  life ins.  15
petroleum  45
Uruguay  30
Venezuela  50  ,sn  60
oil co.  67.7
Source: Price Waterhouse  (1991). Corporate  Taxes:  A Worldwide  Summ.  New York.
99TABLE A.2
NQN-RESIDENT  CORPORATION  WrTHHOLDING  TAX RATES
Non-Treaty  Country  Treaty  Country
Country  Dividends  Interest  Royalties  Dividends  Interest  Royalties
rndustrial  Countries
USA  30  30  30  15-30  0-30  0-30
Canada  25  25  25  10-25  10-25  5-25
Australia  30  10  15-25  10  10-25
Japan  20  15/20  20  10-20  10-20  10-20
New Zealand  30  15  15  15-20  10-15  10-30
Austria  25  20  0-25  0-10  0-20
Belgium  25  10  25  10-20  0-25  0-25
Denmark  30  30  0-30  0-30
Finland  25  30  30  0-25  0-25  0-25
France  25  45  33.33  0-25  0-45  0-33.33
Gennany  25  25  25  15-25  0-25  0-25
Greece  42-50  46,10  25  25-50  0-46  0-25
Ireland  0  30  30  0-30  0-30
Italy  32.4  12.5-30  30  0-32.4  0-30  0-21
Netherlands  25  0-25
Norway  25  10-25
Portugal  30  20/25  15  12-15  10-15  5-15
Spain  25  25  25  5-18  0-15  5-15
Sweden  30  0  0-30
Switzerland  35  35  5-35  5-35
United Kingdom  0  25  25  0/10  0/25  0/25
Developing  Countries
Africa
Botswana  15  15  15  15  1.  15
Cameroon  25  15
Congo  20  15-30  20
Ivory Coast  12-18  9-18  20
Gabon  18  10  10
Ghana  30  30
Kenya  15  12.5  20  15  12.5  15-20
Liberia  15  15  30
Malawi  15  15  15
Mauritius
Morocco  15  10  10  5-15  10  10
Nigeria  15  15
Senegal  16  35
South Africa  15  0/15  7.5-15  0-15
Swaziland  15  10
Tanzania  20  20  30  10-20  12.5/20  15-30
Uganda
Zaire  20  20  20  0-30
Zambia  20  30  30  0/20  10  0-15
Zimbabwe  20  10  20  20  7.5-20
100Table A.2  Non-Resident  Corporation  Withholding  Tax Rates (Continued)
Non-Treaty Country  Treaty  Country
Country  Dividends  Interest  Royaltie.s  Dividends  Interest  Royalties
Asia
China, People's Rep  20  20  20  7-15  7-10  6-15
Fiji  30  15  25  15-20  10  10-15
Hong Kong
India  25  25  30  15-25  5-25  10-30
Indonesia  20  20  20  15-20  0-20  10-20
Korea, Republic  of  25  25  25  10-20  0-15  0-15
Malaysia  0 or 20  15  0-20  0-15
Pakistan  15  50-60  50-60  8-15  0-30  0-25
Papau New Guinea  17  48  10-30
Philippines  30-35  30-35  30-35  15-25  max 25  15-25
Singapore  31  31  0-25  0-25  0-25
Taiwan  35  20  20
Thailand  20  10-25  25  10-20  3-25  5-20
Western  Samoa  15  15  15
Europe
Cyprus  30  20-25  10  0-20  0-25  0-10
Czechoslovakia  25  25  25-30  0-25  0-15  0-25
Hungary  20  0-40
Malta  35  35  30-35  5-15  0-12.5




Egypt  32  25





Antigua  2021.6/28.8  20  25
Argentina  20  14.4  15  15-20  10-14.4  15-28.8
Barbados  15  15  25  0-15  5-15  0-15
Belize  25  25  25
Bolivia  10  25  10  10
Brazil  25  25  40  15-25  10-25  10-25
Chile  35
Colombia  19  30  25
Costa Rica  15  15  35
Dominican  Republic  35  35  18  18  18
Ecuador  36
El Salvador  22  22  22
Guatemala  12.5  25  34
Guyana  11.2-13.3  25  10
Honduras  15  5  35
101Table A.2  Non-Rusident  Corporation  Withholding  TAx  Rates (continued)
Non-Treaty  Country  Treaty  Country
Country  Dividends  In erest  Royalties  Dividends  Interest  Royalties
Jamaica  33.33  33.33  33.33  15-33.33  12.5-  0-10
33.3
Mexico  15-35  15/35
Netherlands
Antilles
Panama  10  50
Paraguay  10  30  30
Peru  10  0-45  28
St. Lucia  25
Trinidad & Tobago  25  25  20  5-25  0-30  0-30
Uruguay  40
Venezuela  20




Depreciation  Asset  Initial  Inventory  Accelerated
Country  Methods  Price  Allowance  Valuation  CCA
Industrial  Countries
USA  ACRS  FIFO,LIFO
Canada  DB  C/M
Australia  SL,DB  C/M/R  yes
Japan  SL,DB  CURR  All methods  yes
New Zealand  DB  C/M/R
Austria  SL  20%  MA
Belgium  SL,DDB  CIM/LIFO
Dernark  DB  30% ship ind.  C/M
Finland  DB  FIFO  yes
France  SL,DB  ClM/FIFO/AC
Germany  SL,DB  C/FIFO/L1FO
Greece  SL  CIMidIFO
Ireland  IME  CURR  C/M/LIFO/FIF  yes
0
Italy  SL  CURR  LIFO
Netherlands  SL.DB  C/M/FIFO/LIF
0
Norway  DB  CIM/FIFO
Portugal  SL,DB  C/AC/FIFO  yes
Spain  SL  C/AC/FIFO
Sweden  BOOK  't-A/FIFO
Switzerland  SL,DB  AC/FIFO
United  Kingdom  DB  C/M
Develoging  Countries
Africa
Boswana  SL  25% ind.Bldg.  C
Cameroon  SL  C/M
Congo  SL  C/M/LIFO  yes
Ivory Coast  SL  HIST  C/M/L1FO  yes
Gabon  SL  CIM/FIFO/AC  yes
Ghana  DB  10% Bldg.  C
25% mining
Kenya  DB  CURR  AC/M
Liberia  SL  HIST  LIFO
Malawi  SL  C
Mauritius  *  SL  HIST  30% ind./50%  C/M
hotels
Morocco  SL  FIFO/AC
Nigecia  SL  5-30%  FIFO
manuf.,cons.
Senegal  SL  C/M  yes
South Africa  DB,SL  C/M
Swaziland  DB  50% manuf.  FIFO/AC
103Table A.3 (continued)
Basis of
Depreciation  Asset  Initial  Inventory  Accelerated
Country  Methods  Price  Allowance  Valuation  CCA
Tanzania  SL\DB  C/NRV
Uganda  DB  C/M/FIFO
Zaire  SL  C/M
Zambia  SL,DB  C/M/FIFO
Zimbabwe  SL,DB  C/M  yes
China, People's Rep  SL  C/FIFO/WA  yes
Fiji  PC  30% mach.,  C/FIFO  yes
10% bldg.




India  WDV  HIST  C/M
Indonesia  WDV,SL  AC/FIFO
Korea, Republic  of  DDB,SL  CURR  C/M/LIFO
Malaysia  SL  C/M
Pakistan  DB,SL  C/M/L
Papau New Guinea  SL,DB  C/M/R
Philippines  SL  C/M
Singapore  SL  AC/FIFO
Taiwan  SL/DB  C/FIFO/LIFO  yes
Thailand  SL,DB,SD  C/M
Western  Samoa  DB  C/M
Cyprus  SL  HIST  C/FIFO  yes
Czechoslovakia  SL
Hungary  SL  C/FIFO/LIFO  yes
Malta  DB,SL  C/M
Turkey  DB,SL  AC
Soviet Union (Former)  SL  CP
Middle East
Egypt  DB,SL  HIST  LIFO/FIFO
Iran  DB,SL  C/M
Kuwait  SL  CURR  FIFO/LIFO
Oman  SL  FIFO/LIFO  yes
Saudi Arabia  SL  AC/FIFO
Western  Hemisphere
Antigua  DB  2% bldg  C/FIFO/AC
Argentina  SL  CURR  2% bldg.  C/M




Depreciation  Asset  Initial  Inventory  Accelerated
Country  Methods  Price  Allowance  Valuation  CCA
10-20%  oil
production
Belize  WDV  All methods
Bolivia  SL  R/NRV
Brazil  SL  C/M
Chile  SL  CURR  Repl.Cost  yes
Colombia  SL  HIST  LIFO
Costa Rica  SL,SD  C/FIFO/LIFO/A
C
Dominican  Republic  SL
Ecuador  SL  FIFO/AC/LIFO
El Salvador  SL,DB  FIFO/AC/LIFO
Guatemala  SL  AC/FIFO
Guyana  SL,DB  C/M  yes
Honduras  SL  C/M/LIFO
Jamaica  DB  Hist.  C/M
Mexico  SL  Curr.  M/LIFO
Netherlands  Antilles  SL,DB  LIFO  yes
Panama  SL,DB,SD  FIFO/LIFO/AC
Paraguay  SL  All Methods
Peru  SL  Curr.  AC/FIFO
St. Lucia  DB  20% ind.  C/M
bldg.& mach.
Trinidad  & Tobago  SL  C/M  yes
Uruguay  SL  FIFO/LIFO
Venezuela  SL  Hist.  C/M
SL=straight line, DB=declining balance, DDB=double declining  balance,
WDV=written down value, ACRS=accelerated  cost recovery  system,
IME=immediate  expensing, SD=surm  of year's digits, PC=prime cost
manuf=rmanufacturing,  ind. =industry, cons.  =construction
bldg. = building, mach.  = machinery, equip.  = equipment.
Source: Price Waterhouse  (1991).  Corporate  Taxes: A Worldwide  Summary. New York.
105TABLE  A.4
CORPORATE  TAX  HOLIDAYS
Period  Treatment  of
Country  (Years) Exemption  Depreciation  Treatment  of Losses  Other Features
Bangladesh  4-12  100%  Unused  mandatory  Not carried forward  5-30% of income
deductions  carried  after holiday  invested  in Government
forward  bonds.
Belgium  5  100%  Investments  relating to
real estate, land, plant
and equipment
Bolivia  10  100%
China  2  100%  Joint Ventures
Ecuador  5-15  100%  Special  Projects
France  10  100%  Investment  in
underdeve!oped  areas
Guatemala  10  100%
Ivory Coast  7-11  100%  Depreciation  can be  Carried forward  8 years National  Investment
deferred  indefinitely  Fund Levy - 10% tax
fully recoverable  at a
rate that varies
according  to type of
investment
Korea  5  100%
Malaysia  5-10  100%  Depreciation  delayed  Mandatory  deduction  of  Dividend  exempt from
until end of holiday  associated  non pioneer  personal tax
loss pioneer loss only
Malta  10  100%  carried forward  Export oriented
indefinitely  industries
Morocco  10-14  100% Zone IV Depreciation  mandatory-  Four years carry
50% Zone Im  carried forward in loss  forward
periods only
Pakistan  5-10  100%  Corporations
incorporated  in
Pakistan
Panama  20  100%  Established  in a
province other than
Panama and Colon
Philippines  5  100%
Thailand  3-8  100%  Depreciation  mandatory Pioneer and associated
50% for 5  non-pioneer  income and
additional  yrs  loss aggregated
Source:  Price Waterhouse  (1991). Corporate  Taxes:  A Worldwide  Summarv. New York.
106TABLE A.5
OTHER  TAX INCENTIVES
Investment  Tax  Investment
Credits  Allowances.  Export Incentives  Other Incentives
ndustral  oti
USA  An energy investment  Export related
credit is allowed  for  earnings  of certain
10% of inv. in  corporations
qualified  energy  receive  preferential
property.  Credit also  tax trectment
available  for
expenditures  related to
the rehabilitation  of
older business  real
estate
Car.a  20% tax credit for  resource allowance
research explort.on  equal to 25% of
incurred  in Canada.  resource  profits.
100% deduction  of  mining  &nd  oil and
intangible  exploration gas activities
costs
Australia  150%  deductions  for  Accelerated






Japan  3.5 or 5% of  yes
acquisition  cost for
mach. and equip.
New Zealaad  yes
Belgium  4% tax deduction  of
qualifying
investments.
Denmark  Long term
Danish state
loans at a low
rate of interest
Finland  yes, shipping  ind.
France  50% qualifying
research  expenditures
Greece  defined by Law 1892 yes  deduction  from
taxable  income of
1-3  % of total
exports
107Table A.5 Other Tax Incentives (continued)
Investment  Tax  Export
Country  Credits  Investment  Allowances  Incentives  Other Incentives
Industrial  Countries





Italy  Loans at low i
rates
Netherlands  18% deduction  on
Corp. taxes on
investment  up to
DflSl,000
Norway  23  % deduction  of pre tax
annual profit to a
consolidation  fund
Portugal  Only 80%
dividends  and 80 %
interest bonds are
subject  to tax
Spain  General 5% tax
credit may be
obtained  on new
fixed  assets R&D
15% tax credit on
intangibles
United  Kingdom  Regional  Selective
Assistance  grants




Botswana  extra tax reliefs on
revenue  or capital
account  will be granted
for specific  building
developments.
Cameroon  reduction  of 15% of the
customs  duties on
imported  assets and raw
materials.
Ivory Coast  40-60% deductibles  on  export subsidies
expenditure
Gabon  yes  New companies
108Table A.5 Other Tax Incentives (continued)
Country  Investment  Tax  Investment  Export Incentives  Other sienves
Credits  Allowances
Kenya  85% New building  yes
& hotels 35 %
Machinery
Liberia  yes
Malawi  40% long term
crops and land
clearing
Mauritius  30% Hotel  reduced  corp.
30% Building  tax 15%
Morocco  Exports S years
100%  exemption  of
income tax










Fiji  55% hotels  yes
Hong Kong  insurance &
ship co. special
tax provision
India  50% on new ships
aircrafts, and
machinery
Korea, Republic  of  Tax credit available
Malaysia  up to 100% of capital  5% of FOB value  yes
expenditure  on a  for exports
factory.
109Table A.5 Other Tax Incentives (continued)
Export  Other
Country  Investment  Tax Credits  Investment  Allowances  Incentives  Incentives
Pakistan  15% of the actual cost  55% rebate of
of machinery. Also  tax
available  on acquiring  attributable  to
machinery  or plant on  export sales
lease
Papau New Guinea  Exception  Quota
from income  protection
tax for 3
years
Philippines  50% deduction  of  yes
incremental  labor expenses
in special  areas
Europe
Cyprus  reduction  of taxable  90% of
income for scientific  profit.  .r
research and patents  divid,,.ds
Hungary  investment  rebates up to
100%  in manufacturing
industries  Available  for
joint venture
Malta  30% plant & machinery  Tax free profits distributed  yes
15% buildings  to share holders 12% tax
deductible  training  costs
Turkey  granted to comp. and
individual  tax payers at
rates of 40-60% of the
cost assets acquired in
connection  with specific
projects
Middle East
Kuwait  Soft & Long
term loans
Oman  15% of actual cost of  Rebate  of
machinery  50% of
export tax
110Table A.5 Other Tax Incentives (continued)
Country  Investment  Tax  Investment  Export Incentives  Other Incentives
Credits  Allowances
Antigua  An international
business company  may
be formed  with
exemption from local
taxation for 50 years
provided it doesn't
trade in Antigua
Argentina  Import duty
drawbacks,
nontaxable  tax
refunds Between  10-
15% of FOB value
export financing
Barbados  Exporters outside  the
CARICOM  have a
depreciation
allowance  of 120%
or 140%  of actual
cost.  Export
allowance  93 % on
sales where eligible
sales exceed  81% of
total sales
Bolivi&  upon approval,
alowance of
accelerated
depreciation  as a
deduction  of taxable
income
Brazil  Excise and sales  Sales of some capital
service tax  equipment  are exempt
exemptions  are  from state sales and
granted  to exporters  service taxes
of manufactured
goods
Chile  Reimbursement  of  Guaranteed  income
taxes
Colombia  selected  products
receive income  tax




tax certificates  20%
of invoice  value
111Table A.5 Other Tax Incentives (continued)
Country  Investment  Tax  Investment  Export Incentives  Other Incentives
Credits  Allowances
Costa Rica  50% of reinvested
profits deductible  firm
taxable income taxable
income
Dominican  Republic  up to 50% deduction
in projects  in tourism
and industry.
Ecuador  Mining and tourism  yes
industry  have special
tax treatment
El Salvador  50% reductiun  in  Full tax exemption
investment  in new  and unrestricted
machinery  and  remission  of profits
equipment
Guatemala  available  for  exempt of import
industries  outside  and duties on
county of Guatemala  machinery  and
equipment
Guyana  70% equipment  50% of exports
profits
Honduras  10-20%  rebate on
exports
Jamaica  Write off of 120%  of
cost of market
equipment  over a
period of time
Mexico  tax credits for  Duty free imports
expansion  of small &  products  to be re-
micro industries  exported
Netherlands  Antilles  8-12% Buildings  yes
Panama  exemption  of taxes
to encourage
expansion  of local
industries
Paraguay  Available
Peru  Exemption  from
income tax in
Frontier Zones
Source: Price Waterhouse  (1991). Corporate  Taxes:  A Worldwide  Summary. New York.
112Table A.6
TAX TREATMENT OF LOSSES
Countrv  Loss Carry Forward  Loss Carry  Backward
No. of Years  No. of Years
Industrial Countries
USA  15  3
Cinada  7  3
Australia  Indefinitely  1 orO
Japan  5





France  5  3
Germany  Indefinitely
Greece  5
Ireland  Indefinitely  3
Italy  5
Netherlands  8  3

























Country  Loss Carry Forward  Loss Carry  Backward






China, People's Rep.  5
Fiji  6
Hong Kong  Indefinitely
India  8
Indonesia  5 or 8
Korea, Republic  of  5
Malaysia  Indefinitely
Pakistan  6





Western Samoa  Indefinitely
Europe


















Countrv  Loss  Carry Forward  Loss Carry Backward




Costa Rica  3-5
Dominican  Republic  3
Ecuador  5










St. Lucia  6
Trinidad  & Tobago  Indefinitely
Uruguay  3
Venezuela  3
Source:  Price Waterhouse  (1991).  Corporate  Taxes:  A Worldwide  Summary. New York.
115Table A.7
SOURCE  RULES  FOR CORPORATIONS
Country  Rule  Treatment
Industrial  Countries
USA  Residence  Credit
Canada  Residence,  Source  Credit
Australia  Residence,  Source  Credit
Japan  Residence  Credit
Austria  Residence
Belgium  Residence  Credit,
Denmark  Residence  Credit
France  Source
Germany  Residence
Italy  Residence,  Source  Credit
Netherlands  Residence  Credit,
Norway  Residence  Treaty
Sweden  Residence,  Source  Credit
Switzerland  Residence  Credit





Morocco  Source, except dividends
Nigeria  Residence,  Source
Zimbabwe  Source, except interest
Zambia  Residence
Asia
China, People's Rep.  Source
Hong Kong  Source
India  Residence,  Source  Treaty
Indonesia  Residence  Credit
Korea, Republic  of  Residence,  Source  Credit
Malaysia  Source, foreign income received  Credit
Pakistan  Residence  Credit
Philippines  Residence,  Source  Credit
Singapore  Residence  Credit
Taiwan  Residence  Credit
Thailand  Residence,  Source
116Table A.7 (continued)
Country  Rule  Treatment
Europe
Hungary  Residence
Turkey  Residence,  Source
Middle East
Iran  Source
Saudi Arabia  Source
Western Hemisphere
Ecuador  Source,  Credit
interest and dividends
El Salvador  Source
Guatemala  Source  Credit
Honduras  Residence  None
Jamaica  Residence  Treaty,
Deduction
Mexico  Residence  Credit
Netherlands  Antilles  Residence  Treaty
Panama  Source
Peru  Residence  Credit
Trinidad  & Tobago  Residence  Credit
Uruguay  Source
Venezuela  Source, with exceptions
Source:  Prince Waterhouse  (1991). Corporate  Taxes: A Worldwide  Sunumary. New York.
Conrad (1989).
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